全文获取类型
收费全文 | 573篇 |
免费 | 88篇 |
国内免费 | 42篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 1篇 |
2023年 | 3篇 |
2022年 | 8篇 |
2021年 | 14篇 |
2020年 | 13篇 |
2019年 | 13篇 |
2018年 | 10篇 |
2017年 | 23篇 |
2016年 | 30篇 |
2015年 | 22篇 |
2014年 | 42篇 |
2013年 | 50篇 |
2012年 | 46篇 |
2011年 | 47篇 |
2010年 | 31篇 |
2009年 | 53篇 |
2008年 | 23篇 |
2007年 | 36篇 |
2006年 | 49篇 |
2005年 | 38篇 |
2004年 | 28篇 |
2003年 | 25篇 |
2002年 | 11篇 |
2001年 | 16篇 |
2000年 | 15篇 |
1999年 | 6篇 |
1998年 | 6篇 |
1997年 | 4篇 |
1996年 | 6篇 |
1995年 | 7篇 |
1994年 | 3篇 |
1993年 | 3篇 |
1992年 | 2篇 |
1991年 | 8篇 |
1990年 | 9篇 |
1989年 | 2篇 |
排序方式: 共有703条查询结果,搜索用时 31 毫秒
191.
B. Peter Rosendorff 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(5-6):443-457
This paper presents a game‐theoretic model of suicide terrorism containing three agents: the terrorist leader; a targeted government; and potential terrorist supporters. Supporters join the terrorist group if they gain more from their participation than from their economic opportunities. Preemptive measures by the government can result in a backlash that encourages recruitment through new grievances. Suicide attacks can also lead to recruitment. Increases in preemption costs and/or economic opportunities can reduce the overall level of terrorism, while increasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks. An increase in the effect of preemption on recruitment, or the propaganda effect of suicide bombings has the opposite effect of increasing normal and suicide attacks, but decreasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks in the terrorist organization’s strategy profile. 相似文献
192.
Todd Sandler 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(3):533-548
This article puts forth collection action as a unifying theme for the conference essays on arms trade, control, and production. For each of these topics, collective action failures are related to group size and group composition considerations. Other issues are also examined including the manner in which individual contributions determine the overall level of the associated collective good ‐ the so‐called aggregation technology of public supply. Based on alternative aggregation technologies, the game‐theoretic underpinnings of these arms issues are explored. 相似文献
193.
Kjell Hausken 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(5):517-519
Kovenock and Roberson's (2012a, b) replication of Hausken’s (2008a) equations and parameter restrictions do not enhance our insight into the defense and attack of reliability systems. This reply intends to fill the remaining understanding gaps. 相似文献
194.
Scott Helfstein 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3):385-405
This paper uses game theory and modeling to address the role of incentive structures and information dynamics in nuclear inspections. The traditional argument is that compliant states should be willing to allow inspections to prove their innocence, while proliferating states are likely to impede inspections. This argument does not take into account the historical variation in inspection, signaling, and sanctioning behaviors. Using a game theoretic analysis and model, it is shown that the separation of proliferators from nonproliferators only occurs when the likelihood of proliferation is high and punishment costs are moderate. The model assumes that states can choose how much to cooperate with inspectors and must pay opportunity or secrecy costs when inspections are effective. The results are tested against a set of real-life cases, providing support for the claims of historical variation and the model's deductive propositions. 相似文献
195.
Jeffrey S. Lantis 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):389-409
The 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) produced a Final Document calling for an extension of the principles of the nonproliferation norm as well as steps toward complete disarmament. This article looks beyond the rhetoric, however, to examine recent decisions by great powers to expand nuclear trade with non-NPT countries and the implications of these decisions on the traditional nonproliferation norm of restraint. This article seeks to contribute to constructivist theory by supplementing existing accounts of norm creation and establishment with a new model of norm change. The article develops a case study of the 2008 US-India nuclear deal to highlight the role of elite agency in key stages of norm change, including redefinition and constructive substitution through contestation. It concludes that the traditional nonproliferation norm may be evolving in new directions that are not well captured by existing theoretical frames. 相似文献
196.
Todd C. Robinson 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(1):53-70
ABSTRACTWhat do we mean by nuclear proliferation? What does it mean to proliferate? This article investigates both the literal and figurative meaning of the term “proliferation.” It argues that many of the definitions and conceptualizations of nuclear proliferation often used by scholars are either limited in their utility or logically inconsistent. It then reconceptualizes and redefines the term, incorporating an understanding of both its etymological origins and the geopolitical context in which the phenomenon occurs. It concludes by exploring the potential impact that the politicization of the phenomenon may have on the identification of occurrences of proliferation, from both an academic and a policy-making perspective. 相似文献
197.
针对云重心和云模型评判方法存在的信息丢失、难于评判以及信息扭曲等问题,从确定权重等级、评价集和评价结果3个方面对模型进行了改进和完善.应用二元语义确定指标权重,避免了评价信息的丢失和扭曲,采用综合云的思想确定评价集,充分利用评价者给出的信息,简化相似云的理论来定量衡量评价结果,从而建立了基于云理论一二元语义的雷达装备保障指挥效能评估模型. 相似文献
198.
In this article, we explore when firms have an incentive to hide (or reveal) their capacity information. We consider two firms that aim to maximize profits over time and face limited capacity. One or both of the firms have private information on their own capacity levels, and they update their beliefs about their rival's capacity based on their observation of the other firm's output. We focus on credible revelation mechanisms—a firm may signal its capacity through overproduction, compared to its myopic production levels. We characterize conditions when high‐capacity firms may have the incentive and capability to signal their capacity levels by overproduction. We show that prior beliefs about capacity play a crucial, and surprisingly complex, role on whether the firm would prefer to reveal its capacity or not. A surprising result is that, despite the fact that it may be best for the high‐capacity firm to overproduce to reveal its capacity when capacity information is private, it may end up with more profits than if all capacity information were public knowledge in the first place. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013 相似文献
199.
200.