ESCAPE FROM NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Since the post-World War II genesis of nuclear deterrence, two presidential initiatives have been presented to deliver humanity from the threat of its failure. The first was the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a constellation of space- and ground-based systems that President Ronald Reagan envisioned would render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” The second is President Barack Obama's roadmap to “a world without nuclear weapons,” commonly referred to as “Global Zero.” While these proposals appear to have little in common, deeper investigation reveals a number of provocative similarities in motivation and presentation. Moreover, both generated fierce debate, often with ideological overtones, about their strategic desirability and technical feasibility. We use these parallels, as well as prominent dissimilarities, to draw lessons from the SDI experience that can be applied to the debate over Global Zero.     

THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP

ABSTRACT

Since the 1990s, the group of stakeholders working to combat biological weapons (BW) proliferation has broadened to include new actors who have not traditionally focused on security issues, including organizations from the public health sector, researchers in the life sciences, and the biosafety community. This has had significant benefits for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the arms control establishment more broadly. However, the BWC's agenda has become increasingly dominated by issues of international health and global health security. By focusing solely on response strategies, the United States and other interested parties risk losing sight of other important elements of a counter-BW strategy, including deterrence and prevention. Focusing on public health-related issues to the exclusion of more traditional security matters puts the nonproliferation regime at risk, because it limits the amount of time that stakeholders have available to grapple with the critical questions facing the BWC and the biological weapons nonproliferation establishment—questions that must be answered if the regime is to survive.     

Models of scientific and technological review for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

ABSTRACT

Science and technology (S&T) review is key to anticipating developments in the life sciences that may benefit or run contrary to the aims of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. It serves as a mechanism for both preparing against novel biological threats and identifying the best opportunities for developing and sharing the life sciences to the fullest extent. In the age of rapidly advancing biotechnology, S&T review needs to be wide ranging, involve a diverse set of inputs, and be transparent about its methods and data. This viewpoint considers four models of S&T review and their capacity to respond to the challenge of the life sciences: standing advisory boards; ad hoc working groups; peer review; and wikis. It then identifies a hybrid model that is suitably broad, diverse, and transparent.     

The Armoury Gauging System and Interchangeable Manufacture

Abstract

Scientifically analysing important artefacts from the site of historic battles is vital if the best information is to be retrieved from the field. A detailed knowledge of the specific equipment that was available to the combatants from a known battle is also required at a high level so that artefacts and fragments resulting from an historic battlefield archaeological survey can be recognised when found. Access to specialists from all walks of life is required throughout each battlefield-related project, from the fieldwork stages to the dissemination of information. The following paper discusses the importance of working alongside museums and specialists and gives examples of how the Towton Battlefield Archaeology Project has successfully worked with the staff at the Royal Armouries Leeds.     

How Probable is Cyber War? Bringing IR Theory Back In to the Cyber Conflict Debate

Many well-established explanations for war suggest that cyber weapons have a greater chance of being used offensively than other kinds of military technologies. This response article introduces a research agenda for the study of cyber war, and offers an example – principal-agent problems in cyber operations – to demonstrate how rigorous theoretical and empirical work may proceed.     

C~3I决策系统的Petri网建模技术

综述了Ｃ３Ｉ决策系统的若干Ｐｅｔｒｉ网建模方法。首先介绍了Ｃ３Ｉ系统的一般Ｐｅｔｒｉ网建模技术和时间Ｐｅｔｒｉ网建模技术,并介绍了随机Ｐｅｔｒｉ网建模技术;然后介绍了谓词Ｐｅｔｒｉ网和有色Ｐｅｔｒｉ网建模技术。最后指出了Ｃ３Ｉ决策系统中,Ｐｅｔｒｉ网的若干研究方向。     

关于C3I系统发展中的几个理论难题

在对Ｃ~３Ｉ系统综合评论的基础上,提出了Ｃ~３Ｉ系统发展中的几个理论难题。即：系统一般理论问题;数据融合理论与算法;指挥决策理论问题;管理职能问题;火控理论新问题;智能Ｃ~３Ｉ问题     

Petri网在C3I系统建模分析和综合中的应用

近十多年来,Ｐｅｔｒｉ网理论被广泛应用于Ｃ３Ｉ系统的建模分析和综合设计中,并取得了很多成果。本文就这一领域的研究理论进行综述,并对将来的可能发展方向作一展望     

移动式C3I系统导航定位问题的建模和仿真

未来战争是高新技术的对抗,我们要立于不败,就必须积极主动,知己知彼,避免被动挨打。为此,发展移动式Ｃ３Ｉ系统势在必行。移动式Ｃ３Ｉ系统的一个关键问题就是系统的导航定位问题的处理。作者立足实际,为移动式Ｃ３Ｉ系统建立了系统的导航定位问题的模型。针对引起系统导航定位的各种误差原因予以分析,建立了误差模型并进行了仿真,最后给出仿真结果     

毁歼概率积分的高精度计算

精确地计算武器系统对目标的毁歼概率是重要的。在对几种数值积分方案比较的基础上,证明了Ｇａｕｓ－Ｈｅｒｍｉｔ数值积分方案可以最少的积分点达到最高的精度,并以此方案计算了各个参数对毁歼概率的影响