北斗三号新信号体制共视时间比对

为促使北斗系统特别是北斗三号系统尽早加入国际原子时计算,利用中国科学院国家授时中心以及捷克无线电工程和电子学院两个守时实验室接收机产生的北斗三号新信号体制观测数据,开展基于北斗三号新信号体制共视时间比对试验。结果表明,北斗三号信号的多路径噪声影响小于北斗二号信号,且信噪比优于北斗二号信号。对比已有的研究,北斗三号新信号体制(B1C和B2a)共视时间比对的噪声相对于北斗三号卫星播发的北斗二号兼容信号体制(B1I和B3I)有较大的改善,其结果与GPS、Galileo共视比对结果相当,且在零基线共钟比对中,基于北斗三号新信号体制比对钟差的标准偏差相对于北斗二号信号提高了40%以上;利用北斗三号新信号体制共视得到的亚欧两地钟差噪声小于北斗二号信号,且比对钟差的稳定度相对于北斗二号提高了10%以上。该试验也可为北斗三号时间比对纳入国际原子时计算提供相关的研究基础。     

Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, by Daniel H. Joyner. Oxford University Press, 2011. 192 pages, $100.     

A NEW STANDARD FOR PREEMPTIVE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST WMD THREATS

International law clearly requires an imminent threat of attack as a justification for the preemptive use of military force. However, the standard definition of an imminent threat was derived centuries before the development of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or ballistic missiles and other delivery systems that can reach their targets in a matter of minutes. Any use of force to alleviate threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) prior to tactical warning of the actual launch of such weapons falls into the legally and ethically controversial category of “anticipatory self-defense,” leaving decision makers potentially liable to prosecution for war crimes. Effective and ethical enforcement of nonproliferation therefore demands a standard for imminence of threat broad enough to allow military action as a last resort but sufficiently restrictive to prohibit indiscriminate action against suspected WMD programs. Following a critical review of selected literature and cases on preemption, the author proposes a new standard for preemptive military action: the existence of operational WMD, or a clandestine program to develop WMD, in contravention of international law. The author discusses the implications of this new proposed standard, which at the time of writing would permit preemptive attack against WMD-armed terrorist groups but prohibit it against all states except Iran and possibly North Korea.     

A Novel Framework for Safeguarding Naval Nuclear Material

ABSTRACT

The present international standard allows non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to forego safeguards when nuclear material is used in a “non-proscribed military activity,” though no criteria have been established to determine when NNWS can remove naval nuclear material from safeguards. Though at present, only nuclear-armed states possess nuclear submarines, the global nuclear naval landscape may soon change with the advancement of Brazil's fledgling program and the possible precedent it would set for other NNWS. A framework is needed to shore up nuclear security and prevent nuclear material diversion from the nuclear naval sector. Proposed and existing nonproliferation frameworks, including a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and commitments through the nuclear security summits, are insufficient to close this loophole. A Naval Use Safeguards Agreement (NUSA), modeled after the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency, would provide a framework to remove the opacity surrounding nuclear material in the naval sector. Designed for NNWS and encouraged as confidence-building measures for nuclear weapon states, NUSA would explicitly outline those stages in the naval nuclear fuel cycle where safeguards are to be applied and in what context. This viewpoint also further provides direction for targeted research and development in technical naval nuclear safeguards solutions.     

COERCION OR PERSUASION?

From 1961 to 1963, an interagency debate took place within the Kennedy administration as to whether to use persuasion or more coercive means in order to multilateralize nuclear safeguards, that is, to make the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the administrator of safeguards on bilateral nuclear exports from the United States. Persuasion as a general rule was deemed preferable, in order to make the many states that had misgivings about IAEA safeguards accept multilateralization. The coercion-persuasion debate followed years of trying to establish a "common front" among Western nuclear suppliers with regard to nuclear safeguards. Disagreement about the intrusiveness of the system proved a major obstacle, but eventually a common position reflecting the need to take international opinion into consideration was agreed. The adoption of the first IAEA safeguards document in 1961 created for the first time a common standard for the application of safeguards. This was a prerequisite to the U.S. policy of transferring to the IAEA the administration of safeguards on bilateral nuclear agreements. The resulting multilateralization of safeguards laid the groundwork for the IAEA to become the universal safeguarder in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons-an unforeseen outcome, since at the outset, IAEA safeguards were perceived as a "holding operation" while waiting for a disarmament agreement.     

BEYOND DECLARATIONS OF INTENT

This essay explores the obligations arising from the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, signed in Palermo, Italy at the end of 2000. It also discusses the initiatives required to prepare the legal system and related infrastructure of Zimbabwe for its implementation. Zimbabwe joined more than 120 other countries in signing the Palermo convention, but has not yet ratified it. The ratification would enshrine the latest initiatives to develop effective strategies against transnational organised crime. The Palermo convention makes demands on the laws and institutions of states parties which could enhance their capacity to confront organised crime. Ratification signifies competence to implement the prescribed obligations, which can only occur after introducing suitable domestic laws, and adopting the necessary administrative mechanisms. The required reforms are bound to have certain policy and legislative implications for Zimbabwe. Regional initiatives complementary to the Palermo convention are expected to catalyse positive changes in Zimbabwe's response mechanisms.     

美国退出《中导条约》与俄美关系发展走向

2018年10月,美国宣布单方面退出《中导条约》。《中导条约》是美苏两国在冷战后期达成的,并得到了切实执行的条约,对于维护冷战后全球战略平衡发挥了至关重要的作用。冷战后,俄美曾经企图将《中导条约》多边化,构建俄美新型战略关系,但最终反目成仇,使得俄美关系严重倒退,并迈入新的相互战略遏制的时代。     

Artificial intelligence & future warfare: implications for international security

Recent developments in artificial intelligence (AI) suggest that this emerging technology will have a deterministic and potentially transformative influence on military power, strategic competition, and world politics more broadly. After the initial surge of broad speculation in the literature related to AI this article provides some much needed specificity to the debate. It argues that left unchecked the uncertainties and vulnerabilities created by the rapid proliferation and diffusion of AI could become a major potential source of instability and great power strategic rivalry. The article identifies several AI-related innovations and technological developments that will likely have genuine consequences for military applications from a tactical battlefield perspective to the strategic level.     

Poland's national potential and its international position within the European Union – research remarks

This article examines Poland's national potential and its international position within the European Union (EU) with respect to security issues. It presents research results based on a comparison of Poland's national potential as it relates to other EU countries, which is useful when evaluating Poland's power within the EU. The article also evaluates Poland's crisis potential, i.e. it identifies those factors that may potentially be treated as threats to national and regional security. Finally, it enables the identification of challenges to Poland's security in the second decade of the twenty-first century. The research is conducted according to a multidimensional comparative analysis, which is perceived by the author as the best available to measure a country's power despite its weaknesses.