基于体系结构方法的机群对海作战活动分析

机群综合电子信息系统在高技术局部战争环境中可以为机群协同作战提供信息能力与优势,对机群作战活动的分析是设计其体系结构的基础,因此对机群在作战中的活动进行分析有重要意义。针对海军航空兵机群的对海作战,利用体系结构设计工具,在DoD AF V1.0框架下分析了机群对海作战活动,并在此基础上开发了相关作战视图。     

基于仿真实验的弹道导弹阵地优选

合理部署弹道导弹位置对于提高作战效能具有至关重要的作用。基于解析计算的优化方法难以反映环境因素、武器装备的技术和动力特性等不确定性因素对部署位置的影响,求得的结果存在置信度低的问题。故将解析法与仿真实验相结合,以体系对抗条件下弹道导弹作战效能评估的数学模型为基础,建立了由各种作战实体和行动的模型聚合而成的弹道导弹攻防对抗仿真模型,然后通过仿真实验找出最优部署位置,最后给出了应用示例。实验表明该方法具有速度快、效率高、结果清晰直观的特点,可为指挥员提供科学、快速的决策支持。     

基于流体体积模型的双层油罐渗漏数值模拟

为了对钢制强化玻璃纤维制双层油罐贯通间隙空间进行优化设计,针对目前市场上主流双层油罐间隙空间的结构特点,应用计算流体力学数值模拟软件CFD,基于多相流流体体积模型,对双层油罐内罐发生渗漏后渗漏液体在贯通间隙空间的流动特点进行模拟计算。计算结果表明：液体在间隙空间流动时,其表面力对流动的影响占支配作用,体积力的作用可以忽略;当间隙垫片之间的距离≥0.8 mm,其对液体流动的阻碍作用开始减弱;主流双层油罐间隙空间的设计不合理,无法将油罐渗漏液体尽快引流到间隙底部。最后,根据液体在间隙空间的流动特点,对双层油罐间隙空间的设计提出了改进措施。     

基于小样本数据的作战计划生成方法

针对部队实兵对抗实验数据生成和采集的投入高、难度大的实际,提出基于小样本数据生成作战计划的方法：首先,采用偏最小二乘回归分析法建立作战因素与作战结果间的多元非线性模型;其次,采用改进的遗传算法,在MATLAB平台编程实现了对模型的整数规划求解,并通过实例验证算法的有效性;最后,利用作战因素的重要性排序分析作战计划的调整流程。     

基于战法仿真综合集成研讨厅的专家行为研究

针对战法仿真实验的复杂性及其仿真可信度要求,结合基于战法仿真实验的综合集成研讨厅平台,分析了专家在战法仿真实验中的地位和作用,研究提出了仿真实验中专家的行为要求和规范,为基于战法仿真综合集成研讨厅的创新应用提供了理论和方法。经应用证明,该方法可以有效地提高战法仿真过程的透明度和仿真实验结果的可信度。具有很强的适应性和实用性。     

What is Doctrine?

‘Doctrine’ has been part of military vernacular for at least a century. Nonetheless, it is a concept which is rather under-explored. The aim of this article is thus to break doctrine down into its component parts in order to grasp what a military doctrine actually is. Thereafter, the article points out different ways to utilise doctrine as a military devise. A doctrine cannot be, or rather should not be, all things to all men. On the contrary, doctrine can be a tool of command, tool of education or a tool of change. The main upshot of the article is that the future of doctrine is far brighter than its critics want us to believe.     

Nothing fails like success: The London Ambassadors’ Conference and the coming of the First World War

During the July Crisis Britain’s foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, focused on organising a conference through which differences could be reconciled. After the war, he maintained that Germany’s unwillingness to join this conference was one of the immediate causes of war. This essay disputes Grey’s contention, arguing that his plans for a conference, based on a misleading analogy to the previous Balkan Crises, actually helped facilitate the outbreak of war in 1914 by sanctioning inaction in the first phase of the crisis (28 June–22 July) and by tacitly encouraging Russian mobilisation in the second phase (23 July–4 August).     

The British army,information management and the First World War revolution in military affairs

Information Management (IM) – the systematic ordering, processing and channelling of information within organisations – forms a critical component of modern military command and control systems. As a subject of scholarly enquiry, however, the history of military IM has been relatively poorly served. Employing new and under-utilised archival sources, this article takes the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) of the First World War as its case study and assesses the extent to which its IM system contributed to the emergence of the modern battlefield in 1918. It argues that the demands of fighting a modern war resulted in a general, but not universal, improvement in the BEF’s IM techniques, which in turn laid the groundwork, albeit in embryonic form, for the IM systems of modern armies.     

‘Stay-Behind’ in France: Much ado about nothing?

Stay-behind networks in France were set up starting in 1948 and were aimed at responding to the possibility of a Soviet armed attack into Western Europe. Participants were identified, and arms and explosives cached, to be activated in case of hostilities. This activity became folded into a multilateral effort under the Allied Coordination Committee (ACC) of NATO. In France, the network was run as a highly compartmented activity under the French external intelligence service (DGSE). As the Soviet threat receded, the stay-behind activity became more and more dormant, and in 1990 it was quietly disbanded, immediately after the P-2 scandal broke in Italy.     

Waging the inchoate war: Defining,fighting, and second-guessing the ‘Long War’

Abstract

This article answers three questions: What is the nature of the Long War? How is progress (or lack thereof) to be assessed? Where is it likely to go next? An appreciation of Clausewitz shows that practical centers of gravity exist for the Long War, and that the conflict pivots upon the ability to persuasively link ideology to events via a strategic narrative. A close examination of an illustrative case study, the interaction between the US and the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq 2004 – 2006, shows that Al Qaeda has suffered a severe setback, but also that the nature of the war is set to shift yet again. Further tangible progress for the US requires waging the Long War as a global counterinsurgency based on a strategy of ‘selective identification’ (versus pure ‘disaggregation’) as well as an understanding of how to more effectively craft a strategic narrative.