测时差定位的误差分析及表征方法

测时差无源定位具有很高的测量精度,但是时差定位在不同的定位区域定位误差差异非常大,更为重要的是误差区域分布形状复杂,用传统的误差半径和误差面积都很难表征具体点误差在军事上的意义.引入了概率椭圆来表示目标的概率分布,可较好地表征不规则的误差分布,有很强的军事应用价值.并给出了目标处于不同位置时的概率椭圆算法.     

基于VISA和SCPI的自动校准程序开发

描述了在VC++环境中开发的基于VISA接口标准的射频半实物仿真系统校准自动测试程序.利用VISA函数与接口无关、与操作系统无关、与编程环境无关的特点,通过GPIB总线和SCPI标准命令对矢量网络分析仪进行程序控制,达到空间辐射信号精确测量的目的,实现了目标阵列的宽带特性校准.     

基于几何关系的视线指令制导律研究

针对近程车载防空系统拦截空地导弹的制导问题,设计了一种视线指令制导律.首先建立了地面站、拦截弹和空地导弹三者之间相对运动模型,然后以控制拦截弹位于地面站和空地导弹连线上为目标,根据三者在空间的几何关系设计了一种视线指令制导律,并对拦截的可行性进行了分析.仿真结果验证了所设计的制导律能够有效保证地面站的安全,与比例导引律相比,提高了制导精度,缩短了拦截时间.     

空舰导弹火控系统精度分析研究

介绍了一种空舰导弹火控系统动态精度试验的试验方法、误差分析理论和方法.用导弹火控系统的数据测量设备获取火控系统输出射击诸元参数实际值,再测量载机和靶船的位置和运动参数,经真值解算模型解算出射击诸元参数标准值.将实际值与标准值进行比较与分析,即可得知空舰导弹火控系统的动态精度是否满足要求.此方法已成功地应用于导弹火控系统精度飞行试验中.     

Country survey VI: Australia

Australia is a geographically large country, with the world's longest national coastline to defend, but a relatively small economy of some 17.5 million people. Since World War II, Australia has faced the dilemma of how to structure defence policy in the absence of an identifiable threat. Its policy of self‐reliance aims to permit Australia to conduct defensive operations in the event of low/medium level threats without depending immediately on its allies. This is to be achieved through the technological sophistication of defence equipment, a highly professional but small defence force and local industry support.

The burden of defence, measured as the share of defence outlay in GDP declined from about 3% in 1971–72 to about 2.3% in 1993–94. It has been the Government's policy to encourage the development of local defence‐related industry, in particular in areas such as: electronics/optics; communications and information technology; aerospace; shipbuilding and repair, munitions; and land vehicles. However, defence procurement has a small impact on the Australian economy as a whole.     

Missile systems: “Flexible modularity” and incremental technological change in military production∗

It is often stated that technological change in the military field is characterised by the introduction of radical innovations rather than by incremental processes of technological change. This article illustrates the diversity of military innovation by arguing that technological change in missiles systems is dominated by incremental change. While some large weapons platforms display the design rigidities normally associated with complex systems, missiles are characterised by “flexible modularity”. Flexible modularity facilitates the continuous introduction of upgrades, and makes missile systems amenable to gradual technological change. Besides, it has significant implications for the future role of missile systems, and poses special problems for missile disarmament and technology control initiatives.     

The ‘African COP’

The 17th Conference of the Parties (COP17) had been anticipated as the ‘African COP’, not only due to the African venue but also due to the opportunity it would afford African countries – with South Africa at the helm – to steer the debate on a global climate change regime. With the conference now over, lobby groups, international organisations, negotiators, observers and commentators alike have been taking stock of its outcome. Despite the litany of developmental and security implications of climate change, COP17 got underway with little hope that much might actually be achieved. In light of the discouraging condition of the global economy, with leading developed economies suffering financially, states were hardly in a mood to be making concessions that would impact their fiscal health. Nonetheless, an agreement was reached. Questions remain, however, about the significance of the outcome of the African COP for the world at large, but ultimately also for Africa.     

UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S ANTISATELLITE TEST

In discussing China's January 2007 hit-to-kill intercept of the Chinese weather satellite FengYun-1C, most American analysts sought the “message” for the United States—either by asserting that China's test was a deliberate step toward a comprehensive counterspace capability to offset U.S. conventional military superiority or an attempt to force the United States to the negotiating table on “the prevention of an arms race in outer space.” Chinese officials, after a long silence, eventually claimed the test was an “experiment” that was “not targeted at any country.” We traveled to China several times in 2007 and had a series of conversations with Chinese individuals knowledgeable about the history of this particular antisatellite program and with access to information about the decision-making process prior to and after the final test. These discussions were off the record, not for attribution, given the sensitivity of the subject. They reflected the views of some of the key institutions involved in the test from the State, the Communist Party, the People's Liberation Army, and aerospace experts involved in debris calculations. The information conveyed to us suggests that American commentators tend to place much greater importance on the United States as a driver in China's decision to develop the technology and conduct the test than do the Chinese.     

ALBANIA'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS CON

In 2003, the Albanian government declared that in late 2002 it had discovered a heretofore unknown cache of 16 tons of chemical weapons. Tirana requested and received assistance from the West in securing and destroying the materials, a task completed in 2007. Albania has been lauded for its responsible handling of the discovery and for being the first nation to complete the destruction of its chemical weapons under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This article argues that the Albanian government has always knowingly possessed the weapons, keeping them a secret until a post-September 11, 2001 international focus on weapons of mass destruction made it politically worthwhile for Tirana to declare and destroy them. The likelihood that the governments of the West turned a willful blind eye to this chain of events is troubling for the credibility of the CWC and confidence in nonproliferation measures in general. Finally, the author recommends measures to avoid and address similar situations in the future.     

舰空导弹武器系统抗击能力评估

舰空导弹武器系统抗击能力通常会随着舰空导弹单次射击而发生变化,为增强舰空导弹武器系统抗击能力评估方法的实用性,提出了一种新的舰空导弹武器系统抗击能力评估方法,进而构建了舰空导弹单次射击能力评估方法。算例证明,本文提供的方法可以有效评定单艘水面舰艇上单个舰空导弹武器系统在作战使用环境下的抗击能力。