线性唯象传热规律下热机内可逆热经济学研究

对符合线性唯象传热规律(q∝Δ(T-1))的热机内可逆热经济学做了进一步研究,导出了在给定条件下Novikov热机的最优利润解析式,并得到了最优利润和相应的效率同其它参数间的关系.     

特殊半鞅的强大数定律

利用特殊半鞅的收敛定理和一般形式的Kronecker引理,给出了特殊半鞅和非负特殊半鞅强大数定律的一般形式,推广和完善了已有的结果.     

飞行器的轨道优化与制导规律研究综述

飞行器的轨道优化与制导规律研究是飞行器设计的重要课题之一。轨道优化与制导规律研究是根据给定的技术指标 ,建立飞行器的运动方程 ,并选择主要设计参数 ,构造性能泛函 ,运用现代控制理论及数学理论原理求解最优参数 ,形成制导规律与相应的飞行器飞行轨道     

实时潜艇损管专家系统的设计与实现

介绍实时潜艇损管专家系统的设计与实现.该系统应用专家系统理论对潜艇损管训练及其在危险情况下进行损管决策领域的知识进行了建模,具有连续实时判断潜艇受损后的浮态和稳性以及制定损管决策方案和损管有效性检验功能.     

基于事例推理的硬盘数据恢复专家系统的研究与实现

分析了硬盘数据恢复工作的重要性、意义 ,在对基于事例推理技术和硬盘数据恢复方法研究的基础之上 ,针对如何实现一个基于事例推理的硬盘数据恢复网上专家系统进行了讨论 ,给出了这个专家系统的实现技术、方法 ,在新一代专家系统与网络技术、数据安全与恢复技术的结合方面有所创新     

一种基于观测器的自修复飞行控制系统设计

故障检测与隔离(FDI)、控制律重构是自修复飞行控制系统设计的重要内容.在自修复飞行控制系统设计中,利用观测器,设计了针对传感器的故障进行检测的方法,可使检测效果在一定的条件下,对系统参数变化不敏感,具有较好的鲁棒性;此外,当飞机操纵机构发生故障时,利用观测器,设计了基于线性模型跟随控制进行飞行重构控制的方法,使得当状态变量不能测量时的控制系统得以物理实现.最后,给出了仿真实例,结果表明了该方法的可行性和有效性.     

Becoming a disarmament champion: the Austrian crusade against nuclear weapons

ABSTRACT

The making of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has put Austria and its involvement in nuclear disarmament in the spotlight. This study highlights several factors that led Austria to become a prominent voice in nuclear-disarmament debates. First, its involvement dovetails with the emphasis on humanitarian disarmament it has promoted since the 1990s. Second, a strong antinuclear identity pervades Austrian society. This “nuclear allergy” combines antimilitarism inherited from the Cold War and, more broadly, an aversion to nuclear power, including for energy purposes. These two considerations form the background to the increased activism of the Austrian Foreign Ministry on nuclear disarmament in international fora. But, equally, Austria’s crusade for the TPNW can be attributed to the engagement of a small team of diplomats implementing personal as well as national preferences in favor of disarmament.     

Legitimate Authority as a Jus Ad Bellum Condition: Defense of a Procedural Requirement in Just War Theory

ABSTRACT

Today, it is widely held that while authorization may be helpful in assuring that the other jus ad bellum criteria are met, legitimate authority is not itself a condition for just recourse to war. Or, if it is necessary, it is said to be a trivial requirement, as mobilization for war requires some political authorization. Those who would retain the legitimacy requirement have differing views about who the proper authority is. I argue that, reasonably understood, legitimate authorization is necessary for jus ad bellum. Considerations of agency and consent in force combine with the social contract to commit us to deferring to recognized authorities. These obligations are strengthened by the epistemic reliability and pragmatic value conferred by governing institutions and procedures limiting recourse to war. These same rationales imply that the U.N. Security Council should regulate the international use of force. I qualify that if higher authorities fail to act, other subsidiary authorities may then authorize force. However, the move to each subsequent level of authorization must be justified. Understood in this way, the requirement that wars not be fought without legitimate authorization is a non-trivial, necessary procedural jus ad bellum condition.     

Pragmatism over principle: US intervention and burden shifting in Somalia, 1992–1993

ABSTRACT

The conventional wisdom about the 1992 US intervention in Somalia is that it was a quintessentially humanitarian mission pushed by President George H. W. Bush. This article challenges that interpretation, drawing on newly declassified documents. The Somalia intervention, I argue, was largely a pragmatic response to concerns held by the US military. In late 1992, as the small UN mission in Somalia was collapsing, senior American generals worried about being drawn into the resulting vacuum. Hence they reluctantly recommended a robust US intervention, in the expectation that this would allow the UN to assemble a larger peacekeeping force that would take over within months. The intervention ultimately failed, but the military learned useful lessons from this experience on how to achieve smoother UN handoffs in the future and thus effectively shift longer-term stabilisation burdens to the international community.