伊拉克战争对国际政治格局的影响

美国凭借其强大的势力肆意出兵攻打伊拉克。这一结果虽不能使国际政治格局发生重大变化 ,世界多极化的趋势不能改变 ,但它进一步强化了美国的单边主义思想 ,使世界多极化的进程受到严峻挑战 ,同时也将改变中东地区的力量对比 ,重塑中东地区的政治格局 ,也使联合国的权威和地位受到了严重的挑战。     

The 1983 Nuclear Crisis – Lessons for Deterrence Theory and Practice

This article distills insights for the scholarship of deterrence by examining the 1983 nuclear crisis – the moment of maximum danger of the late Cold War. Important contributions notwithstanding, our understanding of this episode still has caveats, and a significant pool of theoretical lessons for strategic studies remain to be learned. Utilizing newly available sources, this article suggests an alternative interpretation of Soviet and US conduct. It argues that the then US deterrence strategy almost produced Soviet nuclear overreaction by nearly turning a NATO exercise into a prelude to a preventive Soviet attack. Building on historical findings, this article offers insights about a mechanism for deterrence effectiveness evaluation, recommends establishing a structure responsible for this endeavor, and introduces a new theoretical term to the strategic studies lexicon – a ‘culminating point of deterrence’.     

EXPORT CONTROLS AND INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS

Export controls and international safeguards are central to ensuring international confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear materials and technologies and to achieving adequate oversight on the transfer and use of nuclear materials, technology, and equipment required for the development of proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Although the independent strengths of export controls and international safeguards rely largely on universal adherence, there may be opportunities to exploit the shared strengths of these systems. This article provides background information on the separate evolution of export controls and international safeguards, considers how these two elements of the nonproliferation regime interact, and identifies some possible avenues that could, over time, lead to wholly integrated activities.     

INVESTIGATING THE RUBBLE OF SYRIA'S SECRET REACTOR

Damascus has severely impeded an investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into Syria's construction of a covert nuclear reactor, which was destroyed in a 2007 Israeli air strike. Pressing Damascus to cooperate with the inquiry is necessary to ascertain that there are no other undeclared activities in Syria, to determine the role of North Korea in the construction of the reactor, and to help prevent future clandestine efforts. With Damascus doing its best to avoid the investigation, securing Syrian cooperation will require adept diplomacy backed by the prospect of special inspections and, if necessary, a referral to the UN Security Council. The case of Syria's secret reactor highlights areas in which the IAEA needs buttressing, from the enhanced sharing of information, to reporting that is less political and more forthright. The case also illustrates the downside of politicizing IAEA investigations and supports the new director's apparent intent to return the agency to its core technical tasks.     

北斗三号新信号体制共视时间比对

为促使北斗系统特别是北斗三号系统尽早加入国际原子时计算,利用中国科学院国家授时中心以及捷克无线电工程和电子学院两个守时实验室接收机产生的北斗三号新信号体制观测数据,开展基于北斗三号新信号体制共视时间比对试验。结果表明,北斗三号信号的多路径噪声影响小于北斗二号信号,且信噪比优于北斗二号信号。对比已有的研究,北斗三号新信号体制(B1C和B2a)共视时间比对的噪声相对于北斗三号卫星播发的北斗二号兼容信号体制(B1I和B3I)有较大的改善,其结果与GPS、Galileo共视比对结果相当,且在零基线共钟比对中,基于北斗三号新信号体制比对钟差的标准偏差相对于北斗二号信号提高了40%以上;利用北斗三号新信号体制共视得到的亚欧两地钟差噪声小于北斗二号信号,且比对钟差的稳定度相对于北斗二号提高了10%以上。该试验也可为北斗三号时间比对纳入国际原子时计算提供相关的研究基础。     

美国退出《中导条约》与俄美关系发展走向

2018年10月,美国宣布单方面退出《中导条约》。《中导条约》是美苏两国在冷战后期达成的,并得到了切实执行的条约,对于维护冷战后全球战略平衡发挥了至关重要的作用。冷战后,俄美曾经企图将《中导条约》多边化,构建俄美新型战略关系,但最终反目成仇,使得俄美关系严重倒退,并迈入新的相互战略遏制的时代。     

基于CHARTER机制的减灾卫星调度问题研究

针对CHARTER机制下的减灾卫星(主要为成像卫星)调度问题进行了研究,介绍了CHARTER机制的工作流程,指出CHARTER机制下的减灾卫星调度实质上是一个针对区域目标的重调度问题。在此基础上提出一种改进的区域目标划分算法,并提出基于启发式规则的动态卫星重调度算法,最后通过应用实例证明了所提算法的正确性和有效性。     

A NEW STANDARD FOR PREEMPTIVE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST WMD THREATS

International law clearly requires an imminent threat of attack as a justification for the preemptive use of military force. However, the standard definition of an imminent threat was derived centuries before the development of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or ballistic missiles and other delivery systems that can reach their targets in a matter of minutes. Any use of force to alleviate threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) prior to tactical warning of the actual launch of such weapons falls into the legally and ethically controversial category of “anticipatory self-defense,” leaving decision makers potentially liable to prosecution for war crimes. Effective and ethical enforcement of nonproliferation therefore demands a standard for imminence of threat broad enough to allow military action as a last resort but sufficiently restrictive to prohibit indiscriminate action against suspected WMD programs. Following a critical review of selected literature and cases on preemption, the author proposes a new standard for preemptive military action: the existence of operational WMD, or a clandestine program to develop WMD, in contravention of international law. The author discusses the implications of this new proposed standard, which at the time of writing would permit preemptive attack against WMD-armed terrorist groups but prohibit it against all states except Iran and possibly North Korea.     

COERCION OR PERSUASION?

From 1961 to 1963, an interagency debate took place within the Kennedy administration as to whether to use persuasion or more coercive means in order to multilateralize nuclear safeguards, that is, to make the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the administrator of safeguards on bilateral nuclear exports from the United States. Persuasion as a general rule was deemed preferable, in order to make the many states that had misgivings about IAEA safeguards accept multilateralization. The coercion-persuasion debate followed years of trying to establish a "common front" among Western nuclear suppliers with regard to nuclear safeguards. Disagreement about the intrusiveness of the system proved a major obstacle, but eventually a common position reflecting the need to take international opinion into consideration was agreed. The adoption of the first IAEA safeguards document in 1961 created for the first time a common standard for the application of safeguards. This was a prerequisite to the U.S. policy of transferring to the IAEA the administration of safeguards on bilateral nuclear agreements. The resulting multilateralization of safeguards laid the groundwork for the IAEA to become the universal safeguarder in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons-an unforeseen outcome, since at the outset, IAEA safeguards were perceived as a "holding operation" while waiting for a disarmament agreement.