基于仿真实验的弹道导弹阵地优选

合理部署弹道导弹位置对于提高作战效能具有至关重要的作用。基于解析计算的优化方法难以反映环境因素、武器装备的技术和动力特性等不确定性因素对部署位置的影响,求得的结果存在置信度低的问题。故将解析法与仿真实验相结合,以体系对抗条件下弹道导弹作战效能评估的数学模型为基础,建立了由各种作战实体和行动的模型聚合而成的弹道导弹攻防对抗仿真模型,然后通过仿真实验找出最优部署位置,最后给出了应用示例。实验表明该方法具有速度快、效率高、结果清晰直观的特点,可为指挥员提供科学、快速的决策支持。     

动物飞行控制技术在军事中的应用

半机械动物飞行器代表了微型飞行器的未来方向。文中对动物飞行控制技术仅作简要介绍,对半机械动物飞行器在军事领域中的应用价值和应用前景作了重点讨论．综述了近年来动物飞行控制技术的重要研究动态,结合甲虫机器人介绍了本实验室的近期研究成果。最后,基于动物飞行控制技术的研究瓶颈给出了动物飞行控制技术未来的研究方向。     

信息化条件下的军备控制

军备控制的目的是维护国家的安全和减少国家安全威胁.随着现代科学技术的发展和世界经济一体化进程的加快,国家安全威胁的因素与国家军事能力同步增长.尤其是现代信息技术的快速渗透和发展,不仅带来了安全隐患的增加,也加速了武器装备的更新换代,对国际军备控制产生了广泛的影响.     

信息化条件下鱼雷相关战术技术能力研究

针对信息化海战的特点和对鱼雷的要求,提出了在信息化海战条件下鱼雷应该具备的一些战术和技术能力,如在网络体系中及时可靠获取信息的能力、更强的对抗能力、先进的导航定位能力、远程的水声通信能力等,并对鱼雷航程和航速之间的关系重新进行了分析,以期为新型鱼雷的研制和开发提供一定的参考。     

弹性高超声速飞行器自适应极点配置控制

本文针对乘波体外形的高超声速飞行器存在的结构/推进/气动强耦合特性,利用鲁棒极点配置方法设计了自适应控制器,实现了对高超声速飞行器的速度和高度指令跟踪控制。控制器采用了Proportional-Integral-Filter(PIF)结构,该结构的控制器不仅能够使系统具备良好的稳态特性而且能够对控制信号进行滤波平滑,从而能够有效地抑制高超声速飞行器的弹性振动对控制系统的影响。基于弹性高超声速飞行器模型CSUAL_GHV,分别采用自适应鲁棒极点配置控制方法和自适应非鲁棒极点配置控制方法进行了数值仿真。结果表明,与非鲁棒极点配置控制方法相比,采用自适应鲁棒极点配置控制方法的控制系统不仅使飞行器能够很快地跟踪上速度和高度指令,跟踪误差小于1%,而且高超声速飞行器的弹性振动也得到了有效地抑制。飞行器在整个飞行过程中的飞行攻角均处于±2°范围内,满足超燃冲压发动机的工作要求。     

How Probable is Cyber War? Bringing IR Theory Back In to the Cyber Conflict Debate

Many well-established explanations for war suggest that cyber weapons have a greater chance of being used offensively than other kinds of military technologies. This response article introduces a research agenda for the study of cyber war, and offers an example – principal-agent problems in cyber operations – to demonstrate how rigorous theoretical and empirical work may proceed.     

Just How Important Are ‘Hearts and Minds’ Anyway? Counterinsurgency Goes to the Polls

Despite all the talk of ‘hearts and minds’ being the key to counterinsurgency, local public opinion is rarely studied and when it is, it often yields surprising conclusions. Through analyzing polling data from Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, this article shows that public opinion is less malleable, more of an effect rather than a cause of tactical success, and a poor predictor of strategic victory. As a result, modern counterinsurgency doctrine’s focus on winning popular support may need to be rethought.     

Dual‐ascent and primal heuristics for production‐assembly‐distribution system design

This article proposes two dual‐ascent algorithms and uses each in combination with a primal drop heuristic embedded within a branch and bound framework to solve the uncapacitated production assembly distribution system (i.e., supply chain) design problem, which is formulated as a mixed integer program. Computational results indicate that one approach, which combines primal drop and dual‐ascent heuristics, can solve instances within reasonable time and prescribes solutions with gaps between the primal and dual solution values that are less than 0.15%, an efficacy suiting it for actual large‐scale applications. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

防空兵网络化作战指挥控制方式

信息化条件下防空兵作战依托防空兵指挥信息系统,已经将防空兵各个作战要素联结到了一起,初步具备了网络化作战的雏形.而恰当的指挥控制方式是实施高效防空兵网络化作战的关键问题之一.首先剖析了防空兵网络化作战给指挥控制带来的新特点,而后构建了防空兵网络化作战指挥控制方式的概念模型,在此基础上提出了适应防空兵网络化作战的指挥控制方式是自适应指挥控制方式.并研究了防空兵网络化作战实施自适应指挥控制方式的必要性、可行性、内在机理以及实现的途径.     

A more complex and conventional victory: revisiting the Dhofar counterinsurgency, 1963–1975

Following the emergence of a communist regime in South Yemen and the multiplication of subversive movements in the United Kingdom's Gulf protectorates, British policymakers genuinely feared the spread of communism throughout southern Arabia. Defeating the People's Front for the Liberation for the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) insurgency in Oman's Dhofar province was considered central to preventing such an outcome. In their pursuit of victory, British officers overthrew the sultan of Oman, escalated the war by conducting attacks in South Yemen, and, ultimately, appealed to Islam as a means of rallying support against communism. However, lessons learned in previous counterinsurgencies (Malaya, Kenya, and Borneo) proved of only limited value in Oman's physical and cultural environment. Unfortunately, none of these measures worked as anticipated. Only Iran's direct military intervention and the dramatic growth of Oman's financial resources after the 1973 oil crisis provided the resources to conduct large-scale offensive operations. Even so, victory was only achieved in 1975 because the rebellion's leaders unwisely attempted to oppose the Anglo–Omani offensives conventionally.