基于信息论的C3I系统决策性能的评价

信息熵是描述信息系统的一种比较成功的方法.采用信息论的方法对决策系统进行描述,在考虑了决策者的有界合理性限制和达到满意性能指标的要求下,分析了单人指挥决策系统的系统性能,并在此基础上分析了多人指挥决策系统的系统性能,最后得出采用决策系统的误差概率P和相互一致性度量Q作为评价C3I系统决策性能标准的结论.     

Analytic solution for the nucleolus of a three‐player cooperative game

The nucleolus solution for cooperative games in characteristic function form is usually computed numerically by solving a sequence of linear programing (LP) problems, or by solving a single, but very large‐scale, LP problem. This article proposes an algebraic method to compute the nucleolus solution analytically (i.e., in closed‐form) for a three‐player cooperative game in characteristic function form. We first consider cooperative games with empty core and derive a formula to compute the nucleolus solution. Next, we examine cooperative games with nonempty core and calculate the nucleolus solution analytically for five possible cases arising from the relationship among the value functions of different coalitions. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

The multiplicative representation for multiple objectives optimization with an application for arms procurement

Multiple Objectives Optimization is much seen in combination with linear functions and even with linear programming, together with an adding of the objectives by using weights. With distance functions, normalization instead of weights is used. It is also possible that together with an additive direct influence of the objectives on the utility function a mutual utility of the objectives exists under the form of a multiplicative representation. A critical comment is brought on some representations of this kind. A full‐multiplicative form may offer other opportunities, which will be discussed at length in an effort to exclude weights and normalization. This theoretical approach is followed by an application for arms procurement. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 327–340, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10014     

A search game on a cyclic graph

There is a finite cyclic graph. The hider chooses one of all nodes except the specified one, and he hides an (immobile) object there. At the beginning the seeker is at the specified node. After the seeker chooses an ordering of the nodes except the specified one, he examines each nodes in that order until he finds the object, traveling along edges. It costs an amount when he moves from a node to an adjacent one and also when he checks a node. While the hider wishes to maximize the sum of the traveling costs and the examination costs which are required to find the object, the seeker wishes to minimize it. The problem is modeled as a two‐person zero‐sum game. We solve the game when unit costs (traveling cost + examination cost) have geometrical relations depending on nodes. Then we give properties of optimal strategies of both players. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

试论武器装备的效费比分析

运用价值工程(VE)方法分析武器装备,称效费比为价值。按照杜佩(Dupuy)的方法,把武器装备的效能转化为“战斗效能值”(OLI),又计算出了武器装备的全寿命费用,然后将2者加以对比,获得效能—费用的最佳组合,同时提出了选择武器装备系统的定量分析方法。这些对于提高我国国防经济效益,具有一定的指导和借鉴意义。     

Optimal switchover times between two activities utilizing the same resource

The “gold‐mining” decision problem is concerned with the efficient utilization of a delicate mining equipment working in a number of different mines. Richard Bellman was the first to consider this type of a problem. The solution found by Bellman for the finite‐horizon, continuous‐time version of the problem with two mines is not overly realistic since he assumed that fractional parts of the same mining equipment could be used in different mines and this fraction could change instantaneously. In this paper, we provide some extensions to this model in order to produce more operational and realistic solutions. Our first model is concerned with developing an operational policy where the equipment may be switched from one mine to the other at most once during a finite horizon. In the next extension we incorporate a cost component in the objective function and assume that the horizon length is not fixed but it is the second decision variable. Structural properties of the optimal solutions are obtained using nonlinear programming. Each model and its solution is illustrated with a numerical example. The models developed here may have potential applications in other areas including production of items requiring the same machine or choosing a sequence of activities requiring the same resource. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 186–203, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.10008     

A general model of heterogeneous system lifetimes and conditions for system burn‐in

Burn‐in is a technique to enhance reliability by eliminating weak items from a population of items having heterogeneous lifetimes. System burn‐in can improve system reliability, but the conditions for system burn‐in to be performed after component burn‐in remain a little understood mathematical challenge. To derive such conditions, we first introduce a general model of heterogeneous system lifetimes, in which the component burn‐in information and assembly problems are related to the prediction of system burn‐in. Many existing system burn‐in models become special cases and two important results are identified. First, heterogeneous system lifetimes can be understood naturally as a consequence of heterogeneous component lifetimes and heterogeneous assembly quality. Second, system burn‐in is effective if assembly quality variation in the components and connections which are arranged in series is greater than a threshold, where the threshold depends on the system structure and component failure rates. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 364–380, 2003.     

Effectiveness of (R,Q) policies in one‐warehouse multiretailer systems with deterministic demand and backlogging

Consider a distribution system with a central warehouse and multiple retailers. Customer demand arrives at each of the retailers continuously at a constant rate. The retailers replenish their inventories from the warehouse which in turn orders from an outside supplier with unlimited stock. There are economies of scale in replenishing the inventories at both the warehouse and the retail level. Stockouts at the retailers are backlogged. The system incurs holding and backorder costs. The objective is to minimize the long‐run average total cost in the system. This paper studies the cost effectiveness of (R, Q) policies in the above system. Under an (R, Q) policy, each facility orders a fixed quantity Q from its supplier every time its inventory position reaches a reorder point R. It is shown that (R, Q) policies are at least 76% effective. Numerical examples are provided to further illustrate the cost effectiveness of (R, Q) policies. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 422–439, 2000     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

Puzzle‐based storage systems

We introduce and develop models for a physical goods storage system based on the 15‐puzzle, a classic children's game in which 15 numbered tiles slide within a 4 × 4 grid. The objective of the game is to arrange the tiles in numerical sequence, starting from a random arrangement. For our purposes, the tiles represent totes, pallets, or even containers that must be stored very densely, and the objective is to maneuver items to an input–output point for retrieval or processing. We develop analytical results for storage configurations having a single empty location (as in the game) and experimental results for configurations with multiple empty locations. Designs with many empty locations can be made to form aisles, allowing us to compare puzzle‐based designs with traditional aisle‐based designs found in warehousing systems. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007