基于GO法的军事供应链可靠性分析

军事供应链管理要获得高效率和效益,最基础的必须是有高可靠性作保证。结合GO法——一种系统可靠性分析方法和军事供应链自身的特点,阐明了将GO法应用于军事供应链可靠性分析中的可行性。通过构建军事供应链结构模型,运用GO法原理,分析出军事供应链系统中的信号流和操作符,将军事供应链系统结构图转化为GO图,通过GO运算,求出各信号流的等效故障率,进而求出军事供应链中各节点的等效可靠度,对供应链网络结构模型的可靠性问题进行定量分析,并通过实例对该方法的应用进行了具体说明。结果表明：GO法不仅能够计算出整个军事供应链的可靠性,还可以清楚地得到各环节的可靠性,从而可以追溯出影响军事供应链系统整体可靠性的瓶颈,为制定相关的可靠性管理措施提供科学依据。     

电传操纵系统可靠性分析及飞行安全评估

分析了电传操纵系统可靠性,介绍了可靠性设计的工程方法.建立了飞行员排除故障的数学模型,提出了确定驾驶员排除飞行危险的条件概率的两种方法;在研究人-机闭环系统基础之上,建立了基于马尔可夫链的飞行安全评估模型,提出了由于飞行控制系统故障引起飞行危险的安全评估计算方法.最后以横向通道传感器故障为例对某型飞机进行安全评估.     

Inventory transshipment game with limited supply: Trap or treat

Inventory transshipment is generally shown to be beneficial to retailers by matching their excess demand with surplus inventory. We investigate an inventory transshipment game with two newsvendor-type retailers under limited total supply and check whether the retailers are better off than the case without transshipment. We derive the ordering strategies for the retailers and show that unlike the unlimited supply case, a pure Nash equilibrium only exists under certain conditions. Furthermore, contrary to the conventional wisdom, we show that inventory transshipment may not always benefit both retailers. Although one of the retailers is guaranteed to be better off, the other could be worse off. The decision criteria are then provided for the retailers to determine if they will benefit from the exercise of inventory transshipment. Numerical study indicates that the carefully chosen transshipment prices play an important role in keeping inventory transshipment beneficial to both retailers. Subsequently, a coordinating mechanism is designed for the retailers to negotiate transshipment prices that maximize the total profit of the two retailers while keeping each of them in a beneficial position.     

Outbound supply chain network design with mode selection and lead time considerations

We present a large‐scale network design model for the outbound supply chain of an automotive company that considers transportation mode selection (road vs. rail) and explicitly models the relationship between lead times and the volume of flow through the nodes of the network. We formulate the problem as a nonlinear zero‐one integer program, reformulate it to obtain a linear integer model, and develop a Lagrangian heuristic for its solution that gives near‐optimal results in reasonable time. We also present scenario analyses that examine the behavior of the supply chain under different parameter settings and the performance of the solution procedures under different experimental conditions. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

基于险度函数的装备供应链库存风险损失度量

目前,对供应链库存风险损失的定量研究比较少,而定量研究中鲜有对风险偏好变化问题的研究,因此首先分析了各种风险度量方法,通过比较采用了险度函数作为对装备供应链风险损失的度量方法;然后,结合装备供应链实际,提出了定常风险偏好特性险度函数和可变风险偏好特性险度函数的适用范围,以及装备供应链库存风险损失度量的损失水平值,并给出了装备供应链库存风险损失度量函数;最后,通过算例进行了验证.实验结果表明:行为人的不同风险偏好特性会对同一事态产生不同的预判,进而可能影响对风险的决策,这是符合客观现实的.     

