Defense policy in Brazil: bridging the gap between ends and means?

This article aims to analyze the Brazilian Defense Policy in terms of its ability to reduce the gap between ends and means. Since 2003, the Brazilian defense policy has evolved along with Brazil’s increased role in the international system. Sustaining this process depends on institutional, economic, and operational conditions that are yet to be fully guaranteed. They require negotiations, reforms, and strategic perspective. By identifying specific challenges emerging from the national security institutional framework, the combat capability building process, the budgetary cycle, as well as from the defense industrial base, we sought to explain their rationale and to offer concrete policy pointers to overcome obstacles. As a general conclusion, the Brazilian defense policy was strengthened by the 2008 National Defense Strategy (END) due to its clearer strategic goals. Bridging the gap between those ends and the proper means is a continuous effort for any given country, but in the case of Brazil it has been addressed with firmer steps since the END, even in the face of harder economic and political conditions.     

Reliability of a two-dimensional demand-based networked system with multistate components

Existing research on multistate system reliability has mainly focused on one-dimensional systems such as parallel systems, linear sliding window systems, and linearly consecutively connected systems. However, two-dimensional networked systems widely exist in real-world applications such as lighting systems, monitoring systems, and computer network systems. This research considers a two-dimensional networked system consisting of multistate components. The system fails if the cumulative performance of any row or any column cannot meet a predetermined demand. A novel reliability evaluation algorithm is proposed for the considered two-dimensional networked system by extending the universal generating function technique. Furthermore, the proposed model and reliability evaluation algorithm are extended to a two-dimensional networked system with phased missions. The proposed models and algorithms are illustrated by a matrix heating system in a thermoforming machine.     

库存控制条件下弹药供应链稳定性研究

由于弹药供应链系统中存在牛鞭效应问题,为了减少牛鞭效应对弹药供应系统的影响,研究系统的稳定性,建立了一阶弹药供应链系统。分析了弹药供应链系统的构成,对系统进行了数学建模分析与仿真验证分析。分析得出,决策参数调整系数β对弹药供应链系统稳定性的影响明显,部队需求量变化及订货量决策参数安全系数α影响较弱。并得出系统稳定时或系统出现震荡、混沌现象时调整系数β的取值范围。     

多架无人机协同作战的路径规划

提出了一种协调多架无人机的编队同时到达目标的航路规划方法.首先根据敌方防御区域内雷达、导弹等威胁阵地的具体分布情况,采用划分Voronoi多边形的方法制定初始航路,然后通过叠加定长线段到初始航路上对初始航路进行离散化,最后采用动态链类比法调整航路并对航路进行光顺优化处理,使航路安全可飞.并用数字仿真技术对该方法进行了验证,结果表明该方法是可行的.     

空战视景仿真系统通用框架研究

依据一个空战视景仿真系统的开发,系统分析了视景仿真系统的一般性规律和其管理框架。通过分析空战视景仿真系统的硬件、软件结构,着重提炼出不同的视景仿真系统的共性与特殊性。在软件设计过程中,对数据处理、实体管理和事件响应的设计,重视了设计模式的应用,将仿真系统的通用性、可拓展性与软件工程理论相结合,构建了一个可通用的,具有拓展性的视景仿真软件平台。视景仿真系统通用框架的研究,为设计更加灵活,更加适用的视景系统提供了理论基础;对于以后的视景仿真系统的设计,具有一定的参考价值。     

Technical note: Reexamination of all‐or‐none inspection policies in a supply chain with endogenous product quality

This note studies the optimal inspection policies in a supply chain in which a manufacturer purchases components from a supplier but has no direct control of component quality. The manufacturer uses an inspection policy and a damage cost sharing contract to encourage the supplier to improve the component quality. We find that all‐or‐none inspection policies are optimal for the manufacturer if the supplier's share of the damage cost is larger than a threshold; otherwise, the manufacturer should inspect a fraction of a batch. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Revenue sharing contracts in a supply chain with uncontractible actions

