Assessing the value of demand sharing in supply chains

We consider the problem of assessing the value of demand sharing in a multistage supply chain in which the retailer observes stationary autoregressive moving average demand with Gaussian white noise (shocks). Similar to previous research, we assume each supply chain player constructs its best linear forecast of the leadtime demand and uses it to determine the order quantity via a periodic review myopic order‐up‐to policy. We demonstrate how a typical supply chain player can determine the extent of its available information in the presence of demand sharing by studying the properties of the moving average polynomials of adjacent supply chain players. The retailer's demand is driven by the random shocks appearing in the autoregressive moving average representation for its demand. Under the assumptions we will make in this article, to the retailer, knowing the shock information is equivalent to knowing the demand process (assuming that the model parameters are also known). Thus (in the event of sharing) the retailer's demand sequence and shock sequence would contain the same information to the retailer's supplier. We will show that, once we consider the dynamics of demand propagation further up the chain, it may be that a player's demand and shock sequences will contain different levels of information for an upstream player. Hence, we study how a player can determine its available information under demand sharing, and use this information to forecast leadtime demand. We characterize the value of demand sharing for a typical supply chain player. Furthermore, we show conditions under which (i) it is equivalent to no sharing, (ii) it is equivalent to full information shock sharing, and (iii) it is intermediate in value to the two previously described arrangements. Although it follows from existing literature that demand sharing is equivalent to full information shock sharing between a retailer and supplier, we demonstrate and characterize when this result does not generalize to upstream supply chain players. We then show that demand propagates through a supply chain where any player may share nothing, its demand, or its full information shocks (FIS) with an adjacent upstream player as quasi‐ARMA in—quasi‐ARMA out. We also provide a convenient form for the propagation of demand in a supply chain that will lend itself to future research applications. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 515–531, 2014     

A branch‐and‐price approach for the stochastic generalized assignment problem

In this article, we address a stochastic generalized assignment machine scheduling problem in which the processing times of jobs are assumed to be random variables. We develop a branch‐and‐price (B&P) approach for solving this problem wherein the pricing problem is separable with respect to each machine, and has the structure of a multidimensional knapsack problem. In addition, we explore two other extensions of this method—one that utilizes a dual‐stabilization technique and another that incorporates an advanced‐start procedure to obtain an initial feasible solution. We compare the performance of these methods with that of the branch‐and‐cut (B&C) method within CPLEX. Our results show that all B&P‐based approaches perform better than the B&C method, with the best performance obtained for the B&P procedure that includes both the extensions aforementioned. We also utilize a Monte Carlo method within the B&P scheme, which affords the use of a small subset of scenarios at a time to estimate the “true” optimal objective function value. Our experimental investigation reveals that this approach readily yields solutions lying within 5% of optimality, while providing more than a 10‐fold savings in CPU times in comparison with the best of the other proposed B&P procedures. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 131–143, 2014     

MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

This paper tests the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth by including the impact of the share of military and civilian components of government expenditure in an economic growth model with endogenous technology. In this framework, we empirically consider the hypothesis of a non‐linear effect of military expenditure on economic growth. Differences between the costs and benefits of the defence sector has traditionally explained the non‐linear relationship suggesting that shocks to insecurity may also be a source of non‐linearity as they determine a re‐allocative effect within government expenditure. While parametric partial correlations are in line with empirical findings, the robustness of estimations is tested by using a non‐parametric approach. The negative relationship between military expenditure and growth in countries with high levels of military burden predicted by theory becomes significant only after including a proxy for re‐allocative effects in the growth equation.     

PROTECTING CULTURAL MONUMENTS AGAINST TERRORISM

Famous cultural monuments are often regarded as unique icons, making them an attractive target for terrorists. Despite huge military and police outlays, terrorist attacks on important monuments can hardly be avoided. We argue that an effective strategy to discourage terrorist attacks on iconic monuments is for a government to show a firm commitment to swift reconstruction. Using a simple game‐theoretic model, we demonstrate how a credible claim to rebuild any destroyed cultural monument discourages terrorist attacks by altering the terrorists' expectations and by increasing the government's reputation costs if they fail to rebuild.     

