量子雷达的技术体制

当前,量子信息理论正在蓬勃发展,其应用已经深入到自然科学的各个领域.量子雷达是量子信息技术在目标探测上的具体应用,可探测隐身目标,具有超强的隐蔽性和机动性.主要介绍了量子雷达的分类、原理、系统组成、特点和关键技术问题.     

融合地理信息的粒子滤波被动跟踪算法

在粒子滤波机动目标跟踪中,为避免粒子集退化现象,通常采取大量的初始粒子数,因而带来了运算量大、跟踪精度低的问题.融合目标舰可能的航线及地理位置先验信息,将约束条件加入到粒子更新迭代中,对粒子的分布和权值进行调整.通过仿真对比加入约束前后算法的跟踪性能,可以看出融合地理信息后,较好地解决了粒子滤波计算量大的难题,提高了纯方位跟踪定位的精度.     

装甲车辆运动姿态实时仿真系统设计与实现

系统基于计算机仿真技术构建装甲车辆运动时的虚拟战场环境,利用自动控制技术和虚拟现实技术实现对装甲车辆运动姿态的实时仿真,采用同步建模和实时动态仿真技术实现机电系统与视景的同步仿真,从而保证了平台振动位置与由视景运动产生的位置变化一致.通过软、硬件互补的优化设计,提高了系统的抗干扰能力,实现了高仿真度、高质量的仿真通用平台的研制.该系统模型结构完整,参数选取精细,量化科学,三维图形实时性好,模拟程度逼真,工作可靠,维护方便,通用性强.     

一种消除瞄准线漂移的实现方法

由地球自转引起的瞄准线漂移是坦克火控面临的棘手问题。提出了一种基于惯性姿态信息的瞄准线漂移抑制方法,借助车载惯导系统,获得瞄准镜的地理坐标和姿态信息,计算出地球自转角速率在瞄准镜坐标系上的分量。伺服系统依此向两个方向的控制通道增加补偿值,由此抵消地球自转的影响,乘员就会感到瞄准线始终对准目标,而不会产生偏离,因而省去了频繁调整的工作。该方法既可用于坦克作战训练,也可用于机载或舰载稳瞄装置的调试。     

隐身飞机突防建模及低可探测性轨迹规划

针对隐身飞机突防飞行规划,分析了隐身飞机对警戒雷达网突防过程问题特性,建立了雷达探测模型与组网警戒雷达信息融合模型;综合考虑隐身飞机的隐身能力、预警时间和燃料消耗将隐身飞机低可探测性轨迹规划问题形式化为一个复杂多目标非线性连续时间最优控制问题;并提出基于伪谱法的低可探测性轨迹规划方法。仿真实验实现了在组网警戒雷达下隐身飞机的低可探测性突防轨迹规划,证明了方法的可用性和有效性。     

信息支援条件下协同空战态势评估研究

针对现有空战态势评估方法表现形式不够直观、模型简单的问题,提出一种将威力场与遗传神经网络相结合的态势评估方法,并将其应用于信息支援条件下的协同空战态势评估.分别从攻击能力、探测能力、电子干扰能力、生存能力、通信能力、告警能力、协同能力以及决策能力等方面构建威力势模型.利用遗传算法优化BP神经网络,并将其应用于编队作战能力评估.最后利用具体算例进行仿真验证,结果表明该方法是正确可行的.相比于传统态势评估方法,该方法在信息支援条件下的超视距协同空战态势评估中具有全面性、直观性、准确性等优势.     

基于Rényi信息增量的机动目标协同跟踪算法

针对基于多传感器组网进行机动目标跟踪的传感器管理问题,提出了一种基于Rényi信息增量的机动目标协同跟踪算法。首先结合"当前"统计模型和交互式多模型不敏卡尔曼滤波算法设计了一种变结构多模型算法,来进行机动目标的状态估计;然后以Rényi信息增量为评价准则,选择使Rényi信息增量最大的单个传感器进行目标跟踪;最后利用得到的最优加速度估计进行网格划分,更新变结构多模型中的模型集合。在一般机动及强机动场景下进行了算法性能分析,仿真结果表明,该算法能够合理地选择传感器,提高了对机动目标的跟踪精度。     

美军“作战信息中心”的概念、内涵及启示

自20世纪中叶,美军舰载指挥控制系统中频繁出现一个词“CIC（ Combat Information Center）”,由此,CIC作为舰艇中枢神经,几乎成为美军各型舰艇的标准配置。国内很多技术人员和参考书籍将CIC翻译成“作战情报中心”,这容易引起很多误解。注意CIC用词“Information”,不是“Intelligence”,一词之差、谬之千里,应该译为“作战信息中心”。侧重于对CIC的内涵进行剖析,试图揭示其内在的发展规律。 CIC的演化过程中蕴涵着美军在装备发展过程中的各种试错、实践、经验和教训,美军装备建设的严谨、求实和科学的成份,特别是其技术进步的持续性和连贯性,值得借鉴和思考。     

Timing of information acquisition in a competitive environment

This article investigates the impact of timing on sellers' information acquisition strategies in a duopoly setting. Market uncertainty is captured by a representative consumer who has a private taste for the product's horizontal attribute, and both sellers can acquire this information either before (ex‐ante acquisition) or after (ex‐post acquisition) observing their own product qualities. We identify several conflicting effects of information acquisition that vary significantly in its timing and market characteristics. In the monopoly scenario, information acquisition is unambiguously beneficial and ex‐ante acquisition is the dominant option, because it helps a seller not only design the proper product but also craft better pricing strategy. By contrast, when there is competition, information acquisition eliminates the buffer role of market uncertainty and leads to the fiercest production or pricing competition, which makes the subsequent effects of acquisition detrimental, and a seller's payoff is nonmonotonic in terms of its acquisition cost. Moreover, compared with the ex‐ante information acquisition, ex‐post information acquisition normally generates higher sellers' equilibrium payoffs by postponing the timing of acquisition and maintaining product differentiation. Nonetheless, ex‐post information acquisition also provides the seller with greater acquisition incentive and occasionally makes him worse off than that in the ex‐ante scenario. Thus, in a competitive environment, having the option of information acquisition and flexibility in its timing can be both detrimental and irresistible. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 3–22, 2016     

Should firms conceal information when dealing with common suppliers?

A firm making quantity decision under uncertainty loses profit if its private information is leaked to competitors. Outsourcing increases this risk as a third party supplier may leak information for its own benefit. The firm may choose to conceal information from the competitors by entering in a confidentiality agreement with the supplier. This, however, diminishes the firm's ability to dampen competition by signaling a higher quantity commitment. We examine this trade‐off in a stylized supply chain in which two firms, endowed with private demand information, order sequentially from a common supplier, and engage in differentiated quantity competition. In our model, the supplier can set different wholesale prices for firms, and the second‐mover firm could be better informed. Contrary to what is expected, information concealment is not always beneficial to the first mover. We characterize conditions under which the first mover firm will not prefer concealing information. We show that this depends on the relative informativeness of the second mover and is moderated by competition intensity. We examine the supplier's incentive in participating in information concealment, and develop a contract that enables it for wider set of parameter values. We extend our analysis to examine firms' incentive to improve information. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 62:1–15, 2015