基于战法仿真综合集成研讨厅的专家行为研究

针对战法仿真实验的复杂性及其仿真可信度要求,结合基于战法仿真实验的综合集成研讨厅平台,分析了专家在战法仿真实验中的地位和作用,研究提出了仿真实验中专家的行为要求和规范,为基于战法仿真综合集成研讨厅的创新应用提供了理论和方法。经应用证明,该方法可以有效地提高战法仿真过程的透明度和仿真实验结果的可信度。具有很强的适应性和实用性。     

What is Doctrine?

‘Doctrine’ has been part of military vernacular for at least a century. Nonetheless, it is a concept which is rather under-explored. The aim of this article is thus to break doctrine down into its component parts in order to grasp what a military doctrine actually is. Thereafter, the article points out different ways to utilise doctrine as a military devise. A doctrine cannot be, or rather should not be, all things to all men. On the contrary, doctrine can be a tool of command, tool of education or a tool of change. The main upshot of the article is that the future of doctrine is far brighter than its critics want us to believe.     

Nothing fails like success: The London Ambassadors’ Conference and the coming of the First World War

During the July Crisis Britain’s foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, focused on organising a conference through which differences could be reconciled. After the war, he maintained that Germany’s unwillingness to join this conference was one of the immediate causes of war. This essay disputes Grey’s contention, arguing that his plans for a conference, based on a misleading analogy to the previous Balkan Crises, actually helped facilitate the outbreak of war in 1914 by sanctioning inaction in the first phase of the crisis (28 June–22 July) and by tacitly encouraging Russian mobilisation in the second phase (23 July–4 August).     

‘Stay-Behind’ in France: Much ado about nothing?

Stay-behind networks in France were set up starting in 1948 and were aimed at responding to the possibility of a Soviet armed attack into Western Europe. Participants were identified, and arms and explosives cached, to be activated in case of hostilities. This activity became folded into a multilateral effort under the Allied Coordination Committee (ACC) of NATO. In France, the network was run as a highly compartmented activity under the French external intelligence service (DGSE). As the Soviet threat receded, the stay-behind activity became more and more dormant, and in 1990 it was quietly disbanded, immediately after the P-2 scandal broke in Italy.     

Waging the inchoate war: Defining,fighting, and second-guessing the ‘Long War’

Abstract

This article answers three questions: What is the nature of the Long War? How is progress (or lack thereof) to be assessed? Where is it likely to go next? An appreciation of Clausewitz shows that practical centers of gravity exist for the Long War, and that the conflict pivots upon the ability to persuasively link ideology to events via a strategic narrative. A close examination of an illustrative case study, the interaction between the US and the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq 2004 – 2006, shows that Al Qaeda has suffered a severe setback, but also that the nature of the war is set to shift yet again. Further tangible progress for the US requires waging the Long War as a global counterinsurgency based on a strategy of ‘selective identification’ (versus pure ‘disaggregation’) as well as an understanding of how to more effectively craft a strategic narrative.     

The unnecessary uprising: Jeju Island rebellion and South Korean counterinsurgency experience 1947–48

This paper systematically analyzes the causes of the escalation of violence during the initial stages of the Jeju Island Rebellion and the failure of South Korean counterinsurgency operations. It is argued that four interrelated factors provided the conditions for armed insurgency in the small island of Jeju: inter-agency tension between the Korean National Police (KNP) and the Korean Constabulary; the mainlanders' misinterpretation of the insurgency; the effect of systematic police brutality; and the role of youth groups. Consequently, two counterinsurgency lessons will be drawn from this study: that inter-agency cooperation and coordination at the tactical level between security branches and the incorporation of local population at the micro-level is essential in conducting efficient and effective counterinsurgency operations.     

基于联合相似测度的SAR图像边缘点特征配准方法

针对SAR图像配准过程中几何变换影响特征匹配稳健性和适应性的问题,提出了一种在特征匹配过程中直接解算几何变换模型的边缘点特征配准方法。利用SAR图像边缘点的梯度和方向特征,基于像素迁移思想,定义了图像匹配的联合相似度——联合特征均方和(SSJF),并建立了SAR图像边缘点集相似性匹配准则;基于方向模板提出了改进的ROEWA算子;利用改进的遗传算法(GA)来进行相似度的全局优化搜索,获取配准模型参数;利用多幅SAR图像的配准试验,对本文方法的性能进行了验证。     

失去润滑条件下弧齿锥齿轮传动系统瞬态温度场Simulink仿真分析

根据传热学理论和热网络法,以某型直升机尾减速器弧齿锥齿轮传动系统为研究对象,建立了其温度场Simulink仿真计算模型。基于该模型,计算获得该传动系统正常润滑条件下的稳态温度场,并以它作为初始条件计算分析该传动系统失去润滑条件下的瞬态温度场,为预测该弧齿锥齿轮传动系统在失去润滑条件下的干运转生存能力提供理论依据。     

航空导航技术的发展方向

针对航空导航的特点,对现有航空导航装备的特点进行了分析,并结合未来作战的需求,给出了航空导航技术的发展方向,主要是组合式导航体制,将卫星导航与惯导的组合进一步与地形辅助导航、地球物理导航、地磁导航等方式结合起来.     

Unrestricted warfare: Review essay I

During the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970), France chose to support Biafra, but only on a limited scale, providing mercenaries and obsolete weaponry to Ojukwu's regime. General Charles de Gaulle's assistance to Ojukwu was conditioned by the French military drawdown after 1961, the increased power of French secret services on the continent, and the interventions in Katanga (1960–1963), Gabon (1964) and Chad (1968–1972). France supported Biafra primarily to protect its former colonies from Nigeria, stop Soviet subversion and acquire an economic foothold in the oil-rich Niger Delta. De Gaulle chose a limited strategy for two reasons. If Biafra won the war, France would be Biafra's greatest ally. If Nigeria won the war, France could extricate itself from the situation relatively easily and re-establish relations with the Nigerian government, which is what ultimately occurred.