Revenue sharing contracts in a supply chain with uncontractible actions

We consider a supplier–customer relationship where the customer faces a typical Newsvendor problem of determining perishable capacity to meet uncertain demand. The customer outsources a critical, demand‐enhancing service to an outside supplier, who receives a fixed share of the revenue from the customer. Given such a linear sharing contract, the customer chooses capacity and the service supplier chooses service effort level before demand is realized. We consider the two cases when these decisions are made simultaneously (simultaneous game) or sequentially (sequential game). For each game, we analyze how the equilibrium solutions vary with the parameters of the problem. We show that in the equilibrium, it is possible that either the customer's capacity increases or the service supplier's effort level decreases when the supplier receives a larger share of the revenue. We also show that given the same sharing contract, the sequential game always induces a higher capacity and more effort. For the case of additive effort effect and uniform demand distribution, we consider the customer's problem of designing the optimal contract with or without a fixed payment in the contract, and obtain sensitivity results on how the optimal contract depends on the problem parameters. For the case of fixed payment, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier to induce more service effort when the profit margin is higher, the cost of effort is lower, effort is more effective in stimulating demand, the variability of demand is smaller or the supplier makes the first move in the sequential game. For the case of no fixed payment, however, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier when the variability of demand is larger or its mean is smaller. Numerical examples are analyzed to validate the sensitivity results for the case of normal demand distribution and to provide more managerial insights. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Scheduling and due‐date quotation in a make‐to‐order supply chain

We consider a manufacturer, served by a single supplier, who has to quote due dates to arriving customers in a make‐to‐order production environment. The manufacturer is penalized for long lead times and for missing due dates. To meet due dates, the manufacturer has to obtain components from a supplier. We model this manufacturer and supplier as a two‐machine flow shop, consider several variations of this problem, and design effective due‐date quotation and scheduling algorithms for centralized and decentralized versions of the model. We perform extensive computational testing to assess the effectiveness of our algorithms and to compare the centralized and decentralized models to quantify the value of centralized control in a make‐to‐order supply chain. Since complete information exchange and centralized control is not always practical or cost‐effective, we explore the value of partial information exchange for this system. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Nash bargaining over allocations in inventory pooling contracts

When facing uncertain demand, several firms may consider pooling their inventories leading to the emergence of two key contractual issues. How much should each produce or purchase for inventory purposes? How should inventory be allocated when shortages occur to some of the firms? Previously, if the allocations issue was considered, it was undertaken through evaluation of the consequences of an arbitrary priority scheme. We consider both these issues within a Nash bargaining solution (NBS) cooperative framework. The firms may not be risk neutral, hence a nontransferable utility bargaining game is defined. Thus the physical pooling mechanism itself must benefit the firms, even without any monetary transfers. The firms may be asymmetric in the sense of having different unit production costs and unit revenues. Our assumption with respect to shortage allocation is that a firm not suffering from a shortfall, will not be affected by any of the other firms' shortages. For two risk neutral firms, the NBS is shown to award priority on all inventory produced to the firm with higher ratio of unit revenue to unit production cost. Nevertheless, the arrangement is also beneficial for the other firm contributing to the total production. We provide examples of Uniform and Bernoulli demand distributions, for which the problem can be solved analytically. For firms with constant absolute risk aversion, the agreement may not award priority to any firm. Analytically solvable examples allow additional insights, e.g. that higher risk aversion can, for some problem parameters, cause an increase in the sum of quantities produced, which is not the case in a single newsvendor setting. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Lateral stock transshipments in a two‐location inventory system with fixed and joint replenishment costs

We address the problem of inventory management in a two‐location inventory system, in which the transshipments are carried out as means of emergency or alternative supply after demand has been realized. This model differs from previous ones as regards its replenishment costs structure, in which nonnegligible fixed replenishment costs and a joint replenishment cost are considered. The single period planning horizon is analyzed, with the form and several properties of the optimal replenishment and transshipment policies developed, discussed and illustrated. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 46: 525–547, 1999     

