India's Evolving Nuclear Posture

This article analyzes India's nuclear doctrine, finding it to be critically flawed and inimical to strategic stability in South Asia. In pursuing an ambitious triad of nuclear forces, India is straying from the sensible course it charted after going overtly nuclear in 1998. In doing so, it is exacerbating the triangular nuclear dilemma stemming from India's simultaneous rivalries with China and Pakistan. Strategic instability is compounded by India's pursuit of conventional “proactive strategy options,” which have the potential to lead to uncontrollable nuclear escalation on the subcontinent. New Delhi should reaffirm and redefine its doctrine of minimum credible nuclear deterrence, based on small nuclear forces with sufficient redundancy and diversity to deter a first strike by either China or Pakistan. It should also reinvigorate its nuclear diplomacy and assume a leadership role in the evolving global nuclear weapon regime.     

The Requirements of Nuclear Stability in South Asia

While recent history arguably demonstrates a high level of nuclear stability in South Asia, this article argues that this stability has historically been a function of India's relative weakness. It argues that, as India becomes stronger, attention must be paid to the technical and political requirements of nuclear stability: the reliability of weapons and command and control and the political conditions that underpin stable relations between nuclear-armed states. It concludes by recommending the United States aim to modify the perceptions of regional elites about their various intentions and decision-making processes and the role of the United States as crisis manager.     

Understanding the ‘failure’ of the Séléka rebellion

This paper examines the downfall of the Séléka rebellion, which staged a coup in the Central African Republic in March 2013. The coup plunged the country into violence and chaos, and there has been an uneasy quest for peace ever since. This article explains why the leader of the rebellion lost control over his troops and was finally pushed by regional actors to leave power. The article concludes that the Séléka rebellion was already fragile and, together with the poor leadership demonstrated by the coalition leader, the rebellion was unable to hold on to power.     

China's Nuclear Forces and Their Significance to India

The Indian nuclear program is a response to a perceived politico-strategic threat from China as opposed to a military-operational one that New Delhi began after perceiving an “ultimatum” from China in 1965. Consequently, India is in the process of acquiring an assured second-strike capability vis-à-vis China to meet the requirements of general deterrence. While India has always been concerned about the Sino-Pakistani nuclear/missile nexus, China has become wary of the growing military ties between the United States and India in recent years, especially because of the military implications of the US-India civil nuclear deal. Given the growing conventional military gap between the two states, India is not lowering its nuclear threshold to meet the Chinese conventional challenge. Instead, India is upgrading its conventional military strategy from dissuasion to deterrence against China. While the overall Sino-Indian nuclear relationship is stable, it will be challenged as China acquires advanced conventional weapons that blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear conflict.     

Pakistan's Evolving Nuclear Weapon Posture

This essay provides an overview of the ongoing quantitative and qualitative changes in Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and their impact on deterrence stability vis-à-vis India. Prominent among these trends is a major expansion in fissile material production that enables the manufacture of lighter and more compact warheads optimized for battlefield missions; the development of cruise missiles and shorter-range ballistic missiles possessing dual-use capabilities; and a greater emphasis in doctrinal pronouncements on the need for strike options geared to all levels of conflict. Although these trends pose problematic ramifications for the risks of unauthorized and inadvertent escalation, deterrence stability in South Asia is not as precarious as many observers fear. The challenges of fashioning a robust nuclear peace between India and Pakistan cannot be lightly dismissed, however, and policy makers would do well to undertake some reinforcing measures.     

Is the Indian Nuclear Tiger Changing Its Stripes?

Sixteen years after stepping out of the nuclear closet, India's nuclear posture, some of its operational practices, and hardware developments are beginning to mimic those of the original five nuclear weapon states. Several proliferation scholars in the United States contend that India's national security managers are poised to repeat the worst mistakes of the superpowers’ Cold War nuclear competition, with negative consequences for deterrence, crisis, and stability in South Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. This article takes a contrarian view. It dissects the best available data to show why the alarmist view is overstated. It argues that not only are the alarmists’ claims unsupported by evidence, their interpretation of the skeletal and often contradictory data threatens to construct the very threat they prophesize.     

美军战略传播的发展特点及启示

美军通过战略传播的整合力量对其形象建构进行了卓有成效的探索与实践。在分析梳理美军战略传播概念的提出背景及其演进过程的基础上,总结归纳了美军实施战略传播的特点。同时,结合分析对外宣传中面临的问题与挑战,借鉴美军战略传播的有益做法,提出了改进的建议与措施。     

双高速摄像机交汇的高旋弹丸位姿估计算法及误差分析

为了测量高旋弹丸在炮口处的各种信息,基于双高速摄像机交汇的测量方法,提出了一种新的弹丸位姿估计方法.对总攻角函数进行了误差建模与分析,结果表明两台高速摄像机的光轴应相互垂直,且应选择光轴远离攻角平面的高速摄像机所对应的测量函数计算总攻角,此时测量误差最小.以靶场实验的方式对攻角函数的误差分析结论和位姿估计算法进行验证....     

论人的防御火灾意识的更新

通过分析人的素质、行为和能动作用 ,揭示人类防御火灾意识偏低的原因 ,指出人类要实现人与自然协调发展 ,减少火灾的侵袭 ,就必须提高人的素质 ,规范人的行为 ,发挥人的主观能动作用。     

任职院校国防生自尊、自我效能感及个性特征的研究

调查任职院校国防生自尊、自我效能感状况及其个性特征,为任职培训期间开展教育和管理工作提供参考。采用自尊量表（SES）、一般自我效能感量表（GSES）、艾森克人格问卷（EPQ）以及自编问卷方法,对535名任职院校国防生进行调查。结果显示：任职院校国防生自尊水平与专业、是否学员骨干等因素有关;自我效能水平与居住地等因素有关;任职院校国防生人格特征与军校生和军人群体相对接近,但与大学生群体有所不同。可见,对任职院校国防生进行教育管理时,应该重点从提高国防生的自尊和自我效能感水平入手,更好地维护和提高国防生在任职培训期间的心理健康水平。