We consider a supplier–customer relationship where the customer faces a typical Newsvendor problem of determining perishable capacity to meet uncertain demand. The customer outsources a critical, demand‐enhancing service to an outside supplier, who receives a fixed share of the revenue from the customer. Given such a linear sharing contract, the customer chooses capacity and the service supplier chooses service effort level before demand is realized. We consider the two cases when these decisions are made simultaneously (simultaneous game) or sequentially (sequential game). For each game, we analyze how the equilibrium solutions vary with the parameters of the problem. We show that in the equilibrium, it is possible that either the customer's capacity increases or the service supplier's effort level decreases when the supplier receives a larger share of the revenue. We also show that given the same sharing contract, the sequential game always induces a higher capacity and more effort. For the case of additive effort effect and uniform demand distribution, we consider the customer's problem of designing the optimal contract with or without a fixed payment in the contract, and obtain sensitivity results on how the optimal contract depends on the problem parameters. For the case of fixed payment, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier to induce more service effort when the profit margin is higher, the cost of effort is lower, effort is more effective in stimulating demand, the variability of demand is smaller or the supplier makes the first move in the sequential game. For the case of no fixed payment, however, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier when the variability of demand is larger or its mean is smaller. Numerical examples are analyzed to validate the sensitivity results for the case of normal demand distribution and to provide more managerial insights. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Scheduling and due‐date quotation in a make‐to‐order supply chain

We consider a manufacturer, served by a single supplier, who has to quote due dates to arriving customers in a make‐to‐order production environment. The manufacturer is penalized for long lead times and for missing due dates. To meet due dates, the manufacturer has to obtain components from a supplier. We model this manufacturer and supplier as a two‐machine flow shop, consider several variations of this problem, and design effective due‐date quotation and scheduling algorithms for centralized and decentralized versions of the model. We perform extensive computational testing to assess the effectiveness of our algorithms and to compare the centralized and decentralized models to quantify the value of centralized control in a make‐to‐order supply chain. Since complete information exchange and centralized control is not always practical or cost‐effective, we explore the value of partial information exchange for this system. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Nash bargaining over allocations in inventory pooling contracts

When facing uncertain demand, several firms may consider pooling their inventories leading to the emergence of two key contractual issues. How much should each produce or purchase for inventory purposes? How should inventory be allocated when shortages occur to some of the firms? Previously, if the allocations issue was considered, it was undertaken through evaluation of the consequences of an arbitrary priority scheme. We consider both these issues within a Nash bargaining solution (NBS) cooperative framework. The firms may not be risk neutral, hence a nontransferable utility bargaining game is defined. Thus the physical pooling mechanism itself must benefit the firms, even without any monetary transfers. The firms may be asymmetric in the sense of having different unit production costs and unit revenues. Our assumption with respect to shortage allocation is that a firm not suffering from a shortfall, will not be affected by any of the other firms' shortages. For two risk neutral firms, the NBS is shown to award priority on all inventory produced to the firm with higher ratio of unit revenue to unit production cost. Nevertheless, the arrangement is also beneficial for the other firm contributing to the total production. We provide examples of Uniform and Bernoulli demand distributions, for which the problem can be solved analytically. For firms with constant absolute risk aversion, the agreement may not award priority to any firm. Analytically solvable examples allow additional insights, e.g. that higher risk aversion can, for some problem parameters, cause an increase in the sum of quantities produced, which is not the case in a single newsvendor setting. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Inducing coordination in supply chains through linear reward schemes

Decentralized decision‐making in supply chain management is quite common, and often inevitable, due to the magnitude of the chain, its geographical dispersion, and the number of agents that play a role in it. But, decentralized decision‐making is known to result in inefficient Nash equilibrium outcomes, and optimal outcomes that maximize the sum of the utilities of all agents need not be Nash equilibria. In this paper we demonstrate through several examples of supply chain models how linear reward/penalty schemes can be implemented so that a given optimal solution becomes a Nash equilibrium. The examples represent both vertical and horizontal coordination issues. The techniques we employ build on a general framework for the use of linear reward/penalty schemes to induce stability in given optimal solutions and should be useful to other multi‐agent operations management settings. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006