知识库推理和维护系统 (KBIMS)

赋予知识库自动推理和维护功能,从而使知识库有效和实用,是知识库面临的关键问题。本文提出了一程基于缺言推理的知识库自动推理和维护方法,并介绍了根据此方法,在VAX—Ⅰ/780上使用GKD—Prolog 作为工具实现的一个知识库推理和维护系统。     

机械装备磨损量检测参数的一种确定方法

本文依据以可靠性为中心的维修理论,提出了一种新的检测磨损量的方式——功能检测,并给出了确定有关检测参数的方法和步骤.     

制订科学的预防维修大纲加速维修管理科学化

本文探讨了欧洲国家维修团体联盟(EFNMS)第十次学术会议的主题——“维修——为了未来的投资”的意义和内涵.在此基础上,重点介绍了为获取此种投资效益所必需制订的预防维修大纲的方法及其理论依据.     

一种炮瞄雷达故障诊断专家系统

依据炮瞄雷达故障诊断的需要,提出了一种智能化炮瞄雷达故障诊断专家系统设计方案。探讨了方案的组成,给出了实用诊断策略。     

舰用锅炉过热器使用寿命的论证

鉴于某型舰用锅炉过热器破损的主因在于其内部腐蚀,而破损的主要方式是由管头的溃烂开始直至整个管头烂掉为止,导致管子的胀接松动而漏泄。因此,过热器的使用年限全取决于管头的腐蚀速度。通过确定过热器内管头的腐蚀率、锅炉年内运行时间以及保养时间等要素来估算过热器的使用寿命。     

一种提高水雷可靠性的改进性维修新方法

本文介绍一种水雷引信维修的新方法。该方法是改变以前那种原件修复的办法,对可靠性低的部件进行重新设计,从技术上进行改造,提出新的可靠性指标,设计新的部件,进行改进性维修,提高水雷的可靠性,延长其使用寿命。这种设想原则上也可适用于其它武器装备。     

关于军用计算机在坦克部队维修保障问题的探讨

从全系统全寿命的观点来认识装备的维修性,呼吁有关单位在研制以计算机为核心的军用装备时,要同时考虑装备交付部队使用后的维修保障问题,防止出现装备买得起,用不了或用不起的局面。文章从维修保障的重要性、产品维修性设计和维修保障设计等几个方面提出一些看法,并提出一些参考作法。     

The Afghan model in northern Iraq

In Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’, as the Coalition's heavy forces fought in the South, in the North a handful of special operations forces, working with Kurdish rebels, clashed with the Iraqi army along the Green Line. In operations reminiscent of those used a year earlier to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, the lightly armed and heavily outnumbered Coalition forces called in air strikes to defeat Iraq's regular and Republican Guard army divisions. This article tells the story of these operations and discusses some of their implications for future US military policy. The success of the Afghan model in Iraq goes a long way toward demonstrating the efficacy of new air-heavy tactics and shows the strategic value of using light indigenous allies to replace heavy US land forces in both conventional combat and occupation operations.     

Westmoreland was right: learning the wrong lessons from the Vietnam War

Fourth Generation Warfare is a theory of contemporary warfare that posits a number of different ideas that are able to shed light on current conflicts. Whilst much of the debate has been concentrated on the linear development of warfare and also on analysis of the current situation of US forces in Iraq, it has resonance for a number of different conflicts taking place in Africa, if only because the US has become involved in contemporary conflicts in Somalia and the Mahgreb. There are clearly significant issues with the US-centric, flawed linear approach to history, but the actual analysis of modes of warfare has much to offer policymakers in a continent that is under-represented in the literature, and is also in danger of being forgotten in the shadow of analysis of Iraq. This paper moves on from criticising the stepped approach to history and looks at patterns of warfare in contemporary Africa, arguing that there is much in the theory that could be used to explain seemingly illogical tactics or patterns, and thus has much to tell policymakers engaged in conflict analysis.

Rebellions can be made 2 per cent active in a striking force, and 98 per cent passively sympathetic.1 ?1. T.E. Lawrence, ‘Science of Guerrilla Warfare’, 1929, published in Malcolm Brown (ed) T.E. Lawrence in War and Peace: An Anthology of the Military Writings of Lawrence of Arabia (London: Greenhill Books, 2005) p.284.      

Unnecessary or unsung? The utilisation of airpower in Britain's colonial counterinsurgencies

Making extensive use of primary archival documents, this article seeks to explore whether airpower in three of Britain's most significant post-war colonial counterinsurgency campaigns, Malaya, Kenya and South Arabia, was an unnecessary part of British strategy, offering little useful military force due to the futility and strategic damage rendered by offensive bombardment, or whether airpower was indeed an unsung factor that provided operational flexibility through its effectiveness in a supply context, as well as its intelligence role in providing valuable aerial reconnaissance. In all three case studies the role played by the RAF in medical evacuations, in troop drops, in crop spraying during food-denial initiatives, and in providing ‘Voice Aircraft’ for the propaganda campaign, provide insights into an under-explored component of Britain's politico-military efforts in counterinsurgency in the 1950s and 1960s and suggests that the main strategic value of airpower in counterinsurgency, then and now, lies in its non-kinetic functions.