Markovian models of three‐on‐one combat involving a hidden defender

In this paper, Markovian models of three‐on‐one stochastic firefights between ground‐based weapon systems are developed. These models address a common scenario of interest to the military, but one which has been much neglected in analytic combat models, that of combat between a hidden defender and an exposed attacking force. Each combatant must detect an opponent before commencing their firing cycle, a task which is considerably more difficult for the attacker. In the models developed here, the defender detects the exposed attacking group after an exponentially distributed time interval, while each attacker has a fixed probability of detecting the defender via the flash signature produced after each shot fired by him. The utility of the approach is demonstrated by investigating what impact the introduction of a coordinated gun‐laying system for the attacking force might have, a system made possible by battlefield digitization. The method used here allows models to be developed incrementally. This and other advantages of the Markovian approach are discussed. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 627–646, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10041     

The transshipment fund mechanism: Coordinating the decentralized multilocation transshipment problem

The multilocation replenishment and transshipment problem is concerned with several retailers facing random demand for the same item at distinct markets, that may use transshipments to eliminate excess inventory/shortages after demand realization. When the system is decentralized so that each retailer operates to maximize their own profit, there are incentive problems that prevent coordination. These problems arise even with two retailers who may pay each other for transshipped units. We propose a new mechanism based on a transshipment fund, which is the first to coordinate the system, in a fully noncooperative setting, for all instances of two retailers as well as all instances of any number of retailers. Moreover, our mechanism strongly coordinates the system, i.e., achieves coordination as the unique equilibrium. The computation and information requirements of this mechanism are realistic and relatively modest. We also present necessary and sufficient conditions for coordination and prove they are always satisfied with our mechanism. Numerical examples illustrate some of the properties underlying this mechanism for two retailers. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

战役物资供应链定性仿真研究

运用定性建模与仿真的方法研究战役物资供应链的整体供应能力,能从整体性角度出发,全局遍历战役物资供应链的不利影响因素。简要介绍了SDG(Signed Directed Graph)定性仿真工具的结构和功能;建立了战役物资供应链整体功能定性仿真模型;根据案例描述,把定量描述转化成定性值,设置定性仿真初始值,进行定性仿真实验。仿真结果为:影响战役物资供应链整体供应能力的主要不利因素为"敌火力打击我战役供应指挥机构",可找到其产生的推理路径,改变定性初始值的设置,控制不利影响因素出现的次数。     

Disruption‐management strategies for short life‐cycle products

Supplier diversification, contingent sourcing, and demand switching (whereby a firm shifts customers to a different product if their preferred product is unavailable), are key building blocks of a disruption‐management strategy for firms that sell multiple products over a single season. In this article, we evaluate 12 possible disruption‐management strategies (combinations of the basic building‐block tactics) in the context of a two‐product newsvendor. We investigate the influence of nine attributes of the firm, its supplier(s), and its products on the firs preference for the various strategies. These attributes include supplier reliability, supplier failure correlation, payment responsibility in the event of a supply failure, product contribution margin, product substitutability, demand uncertainties and correlation, and the decision makes risk aversion. Our results show that contingent sourcing is preferred to supplier diversification as the supply risk (failure probability) increases, but diversification is preferred to contingent sourcing as the demand risk (demand uncertainty) increases. We find that demand switching is not effective at managing supply risk if the products are sourced from the same set of suppliers. Demand switching is effective at managing demand risk and so can be preferred to the other tactics if supply risk is low. Risk aversion makes contingent sourcing preferable over a wider set of supply and demand‐risk combinations. We also find a two‐tactic strategy provides almost the same benefit as a three‐tactic strategy for most reasonable supply and demand‐risk combinations. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

舰艇CGF搜潜过程马氏决策规划模型

舰艇搜索潜艇的过程可以近似地看作一种马尔可夫过程.研究了潜艇训练仿真系统中舰艇CGF(计算机生成兵力)搜索潜艇过程中的状态转移过程和随机搜索发现目标的概率模型,将舰艇CGF搜索潜艇的过程分为若干独立的阶段,建立了搜潜过程马氏决策规划模型,提出了在各种不同初始搜索状态下的舰艇搜索策略.仿真结果给出了舰艇CGF的最优搜索策略集合和发现概率,验证了马氏决策规划模型的有效性.