Supplier‐buyer contracting: Asymmetric cost information and cutoff level policy for buyer participation

We consider the problem of designing a contract to maximize the supplier's profit in a one‐supplier–one‐buyer relationship for a short‐life‐cycle product. Demand for the finished product is stochastic and price‐sensitive, and only its probability distribution is known when the supply contract is written. When the supplier has complete information on the marginal cost of the buyer, we show that several simple contracts can induce the buyer to choose order quantity that attains the single firm profit maximizing solution, resulting in the maximum possible profit for the supplier. When the marginal cost of the buyer is private information, we show that it is no longer possible to achieve the single firm solution. In this case, the optimal order quantity is always smaller while the optimal sale price of the finished product is higher than the single firm solution. The supplier's profit is lowered while that of the buyer is improved. Moreover, a buyer who has a lower marginal cost will extract more profit from the supplier. Under the optimal contract, the supplier employs a cutoff level policy on the buyer's marginal cost to determine whether the buyer should be induced to sign the contract. We characterize the optimal cutoff level and show how it depends on the parameters of the problem. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 41–64, 2001     

基于SuperMap的战区油料保障系统设计与实现

通过对SuperMap与战区油料保障的结合,研究了基于SuperMap的战区油料保障系统,充分利用信息时代的成果提高油料保障的效能。分析了建立基于GIS的战区油料保障系统的必要性,全面构建了基于SuperMap的战区油料保障任务的数学模型,提出了未来信息化油料保障的可能途径,系统的设计并实现了基于SuperMap的战区油料保障系统,从而达到优化油料保障环节,缩短油料保障时间,提高油料保障透明度的目标。     

Modeling and analysis of vessel casualties resulting from tanker traffic through narrow waterways

In this paper, we present a physics-based stochastic model to investigate vessel casualties resulting from tanker traffic through a narrow waterway. A state-space model is developed to represent the waterway and the location of vessels at a given time. We first determine the distribution of surface current at a given location of the waterway depending on channel geometry, bottom topography, boundary conditions, and the distribution of wind. Then we determine the distribution of the angular drift for a given vessel travelling at a given location of a waterway. Finally, we incorporate the drift probabilities and random arrival of vessels into a Markov chain model. By analyzing the time-dependent and the steady-state probabilities of the Markov chain, we obtain risk measures such as the probability of casualty at a given location and also the expected number of casualties for a given number of vessels arriving per unit time. Analysis of the Markovian model also yields an analytical result that shows that the expected number of casualties is proportional to square of the tanker arrival rate. We present our methodology on an experimental model of a hypothetical narrow waterway. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Reseach Logistics 46: 871–892, 1999     

Humanitarian response to hurricane disasters: Coordinating flood‐risk mitigation with fundraising and relief operations

To alleviate flooding, caused by hurricanes, governments build structural barriers called levees. In addition, relief providers such as the nongovernmental organizations and charities raise funds, and procure and deliver supplies (food, water, and medicines) for humanitarian relief. The strategy for managing disasters must, therefore, weigh the costs and benefits of building levees as well as procuring and delivering supplies. We use a three‐stage decision making framework to study how the investment in levee capacity can be integrated with supply procurements, fundraising, and rapid response. One of our major findings is that a large fundraising cost discourages postdisaster funding, implying relatively large investments in levee and prepositioned supplies. That notwithstanding, a large social value (of saving life) can tilt the balance in favor of postdisaster funding. If the levee capacity increases, funding for predisaster procurement is reduced without affecting postdisaster funding. For a sufficiently large increase in capacity, however, postdisaster response becomes superfluous. We also find that hurricane uncertainty motivates levees with large capacity. In contrast, levee‐failures motivate levees with small capacity.     

