冲激雷达抗 RAM能力的实验研究

本文用实验方法从频域和时域两个方面研究了涂覆吸波材料目标的电磁散射,结果表明超宽带信号比常规雷达的窄带信号对付涂覆吸波材料目标有10～12dB好处,说明超宽带信号的确具有抗窄带吸波材料的良好能力。     

现代水面舰船结构发展的若干问题

本文综述现代水面舰船结构的若干进展,从舰船结构材料、结构型式以及舰船生存能力等方面进行评述。     

充电法在复合材料静电测试中的问题

按照GJB2605－96中有关静电衰减性能测试的要求,自制了复合材料静电衰减性能测试装置。用这套测试装置对9种不同结构的复合材料进行了实验研究。研究表明,利用充电法测试材料静电衰减性能时,由于电容效应,测试结果不能正确反映被测材料的静电性能。     

某型锅炉蒸发管束选材方案的探讨

通过对КВΓ－７６型锅炉蒸发管束强度计算的分析验算,发现原设计在某些参数的选取上存在明显的误差,导致选材要求过高．经过论证,得出可用普通碳素钢管替代低合金钢管的结论．     

抗超高速撞击多层结构复合材料研究

本文介绍了抗超高速撞击多层结构复合材料的设计、制备和实验,并对结果进行了讨论,实验证明,以SiC陶瓷基复合材料为防护层、以空心微珠或多孔变密度复合材料为缓冲层、以编织物复合材料为结构层的多层结构复合材料,具有面密度低、抗撞击速度范围宽、抗撞击性能好的特点。     

隐蔽锥扫雷达波束的交叉点电平

本文根据隐蔽锥扫雷达天线的工作原理,从方向性函数出发,分析了接收状态下高频馈电网络中,和差信号的幅相特性与隐蔽锥扫波束交叉点电平的关系,从而对不能自动跟踪的隐蔽锥扫雷达,从天馈系统方面分析了原因,并为设计和部队维修提供了理论根据和有效方法。     

小波理论的单脉冲雷达目标RCS特性测量

随着现代信号处理技术的发展,对非平稳信号分析和处理的小波分析技术已成功应用于雷达目标特性分析领域,大功率单脉冲雷达作为我国航天测控网当中的主干设备,具有一定的目标特性识别能力。主要针对目前靶场的现有装备,讨论了基于小波理论的单脉冲雷达空间目标RCS特性测量,并对窄带低分辨率雷达在未来空间目标识别中发挥其作用谈了作者的看法。     

A Novel Framework for Safeguarding Naval Nuclear Material

ABSTRACT

The present international standard allows non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to forego safeguards when nuclear material is used in a “non-proscribed military activity,” though no criteria have been established to determine when NNWS can remove naval nuclear material from safeguards. Though at present, only nuclear-armed states possess nuclear submarines, the global nuclear naval landscape may soon change with the advancement of Brazil's fledgling program and the possible precedent it would set for other NNWS. A framework is needed to shore up nuclear security and prevent nuclear material diversion from the nuclear naval sector. Proposed and existing nonproliferation frameworks, including a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and commitments through the nuclear security summits, are insufficient to close this loophole. A Naval Use Safeguards Agreement (NUSA), modeled after the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency, would provide a framework to remove the opacity surrounding nuclear material in the naval sector. Designed for NNWS and encouraged as confidence-building measures for nuclear weapon states, NUSA would explicitly outline those stages in the naval nuclear fuel cycle where safeguards are to be applied and in what context. This viewpoint also further provides direction for targeted research and development in technical naval nuclear safeguards solutions.     

FACILITATING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: Verified Declarations of Fissile Material Stocks and Production

Unprecedented interest in seeking progress toward nuclear disarmament exists today; even some nuclear weapon states are looking for new ways to strengthen this process. National declarations of fissile material holdings—highly enriched uranium and plutonium—could play an important role in supporting this effort, facilitating not only transparency but also the irreversibility of the process. This article discusses what kind of content such declarations could have in order to be meaningful and effective, the sequence of data on fissile material holdings that states might release, and some of the challenges to be expected in reconstructing historic fissile material production; it also summarizes current attitudes of weapon states toward making such declarations. Initial declarations can be valuable as confidence-building measures, but better and more background data are necessary if declarations are to serve as the groundwork for deeper cuts in the nuclear arsenals. A robust verification approach would ultimately require inspectors to have access to fissile material production and storage sites. The methods and tools of nuclear forensic analysis—in this context also dubbed nuclear archaeology—would be a key element of this process. This article discusses the capabilities and limitations of potential approaches to verifying declarations of historic production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium; it also identifies and discusses opportunities for further research and development.     

STRATEGY FOR A NEW NUCLEAR AGE

Current U.S. nuclear weapons strategy, force structure, and doctrine contribute to the threat of nuclear terrorism in several ways. First, the U.S. nuclear stockpile presents opportunities for nuclear terrorists to seize the materials they need. Second, U.S. nuclear forces remain a key justification for Russia's maintenance of similar nuclear forces that are less well protected. Third, America's continued embrace of nuclear weapons encourages and legitimizes other states to seek nuclear weapons that they will have difficulty securing from terrorists. The national security interests of the United States would be better served by a strategy to shrink the global footprint of nuclear weapons and provide the highest possible levels of security for the most minimal possible deterrent forces. Given the inability to secure nuclear weapons and materials perfectly or to eliminate terrorism in the foreseeable future, reducing the global inventory of nuclear weapons and materials is the most reliable way to reduce the chances of nuclear terrorism.