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371.
针对目前效能评估方法多重视效能指标的静态观测值,对时序状态数据所蕴含的趋势信息关注较少的缺点,提出基于灰色聚类-粗糙集和集对分析的备件保障效能动态评估方法。针对主客观赋权方法各自的优缺点,引入依赖度和重要度的概念,建立灰色聚类-粗糙集组合赋权模型;将指标权重引入集对理论,提出集对同势、均势和反势的定义,描述备件保障效能的变化规律,构建基于马尔可夫链的集对分析动态模型。实例分析结果表明,该方法可以有效反映备件保障效能的动态变化特征,为决策者制定备件保障长期计划提供科学依据。  相似文献   
372.
A defender wants to detect as quickly as possible whether some attacker is secretly conducting a project that could harm the defender. Security services, for example, need to expose a terrorist plot in time to prevent it. The attacker, in turn, schedules his activities so as to remain undiscovered as long as possible. One pressing question for the defender is: which of the project's activities to focus intelligence efforts on? We model the situation as a zero‐sum game, establish that a late‐start schedule defines a dominant attacker strategy, and describe a dynamic program that yields a Nash equilibrium for the zero‐sum game. Through an innovative use of cooperative game theory, we measure the harm reduction thanks to each activity's intelligence effort, obtain insight into what makes intelligence effort more effective, and show how to identify opportunities for further harm reduction. We use a detailed example of a nuclear weapons development project to demonstrate how a careful trade‐off between time and ease of detection can reduce the harm significantly.  相似文献   
373.
We consider the multitasking scheduling problem on unrelated parallel machines to minimize the total weighted completion time. In this problem, each machine processes a set of jobs, while the processing of a selected job on a machine may be interrupted by other available jobs scheduled on the same machine but unfinished. To solve this problem, we propose an exact branch‐and‐price algorithm, where the master problem at each search node is solved by a novel column generation scheme, called in‐out column generation, to maintain the stability of the dual variables. We use a greedy heuristic to obtain a set of initial columns to start the in‐out column generation, and a hybrid strategy combining a genetic algorithm and an exact dynamic programming algorithm to solve the pricing subproblems approximately and exactly, respectively. Using randomly generated data, we conduct numerical studies to evaluate the performance of the proposed solution approach. We also examine the effects of multitasking on the scheduling outcomes, with which the decision maker can justify making investments to adopt or avoid multitasking.  相似文献   
374.
We consider the shortest path interdiction problem involving two agents, a leader and a follower, playing a Stackelberg game. The leader seeks to maximize the follower's minimum costs by interdicting certain arcs, thus increasing the travel time of those arcs. The follower may improve the network after the interdiction by lowering the costs of some arcs, subject to a cardinality budget restriction on arc improvements. The leader and the follower are both aware of all problem data, with the exception that the leader is unaware of the follower's improvement budget. The effectiveness of an interdiction action is given by the length of a shortest path after arc costs are adjusted by both the interdiction and improvement. We propose a multiobjective optimization model for this problem, with each objective corresponding to a different possible improvement budget value. We provide mathematical optimization techniques to generate a complete set of strategies that are Pareto‐optimal. Additionally, for the special case of series‐parallel graphs, we provide a dynamic‐programming algorithm for generating all Pareto‐optimal solutions.  相似文献   
375.
针对动态环境下的传感器-武器联合任务管理问题展开研究。根据在动态作战过程中出现的有效新目标、有效空闲传感器和武器数量设定阶段门限,以决定进入下一阶段的时机,从而构建多阶段的作战过程。从打击方案质量及系统响应时间的角度出发,分析构建分布式作战体系对系统作战效能的影响,使系统在每个任务管理阶段可以决定响应流程。通过仿真实验验证了所构建的分布式作战体系与设定的阶段门限可以明显提升系统的作战效能。  相似文献   
376.
Multi‐issue allocation situations study problems where an estate must be divided among a group of agents. The claim of each agent is a vector specifying the amount claimed by each agent on each issue. We present a two‐stage rule. First, we divide the estate among the issues following the constrained equal awards rule. Second, the amount assigned to each issue is divided among the agents in proportion to their demands on this issue. We apply the rule to two real‐world problems: the distribution of natural resources between countries and the distribution of budget for education and research between universities.  相似文献   
377.
掌握电磁态势是联合作战的制胜前提之一。通过梳理联合作战电磁态势信息面临的需求,分析现阶段联合作战电磁态势生成面临的主要挑战,并提出对策建议。研究表明,优化电磁态势产品类型、生成模式和显示界面,有利于指挥人员认知和把握电磁态势,促进联合作战行动效能发挥。  相似文献   
378.
The primary objective of this work is to introduce and perform a detailed study of a class of multistate reliability structures in which no ordering in the levels of components' performances is necessary. In particular, the present paper develops the basic theory (exact reliability formulae, reliability bounds, asymptotic results) that will make it feasible to investigate systems whose components are allowed to experience m ≥ 2 kinds of failure (failure modes), and their breakdown is described by different families of cut sets in each mode. For illustration purposes, two classical (binary) systems are extended to analogous multiple failure mode structures, and their reliability performance (bounds and asymptotic behavior) is investigated by numerical experimentation. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 167–185, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.10007  相似文献   
379.
Negotiations between an end product manufacturer and a parts supplier often revolve around two main issues: the supplier's price and the length of time the manufacturer is contractually held to its order quantity, commonly termed the “commitment time frame.” Because actual demand is unknown, the specification of the commitment time frame determines how the demand risk is shared among the members of the supply chain. Casual observation indicates that most manufacturers prefer to delay commitments as long as possible while suppliers prefer early commitments. In this paper, we investigate whether these goals are always in the firm's best interest. In particular, we find that the manufacturer may sometimes be better off with a contract that requires an early commitment to its order quantity, before the supplier commits resources and the supplier may sometimes be better off with a delayed commitment. We also find that the preferred commitment time frame depends upon which member of the supply chain has the power to set their exchange price. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2003  相似文献   
380.
We consider a simple two‐stage supply chain with a single retailer facing i.i.d. demand and a single manufacturer with finite production capacity. We analyze the value of information sharing between the retailer and the manufacturer over a finite time horizon. In our model, the manufacturer receives demand information from the retailer even during time periods in which the retailer does not order. To analyze the impact of information sharing, we consider the following three strategies: (1) the retailer does not share demand information with the manufacturer; (2) the retailer does share demand information with the manufacturer and the manufacturer uses the optimal policy to schedule production; (3) the retailer shares demand information with the manufacturer and the manufacturer uses a greedy policy to schedule production. These strategies allow us to study the impact of information sharing on the manufacturer as a function of the production capacity, and the frequency and timing in which demand information is shared. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2003  相似文献   
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