少数民族教育的经济学分析

少数民族教育是我国教育的重要组成部分。发展少数民族教育,提高民族素质具有重要意义。本文从经济学中的效率与公平、供给与需求、成本与效益三个方面理论来分析我国的少数民族教育,从而更好地发展少数民族教育。     

装备研发与制造一体化物资供应支持系统研究

首先分析了研发与制造一体化技术是适应武器装备柔性化制造需求的先进制造技术,然后介绍了装备研发与制造一体化技术的涵义和体系结构,分为以研发为中心的研发与制造一体化技术和以制造为中心的研发与制造一体化技术。最后详细研究了其中的物资供应支持系统及其体系结构。     

多架无人机协同作战的路径规划

提出了一种协调多架无人机的编队同时到达目标的航路规划方法.首先根据敌方防御区域内雷达、导弹等威胁阵地的具体分布情况,采用划分Voronoi多边形的方法制定初始航路,然后通过叠加定长线段到初始航路上对初始航路进行离散化,最后采用动态链类比法调整航路并对航路进行光顺优化处理,使航路安全可飞.并用数字仿真技术对该方法进行了验证,结果表明该方法是可行的.     

Reliability of a two-dimensional demand-based networked system with multistate components

Existing research on multistate system reliability has mainly focused on one-dimensional systems such as parallel systems, linear sliding window systems, and linearly consecutively connected systems. However, two-dimensional networked systems widely exist in real-world applications such as lighting systems, monitoring systems, and computer network systems. This research considers a two-dimensional networked system consisting of multistate components. The system fails if the cumulative performance of any row or any column cannot meet a predetermined demand. A novel reliability evaluation algorithm is proposed for the considered two-dimensional networked system by extending the universal generating function technique. Furthermore, the proposed model and reliability evaluation algorithm are extended to a two-dimensional networked system with phased missions. The proposed models and algorithms are illustrated by a matrix heating system in a thermoforming machine.     

Revenue sharing contracts in a supply chain with uncontractible actions

We consider a supplier–customer relationship where the customer faces a typical Newsvendor problem of determining perishable capacity to meet uncertain demand. The customer outsources a critical, demand‐enhancing service to an outside supplier, who receives a fixed share of the revenue from the customer. Given such a linear sharing contract, the customer chooses capacity and the service supplier chooses service effort level before demand is realized. We consider the two cases when these decisions are made simultaneously (simultaneous game) or sequentially (sequential game). For each game, we analyze how the equilibrium solutions vary with the parameters of the problem. We show that in the equilibrium, it is possible that either the customer's capacity increases or the service supplier's effort level decreases when the supplier receives a larger share of the revenue. We also show that given the same sharing contract, the sequential game always induces a higher capacity and more effort. For the case of additive effort effect and uniform demand distribution, we consider the customer's problem of designing the optimal contract with or without a fixed payment in the contract, and obtain sensitivity results on how the optimal contract depends on the problem parameters. For the case of fixed payment, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier to induce more service effort when the profit margin is higher, the cost of effort is lower, effort is more effective in stimulating demand, the variability of demand is smaller or the supplier makes the first move in the sequential game. For the case of no fixed payment, however, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier when the variability of demand is larger or its mean is smaller. Numerical examples are analyzed to validate the sensitivity results for the case of normal demand distribution and to provide more managerial insights. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Scheduling and due‐date quotation in a make‐to‐order supply chain

We consider a manufacturer, served by a single supplier, who has to quote due dates to arriving customers in a make‐to‐order production environment. The manufacturer is penalized for long lead times and for missing due dates. To meet due dates, the manufacturer has to obtain components from a supplier. We model this manufacturer and supplier as a two‐machine flow shop, consider several variations of this problem, and design effective due‐date quotation and scheduling algorithms for centralized and decentralized versions of the model. We perform extensive computational testing to assess the effectiveness of our algorithms and to compare the centralized and decentralized models to quantify the value of centralized control in a make‐to‐order supply chain. Since complete information exchange and centralized control is not always practical or cost‐effective, we explore the value of partial information exchange for this system. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008