Global counterinsurgency and US army expansion: the case for recruiting foreign troops

Given the nature of global counterinsurgency operations, the demands of military expansion, and the need for cultural, linguistic, and regional expertise, the United States Army should evaluate the establishment of US-led foreign troop units for its evolving force structure. This article proposes the creation of an American foreign legion based upon the recruitment of US-led, ethnically homogeneous tribal force units to meet the grist mill of counterinsurgency operations. This structured approach would be more beneficial than the current reliance on a de facto American Foreign Legion, represented by private military contractors (PMCs), many of them comprised of foreigners. These PMCs carry a number of oversight, accountability, and legal risks not found in a fully integrated, and US-officered foreign legion. The British Brigade of Gurkhas, the South-West African Police Counter-Insurgency Unit (Koevoet), and the Kit Carson Scouts serve as relevant historical examples where foreign troops were used to supplement national manpower resources.     

Friend or foe? The Cyprus Police Force and the EOKA insurgency

This article examines the ambiguous role played by the Cyprus Police Force during the Greek Cypriot insurgency against Britain between 1955 and 1959. A multiethnic force policing a multiethnic society, the CPF struggled to fulfill its duties. Greek Cypriot officers became ineffective as sympathy for, or fear of insurgents undermined their ability to function. Some collaborated, others resigned. Those who stayed became targets of their own people. Turkish Cypriot officers, recruited in greater numbers to compensate for a reduction in Greek Cypriot officers, worked to enforce the law, but exacerbated intercommunal relations in doing so. In spite of the peculiar conditions present in Cyprus, the case has valuable implications for contemporary policymakers on the vulnerabilities inherent in the use of local police forces to restore law and order in ethnically divided societies.     

To Be or Not To Be: The Development of Soviet Deck Aviation

Few issues were as contentious in the development of the Soviet Navy as the role of aircraft carriers and sea-based aviation. Despite the continued insistence by the highest naval authorities and scientific experts that surface combatants simply could not be protected in the open ocean without the support of ship-borne aviation, Soviet leaders – for a variety of reasons – resisted aircraft carrier development until the final decades of the Cold War. In examining one of the most defining and telling asymmetries of the Cold War at sea, the author argues that while the USSR was economically and technologically capable of building aircraft carriers of any class, bureaucratic infighting, misperceptions of cost and practicality, and the inherent flaws of a totalitarian system ultimately created an impossible gap in capabilities between the two sides. The priorities and direction of Soviet weapons and defense technology development during the Cold War was largely a factor of the military-political situation taking shape at home, and in the world. As a rule, the navy was assigned missions that corresponded to its capabilities at a given point in time, rather than the other way around. Often, the navy lacked the material resources needed to implement its core mission. The availability of these resources, in turn, depended on the country's economic situation, its scientific potential, the technological state of its industry, as well as the subjective influence of political and military leaders on the priorities of technological development. The impact of the country's socioeconomic imperatives was undoubtedly also felt in the sluggish pace of development of ship-borne aviation and aircraft carriers in the USSR.     

Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, by Daniel H. Joyner. Oxford University Press, 2011. 192 pages, $100.     

Bomboozled: How the U.S. Government Misled Itself and Its People into Believing They Could Survive a Nuclear Attack

Bomboozled: How the U.S. Government Misled Itself and Its People into Believing They Could Survive a Nuclear Attack, by Susan Roy. Pointed Leaf Press, 2011. 176 pages, $45.     

A NEW STANDARD FOR PREEMPTIVE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST WMD THREATS

International law clearly requires an imminent threat of attack as a justification for the preemptive use of military force. However, the standard definition of an imminent threat was derived centuries before the development of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or ballistic missiles and other delivery systems that can reach their targets in a matter of minutes. Any use of force to alleviate threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) prior to tactical warning of the actual launch of such weapons falls into the legally and ethically controversial category of “anticipatory self-defense,” leaving decision makers potentially liable to prosecution for war crimes. Effective and ethical enforcement of nonproliferation therefore demands a standard for imminence of threat broad enough to allow military action as a last resort but sufficiently restrictive to prohibit indiscriminate action against suspected WMD programs. Following a critical review of selected literature and cases on preemption, the author proposes a new standard for preemptive military action: the existence of operational WMD, or a clandestine program to develop WMD, in contravention of international law. The author discusses the implications of this new proposed standard, which at the time of writing would permit preemptive attack against WMD-armed terrorist groups but prohibit it against all states except Iran and possibly North Korea.     

BEYOND DECLARATIONS OF INTENT

This essay explores the obligations arising from the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, signed in Palermo, Italy at the end of 2000. It also discusses the initiatives required to prepare the legal system and related infrastructure of Zimbabwe for its implementation. Zimbabwe joined more than 120 other countries in signing the Palermo convention, but has not yet ratified it. The ratification would enshrine the latest initiatives to develop effective strategies against transnational organised crime. The Palermo convention makes demands on the laws and institutions of states parties which could enhance their capacity to confront organised crime. Ratification signifies competence to implement the prescribed obligations, which can only occur after introducing suitable domestic laws, and adopting the necessary administrative mechanisms. The required reforms are bound to have certain policy and legislative implications for Zimbabwe. Regional initiatives complementary to the Palermo convention are expected to catalyse positive changes in Zimbabwe's response mechanisms.     

CORRUPTION,PERCEPTION AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

Bribery undermines human development and a transition to stable democratic rule. It props up illegitimate regimes as corporations bid for contracts by bribing, in a seeming race to the bottom. The world's wealthy are slowly waking up to this and criminalising this scandalous practice of bribing foreign public officials. However, such measures, if enforced, need to be combined with domestic anti-corruption strategies in the South. If this opportunity is missed, the risk of investing private capital in marginalised economies perceived to be highly corrupt is further upped, making investment-driven economic growth possibly even less unattainable.     

Communication: Wrap‐up on the cost of the gulf war

This paper discusses how crises and war may “disrupt” company activities, and how companies adapt to these disruptions. Croatia is used as a case study. The original hypothesis was that war led to breaks in physical flows: in other words, that companies experienced difficulties in importing and obtaining supplies of goods. Instead, it appears that loss of customers and severely worsened conditions of payment were the principal problems for Croatian companies. Although it does not fall within the scope of this investigation, it is interesting to note that the Croatian government has not imposed any direct rationing on the industrial sector, but rather via the banking system.