Strategic obfuscation of production capacities

Recent supply‐chain models that study competition among capacity‐constrained producers omit the possibility of producers strategically setting wholesale prices to create uncertainty with regards to (i.e., to obfuscate) their production capacities. To shed some light on this possibility, we study strategic obfuscation in a supply‐chain model comprised of two competing producers and a retailer, where one of the producers faces a privately‐known capacity constraint. We show that capacity obfuscation can strictly increase the obfuscating producer's profit, therefore, presenting a clear incentive for such practices. Moreover, we identify conditions under which both producers' profits increase. In effect, obfuscation enables producers to tacitly collude and charge higher wholesale prices by moderating competition between producers. The retailer, in contrast, suffers a loss in profit, raises retail prices, while overall channel profits decrease. We show that the extent of capacity obfuscation is limited by its cost and by a strategic retailer's incentive to facilitate a deterrence. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 244–267, 2014     

Impact of tax reduction policies on consumer purchase of new automobiles: An analytical investigation with real data‐based experiments

We investigate and compare the impact of the tax reduction policies implemented in the United States and China to stimulate consumer purchase of new automobiles and improve manufacturers' profits. The U.S. policy provides each qualifying consumer with a federal income tax deduction on state and local sales and excise taxes paid on the purchase price (up to a cutoff level), whereas the Chinese policy reduces the vehicle sales tax rate for consumers. We observe that these policy designs are consistent with the tax management system and the economic environment in the respective country. We analytically determine the effects of the two tax reduction policies on the automobile sales and the manufacturer's and the retailer's profits. Numerical examples are then used to provide insights on the importance of certain factors that influence the effects of the two policies. Finally, a numerical experiment with sensitivity analysis based on real data is conducted to compare the merits and characteristics of the two policies under comparable conditions. We find that the U.S. policy is better than the Chinese policy in stimulating the sales of high‐end automobiles, whereas the Chinese policy is better than the U.S. policy in improving the sales of low‐end automobiles. The U.S. policy is slightly more effective in increasing the profitability of the automobile supply chain; but, in general, the Chinese policy is more cost effective. The methodology developed herein can be used to evaluate other tax reduction policies such as those related to the purchase of energy‐saving vehicles and to serve as a decision model to guide the choice of alternative tax reduction policies. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 61: 577–598, 2014     

Optimization of steerable sensor network for threat detection

A Markov chain approach to detecting a threat in a given surveillance zone by a network of steerable sensors is presented. The network has a finite number of predetermined states, and transition from one state to another follows a Markov chain. Under the assumption that the threat avoids detection, two game theoretic problems for finding an optimal Markov chain (two surveillance strategies) are formulated: the first maximizes the probability of threat detection for two consecutive detection periods, whereas the second minimizes the average time of detection for the worst‐case threat's trajectory. Both problems are reduced to linear programming, and special techniques are suggested to solve them. For a dynamic environment with moving noise sources, the optimal Markov chain changes at each detection period, and the rate of convergence of the Markov chain to its stationary distribution is analyzed. Both surveillance strategies are tested in numerical experiments and compared one with another. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Monitoring the market or the salesperson? The value of information in a multilayer supply chain

We study a supply chain in which a manufacturer relies on a salesperson to sell the products to the consumers. The sales outcome is determined by a random market condition and the salesperson's service level, both of which are privately observed by the salesperson. Apart from them, there are two types of resellers: a knowledgeable reseller observes the market condition, whereas a diligent reseller can monitor the service level. While delegating to a reseller enhances information acquisition, it may also result in double marginalization and inefficiency. We identify several operating regimes in which double marginalization can be eliminated via simple contracts and establish the benefit of monitoring the salesperson over monitoring the market. Our dominance result is not prone to our model characteristics regarding the complementarity of market condition and sales effort, the relative importance of adverse selection and moral hazard, and the contract form. We then generalize our model and re‐establish the dominance result in the presence of reseller's risk aversion or private monitoring expertise. We also quantify the performance gaps among different selling schemes under various scenarios. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

系统动力学的C~4ISR系统信息优势价值链模型仿真

实现信息优势是网络中心战的核心,C4ISR系统是打赢网络中心战、夺取信息优势、决策优势和行动优势的客观基础。从C4ISR系统的工作流程出发,分析了C4ISR系统信息优势价值链,围绕战场态势感知信息优势价值链的生成过程,运用系统动力学方法建立了对抗条件下C4ISR系统信息优势价值链的SD模型,并结合作战背景对试验结果进行了仿真分析,验证了该方法研究复杂军事信息系统的可行性。