国家能源供给对军队后勤建设的影响研究

军队后勤建设离不开国家能源供给,军队能源储备、军事训练、国防工程、科研试验以及日常生活等方面均与国家能源供给有着密切的关系。探讨了国家能源供给对军队后勤建设的影响内容,分析了国家能源供给对军队后勤建设的影响,提出了确定国家能源供给对军队后勤建设影响的方法步骤。     

军事供应链不确定性产生机理研究

军事供应链中不可避免地存在不确定性。构建了军事供应链不确定性产生机理的概念模型,从需求、供应、环境三个方面分析了军事供应链不确定性产生的原因,同时,对军事供应链中可能存在的各种不确定性进行了讨论,明确了加剧不确定性影响的因素是军事供应链系统的复杂性。具体表现为军事供应链成员交互关系的复杂性和军事供应链网络结构的复杂性。提出正是由于这两个原因的存在,对军事供应链的保障性能产生了巨大的影响。     

Strategic dynamic sourcing from competing suppliers with transferable capacity investment

We study the supplier relationship choice for a buyer that invests in transferable capacity operated by a supplier. With a long‐term relationship, the buyer commits to source from a supplier over a long period of time. With a short‐term relationship, the buyer leaves open the option of switching to a new supplier in the future. The buyer has incomplete information about a supplies efficiency, and thus uses auctions to select suppliers and determine the contracts. In addition, the buyer faces uncertain demand for the product. A long‐term relationship may be beneficial for the buyer because it motivates more aggressive bidding at the beginning, resulting a lower initial price. A short‐term relationship may be advantageous because it allows switching, with capacity transfer at some cost, to a more efficient supplier in the future. We find that there exists a critical level of the switching cost above which a long‐term relationship is better for the buyer than a short‐term relationship. In addition, this critical switching cost decreases with demand uncertainty, implying a long‐term relationship is more favorable for a buyer facing volatile demand. Finally, we find that in a long‐term relationship, capacity can be either higher or lower than in a short‐term relationship. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

An integrated electric power supply chain and fuel market network framework: Theoretical modeling with empirical analysis for New England

In this article, we develop a novel electric power supply chain network model with fuel supply markets that captures both the economic network transactions in energy supply markets and the physical network transmission constraints in the electric power network. The theoretical derivation and analysis are done using the theory of variational inequalities. We then apply the model to a specific case, the New England electric power supply chain, consisting of six states, five fuel types, 82 power generators, with a total of 573 generating units, and 10 demand market regions. The empirical case study demonstrates that the regional electric power prices simulated by our model match the actual electricity prices in New England very well. We also compute the electric power prices and the spark spread, an important measure of the power plant profitability, under natural gas and oil price variations. The empirical examples illustrate that in New England, the market/grid‐level fuel competition has become the major factor that affects the influence of the oil price on the natural gas price. Finally, we utilize the model to quantitatively investigate how changes in the demand for electricity influence the electric power and the fuel markets from a regional perspective. The theoretical model can be applied to other regions and multiple electricity markets under deregulation to quantify the interactions in electric power/energy supply chains and their effects on flows and prices. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Supply chain coordination with product line design and a revenue sharing scheme

Many manufacturers sell their products through retailers and share the revenue with those retailers. Given this phenomenon, we build a stylized model to investigate the role of revenue sharing schemes in supply chain coordination and product variety decisions. In our model, a monopolistic manufacturer serves two segments of consumers, which are distinguished by their willingness to pay for quality. In the scenario with exogenous revenue sharing ratios, when the potential gain from serving the low segment is substantial (e.g., the low‐segment consumers' willingness to pay is high enough or the low segment takes a large enough proportion of the market), the retailer is better off abandoning the revenue sharing scheme. Moreover, when the potential gain from serving the low (high) segment is substantial enough, the manufacturer finds it profitable to offer a single product. Furthermore, when revenue sharing ratios are endogenous, we divide our analysis into two cases, depending on the methods of cooperation. When revenue sharing ratios are negotiated at the very beginning, the decentralized supply chain causes further distortion. This suggests that the central premise of revenue sharing—the coordination of supply chains—may be undermined if supply chain parties meticulously bargain over it.     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

区块链在分队战术协同中的应用构想

从战术分队角度出发,探讨了区块链技术在作战实体之间的信息交互及智能协同方面的应用设想,分析了战术分队信息交互的相关技术及面临的挑战,阐述了区块链在未来战术分队指挥体系构建中的发展构想。     

通用武器装备供应系统设计中的硬、软系统方法整合研究

分析了硬、软系统方法应用的异同点,研究了将硬、软系统方法整合起来处理通用装备供应系统设计的问题,最后提出了系统设计的框架。     

装备物资供应保障中的装卸优化方法

装备物资装卸作为供应保障的一个重要环节 ,对装备物资保障效能的发挥有着极大的影响。综述了装备物资装卸过程中应遵循的原则和装卸搬运作业方法 ,提出了装备物资装卸的优化方法。     

Performance analysis of queue length monitoring of M/G/1 systems

This study investigates the statistical process control application for monitoring queue length data in M/G/1 systems. Specifically, we studied the average run length (ARL) characteristics of two different control charts for detecting changes in system utilization. First, the nL chart monitors the sums of successive queue length samples by subgrouping individual observations with sample size n. Next is the individual chart with a warning zone whose control scheme is specified by two pairs of parameters, (upper control limit, d_u) and (lower control limit, d_l), as proposed by Bhat and Rao (Oper Res 20 (1972) 955–966). We will present approaches to calculate ARL for the two types of control charts using the Markov chain formulation and also investigate the effects of parameters of the control charts to provide useful design guidelines for better performance. Extensive numerical results are included for illustration. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011