Putin – the masked nemesis of the strategy of ambiguity

Recent events demonstrate the complex and adaptive approach employed by Russia to reassert influence in Europe. The changing face of Russia’s strategy commenced in 2007 when it launched a crippling cyber-attack against Estonia. This was followed by a large Russian conventional attack against Georgia in 2008, occupying two large areas of the nation. 2014 witnessed the Russian annexation of Crimea where in just a week, Russia seized control of Crimea “without firing a shot.” The annexation of Crimea was rapidly followed by a Russian inspired and led subversive war in eastern Ukraine. The common thread among these diverse Russian operations is its use of ambiguity to confound and confuse decision makers in the West.     

基于贝叶斯网络的作战目标评估

在作战指挥决策活动的筹划阶段,对敌体系要害和关键点的分析,当前尚未形成系统方法。针对此问题,利用贝叶斯网络在非精确知识表达与推理领域的优势,提出了综合考虑目标价值、打击难度、打击效果等因素的作战目标评估模型。根据判别贝叶斯网络分类器性能优于生成贝叶斯网络分类器的特点,在经相关领域专家论证的样本数据集的基础上,采取梯度下降法训练得出评估模型各结点条件概率分布。最后,利用Netica仿真软件,经样本数据测试,证明了作战目标评估模型的合理性。     

面向工业物流服务的智能车及循迹算法的研究

将工业物流服务的智能循迹小车作为研究对象,并结合循迹算法原理,采用混合遗传算法,设计了智能循迹小车。经测试验证,小车能准确接收配送任务,按需求将物件运送到指定工位并语音播报提示,在行驶过程中能够自动避障,并在执行任务过程中能够将输运信息上传至上位机进行实时数据处理。最后,搭建了工业物流模拟服务平台,实现了对运送全程的追踪记录,进而提高工业生产自动化的程度,降低制造企业的生产成本,促进企业信息化建设。     

电子战飞机远距支援干扰阵位配置建模与仿真

针对电子战飞机远距支援干扰新体制雷达阵位配置问题进行研究。首先是对电子战飞机干扰效能量化分析,从俯仰和方位两个方面对干扰覆盖范围进行建模仿真。基于干扰统一方程,建立干扰阵位配置优化模型,包括阵位配置区域和阵位配置高度模型,并给出了干扰阵位配置参数的具体计算方法。最后,通过仿真实例验证模型的有效性,结果表明该模型对于电子战飞机阵位配置有一定的指导意义。     

机载光电传感器视轴指向的智能辅助决策方法

机载光电传感器视轴应尽可能接近目标线,以缩小指向偏差而不使目标偏离传感器瞬时视场,飞行员在复杂的战场态势下进行视轴操控具有一定困难。针对该问题,提出了一种机载光电传感器视轴指向的智能辅助决策方法,该方法以传感器视轴指向的数学模型为基础,通过专家知识建立引导规则,完成目标与各传感器的配对;计算配对后的各传感器视轴指向偏差和偏差变化率,采用模糊控制算法得出视轴偏移率,引导各传感器视轴指向与之配对的目标。仿真结果表明了该方法能够合理引导各传感器视轴指向目标,并能将视轴指向偏差缩小在很小的范围。     

新型空间绳系机器人逼近动力学建模及控制

为弥补传统空间机器人操作范围小,风险高的缺点,介绍了一种新型空间绳系机器人系统。建立其任务核心的逼近动力学模型,基于反馈线性化技术和神经网络控制技术设计智能逼近控制系统,仿真结果验证了控制系统的有效性,为新型近距离空间操作技术的发展奠定基础。     

When Peacekeepers Fail Thousands are Going to Die. The ETO in Rwanda: a Story of Deception

This study develops the concepts of fourth generation operations and the associated principles. First, the concept of fourth generation operations is introduced and defined. Fourth generation operations are the evolution and extension of third and fourth generation warfare based on a change of tactics, technology, and combatants. These operations are currently ongoing in Afghanistan and Iraq, and with the global war on terrorism. Based on the framework of US joint doctrine, the supporting principles of fourth generation operations are developed. This requires the introduction of the principle of Population Perception.     

The sources of the Australian tradition in irregular warfare, 1942–1974

This article had its genesis in a background study for the development of a new Australian Army counter-insurgency doctrine. Archival research showed that the Australian counter-insurgency doctrine employed in such post-1945 conflicts as Burma, Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam originated in the jungle campaigns of the South West Pacific Area during World War II. The historical record also showed that the Army's counter-insurgency doctrine, as with its World War II-jungle warfare doctrine, was a pragmatic amalgam of Australian experience and British doctrine. The article traces this process through the development of a series of doctrine manuals. It also considers the contribution of key individuals to both counter-insurgency theory and practice. This distinctively Australian approach to the development of doctrine was responsible for producing a highly successful manual, The Division in Battle: Pamphlet No. 11, Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (DIB 11), which the Army used during its involvement in Vietnam.     

Bush path to self-destruction: Charles Taylor and the Revolutionary United Front

This article explains the demise of Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebellion. It argues that the main cause of this fate was the group's relationship with its primary sponsor, Charles Taylor. The RUF's dependency on Taylor's patronage, coupled with the rebellion's weak organisational endowments harmed the group's prospects of success. Based on original research, the article shows how Taylor used the RUF as a strategic instrument for his own regional interests, which led to the group's unravelling. More broadly, the article speaks about proxy warfare in Africa and how the relationship between resource flows and rebellion are not always beneficial to rebels as one might expect.     

Boko Haram’s increasingly sophisticated military threat

ABSTRACT

This paper evaluates Boko Haram’s military capabilities and details the process of how its standing army, driven by these capabilities, came to pose a phased threat between 2013 and 2015 in particular. This was a period when military fighting dominated the insurgency in north-east Nigeria. Whereas there is an abundance of literature on Boko Haram’s histories and the impact of its insurgency on north-east Nigeria, analysis of Boko Haram’s military campaigning is still deficient. Attempting to fill this gap, this paper uses field findings and battlefield case studies from north-east Nigeria to highlight how Boko Haram’s overt front – its standing army – came to supplant its guerrilla operations as the main security threat to the frontier area.

This pivot towards military fighting, for a group initially composed of a few ragtag combatants, on the surface might seem surprising. Yet, whereas Boko Haram may lack the popular support required for ‘people’s war’, classic insurgency theories nevertheless hold some explanatory power for this deliberate shift: away from guerrilla warfare as the expedient of the weaker side, and towards the use of a large standing army of locals to swarm, and sometimes successfully overrun, state forces.