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Benjamin Legros 《海军后勤学研究》2023,70(1):53-71
This study aims to determine and evaluate dynamic idling policies where an agent can idle while some customers remain waiting. This type of policies can be employed in situations where the flow of urgent customers does not allow the agent to spend sufficient time on back-office tasks. We model the system as a single-agent exponential queue with abandonment. The objective is to minimize the system's congestion while ensuring a certain proportion of idling time for the agent. Using a Markov decision process approach, we prove that the optimal policy is a threshold policy according to which the agent should idle above (below) a certain threshold on the queue length if the congestion-related performance measure is concave (convex) with respect to the number of customers present. We subsequently obtain the stationary probabilities, performance measures, and idling time duration, expressed using complex integrals. We show how these integrals can be numerically computed and provide simpler expressions for fast-agent and heavy-traffic asymptotic cases. In practice, the most common way to regulate congestion is to control access to the service by rejecting some customers upon arrival. Our analysis reveals that idling policies allow high levels of idling probability that such rejection policies cannot reach. Furthermore, the greatest benefit of implementing an optimal idling policy occurs when the objective occupation rate is close to 50% in highly congested situations. 相似文献
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This paper considers the maintenance of aircraft engine components that are subject to stress. We model the deterioration process by means of the cumulative jump process representation of crack growth. However, because in many cases cracks are not easily observable, maintenance decisions must be made on the basis of other information. We incorporate stress information collected via sensors into the scheduling decision process by means of a partially observable Markov decision process model. Using this model, we demonstrate the optimality of structured maintenance policies, which support practical maintenance schedules. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 45: 335–352, 1998 相似文献
628.
舰载电子装备综合维修保障系统研究 总被引:8,自引:0,他引:8
舰员级维修保障是舰艇维修保障体系中的重要部分,为提高舰员级维修保障水平提出了利用信息管理和专家系统技术建立舰载电子装备综合维修保障系统的思路和技术方案,并结合某类设备提出了建立综合维修保障系统的框架. 相似文献
629.
研究了空战时的决策问题,并对人工智能技术用于空战中机动目标的战术机动决策模拟做了尝试,讨论了计算机控制机动目标的战术机动决策逻辑的设计方法,同时也进行了数字仿真。 相似文献
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A bomber carrying homogenous weapons sequentially engages ground targets capable of retaliation. Upon reaching a target, the bomber may fire a weapon at it. If the target survives the direct fire, it can either return fire or choose to hold fire (play dead). If the former occurs, the bomber is immediately made aware that the target is alive. If no return fire is seen, the true status of the target is unknown to the bomber. After the current engagement, the bomber, if still alive, can either re-engage the same target or move on to the next target in the sequence. The bomber seeks to maximize the expected cumulative damage it can inflict on the targets. We solve the perfect and partial information problems, where a target always fires back and sometimes fires back respectively using stochastic dynamic programming. The perfect information scenario yields an appealing threshold based bombing policy. Indeed, the marginal future reward is the threshold at which the control policy switches and furthermore, the threshold is monotonic decreasing with the number of weapons left with the bomber and monotonic nondecreasing with the number of targets left in the mission. For the partial information scenario, we show via a counterexample that the marginal future reward is not the threshold at which the control switches. In light of the negative result, we provide an appealing threshold based heuristic instead. Finally, we address the partial information game, where the target can choose to fire back and establish the Nash equilibrium strategies for a representative two target scenario. 相似文献