Alternative models of Greek defence expenditures

This paper models and estimates Greek defence spending over the 1950–1989 period. It employs the Stone‐Geary welfare function and estimates levels of defence expenditures by the Engle‐Granger two‐step procedure. The Dickey‐Fuller test regression for cointegration is specified in terms of the significance of additional augmentations. The Deaton‐Muellbauer functional form is then employed and an estimating equation for the expenditure share of defence is derived. This specification is compared with the levels equation through a number of non‐nested tests involving model transformation.     

Evaluating the trade‐off between military spending and investment in the United States

Using tests of a single equation model and cointegration techniques, this paper finds no evidence of a long run trade‐off, and some evidence of a short‐run trade‐off, between military spending and investment in post‐World War II United States data. The short‐run trade‐off is confined to the 1949–1971 period, and may be the result of the sharp expansion and contraction of military outlays in connection with the Korean and Vietnam Wars. In addition, cointegration techniques are used to identify a possible long‐run trade‐off between military spending and consumption.     

The effect of deployment on first‐ and second‐term re‐enlistment in the US active duty force

Why should deployment affect re‐enlistment? In our model, members enter the military with naïve beliefs about deployment and use actual deployment experience to update their beliefs and revise their expected utility of re‐enlisting. Empirically, re‐enlistment is related to the type and number of deployments, consistent with the learning model. Non‐hostile deployment increases first‐term re‐enlistment but hostile deployment has little effect except for the Army, where the effect is positive. Both types increase second‐term re‐enlistment. Interestingly, first‐term members with dependants tend to respond to deployment like second‐term members. In addition, deployment acts directly to affect re‐enlistment, not indirectly through time to promotion.     

Aid versus sanctions for taming oppressors: theory and case study of the Iraqi Kurds

We model an oppressor aiming at victimizing an excluded group in his country, with two main variants. A foreign power affects his behaviour using either conditional aid, subject to the dictator’s participation constraint, or the threat of sanctions, broadly defined, subject to the credibility constraint. The choice between the two is either determined by the latter, or by their relative cost. Aid is preferred when the threat of sanctions is ineffective, and sanctions are too expensive. Sanctions might be imposed, if the threat is ineffective. A case study of the Iraqi Kurds after Iraq was subject to sanctions is presented.     

Military expenditure and economic growth: peru 1970–1996

The present study examines the effects of military expenditure on growth in Peru in the period from 1970 to 1996. By using a Deger‐type Simultaneous Equations Model it is possible to break up the net effect into supply‐ and demand‐side influences. The former consist of positive externalities of defence activities on the other sectors of the economy, while the latter can be described as crowding‐out of civilian investment. Estimations find the supply‐side effects to be insignificantly different from zero, while the crowding‐out effect of defence spending is significant and substantial. It is thereby established that defence expenditure has a negative overall effect on economic growth in Peru. Although several caveats – including specification problems of the Deger model, the quality of the data used, a relatively small sample and the presence of autocorrelation in the estimations – must be considered, these results turn out to be quite robust with respect to estimation methods (3SLS, 2SLS, OLS) and slight modifications to the model. They are also consistent with previous empirical findings from other countries and cross sectional studies.     

Resourcing for defense: Solving the roles and missions puzzle

One of the most important issues facing the post‐Cold War U.S. defense establishment concerns the future allocation of combat tasks and responsibilities among different branches of the armed forces. The challenge is to reduce unnecessary redundancy across roles and missions when resources are highly constrained, without compromising military effectiveness. Defining the policy problem as one of resource allocation rather than operational effectiveness, we develop a methodology for allocating roles and missions. Our methodology focuses at the highest level of force aggregation and uses a mathematical programming model to produce cross‐service cross‐mission trade‐offs that will yield the best total force combat and non‐combat potential within resource consumption constraints.