关于高技术力量平战一体国防动员的思考

坚持向科技创新要战斗力,落实到国防动员建设领域,就是要紧紧围绕党在新形势下的强军目标,积极适应现代战争形态新变化、世界军事变革新趋势、总体国家安全新要求和军队使命任务新拓展,加强高技术力量平战一体国防动员,搭建起高技术力量在经济与军事、地方与军队、潜力与实力、平时与战时的桥梁和纽带,全面提升国防动员战时应战、急时应急、平时服务能力,为保障军队能打仗、打胜仗提供强大科技支撑。     

分兵集火、凡船皆战——浅析美军“分布式杀伤”概念

通过梳理美军"分布式杀伤"概念的提出背景、提出过程、内涵意义,阐述了"分布式杀伤"的三条制胜之道,即符合海战客观环境、符合科技进步方向、符合战争演变趋势。此外,文章还分析了"分布式杀伤"实际执行过程中的几大难点和缺陷,包括指挥控制问题、舰船能力问题、成本和后勤补给问题、防御有效性问题。     

一类二阶Hamilton系统周期解的存在性

Hamilton系统是非线性科学中的一个重要领域,很多人在超二次或次二次条件及其他一些条件下对Hamilton系统的周期解进行了研究。此文则研究了非自制二阶Hamilton系统在零点局部环绕及“非二次”条件下周期解的存在性,并利用局部紧性条件(C)条件以及极大极小方法证明了其周期解的存在性。     

伊拉克战争美军后勤(装备)保障特点及启示

伊拉克战争中,美军采取多种手段和措施,成功地实施了后勤(装备)保障,在保障准备、保障方法、保障信息化建设等方面呈现出许多新特点,为我军做好新形势下的装备保障工作提供了有益的启示。     

基于Canny算子的小波域维纳滤波去噪方法

本文给出了一种利用Canny算子的小波域局部维纳滤波的图像去噪方法。先用二维小波对图像进行分解,在第一重维纳滤波时使用椭圆形方向窗估计信号的方差。在第二重维纳滤波时,使用Canny算子把图像分成边缘区域和非边缘区域,然后结合圆形窗估计信号的方差,再利用局部维纳滤波进行去噪。实验结果表明了本文方法的有效性。     

Beyond Just War: Military Strategy for the Common Good

The objective of this article is to move ethical discourse on military strategy beyond the confines of the established War Convention. This is achieved by utilising the common good, a concept found in political philosophy and theology. The common good acts as a positive organising concept for socio-political activity. With its focus on peace, development and the flourishing of the individual and community, the common good poses a significant challenge to strategy. This article constructs an approach to strategy that is compatible with the common good. Importantly, it does so whilst respecting the pursuit of victory as an indispensable component of strategy’s true nature. The theory presented in this article is then tested in relation to four different modes of strategy: regular war, irregular war, deterrence, and cyberwar.     

Justifying Cyber-intelligence?

The surge in threats aided by or carried out through cyberspace has placed significant pressure on the intelligence community to adapt or leave itself open to attack. Indeed, many in both political and intelligence circles argue for access to ever greater amounts of cyber information in order to catch potential threats before they become real. By collecting all our digital information, the intelligence community argues that it is not only able to detail what people have done or are currently doing but also predict what their next move might be. However, the ethical implications are unclear and the backlash following Edward Snowden’s revelations have shown that such activities are not without controversy. This leaves the debate stuck between the important, ethical role that intelligence can play and the potential for its unrestrained use to cause undue harm. This paper will resolve this by giving greater detail to cyber-intelligence practices, highlighting the different levels of harm that the various intelligence operations can cause. The essence of this paper is not that cyber-intelligence should be banned outright, but that it can be justified given the necessary circumstances. Therefore, the paper will develop a specialised set of Just Cyber-Intelligence Principles, built on the just war tradition, to outline if and when such activities are justified.     

Right Intention and the Ends of War

The jus ad bellum criterion of right intention (CRI) is a central guiding principle of just war theory. It asserts that a country’s resort to war is just only if that country resorts to war for the right reasons. However, there is significant confusion, and little consensus, about how to specify the CRI. We seek to clear up this confusion by evaluating several distinct ways of understanding the criterion. On one understanding, a state’s resort to war is just only if it plans to adhere to the principles of just war while achieving its just cause. We argue that the first understanding makes the CRI superfluous, because it can be subsumed under the probability of success criterion. On a second understanding, a resort to war is just only if a state’s motives, which explain its resort to war, are of the right kind. We argue that this second understanding of the CRI makes it a significant further obstacle to justifying war. However, this second understanding faces a possible infinite regress problem, which, left unresolved, leaves us without a plausible interpretation of the CRI. This constitutes a significant and novel reason for leaving the CRI out of the international law of armed conflict (LOAC).     

Rethinking Military Virtue Ethics in an Age of Unmanned Weapons

Although most styles of military ethics are hybrids that draw on multiple ethical theories, they are usually based primarily on the model of Aristotelian virtue ethics. Virtue ethics is well-suited for regulating the conduct of soldiers who have to make quick decisions on the battlefield, but its applicability to military personnel is threatened by the growing use of unmanned weapon systems. These weapons disrupt virtue ethics’ institutional and cultural basis by changing what it means to display virtue and transforming the roles soldiers perform and the nature of the military profession itself. I argue that in light of these challenges to virtue ethics, at least as it is traditionally understood within the armed forces, soldiers operating unmanned weapons require a more heavily rule-based approach to military ethics.     

Ordering and controlling the dimensions of strategy

Colin Gray’s dimensions of strategy, built upon the earlier work of Clausewitz and Howard, has theoretical, practical, and pedagogic value for the Strategic Studies community. This paper further develops the theory, arguing that the dimensions can be controlled or managed to improve strategic performance. The dimensions are divided into two categories: “internal” and “external” to the process of strategy. The paper describes the dynamic process by which the internal dimensions, which can be controlled, are used to exert influence over the external dimensions that are beyond the control of the strategist. It is argued that six dimensions hold the key to strategic success: politics and the five dimensions concerned with warfighting. This conclusion validates the Clausewitzian paradigm with its emphasis on policy and battle.