The view from above: how the Royal Air Force provided a strategic vision for operational intelligence during the Malayan Emergency

It has long been held that the Federation of Malaya’s counter-insurgency campaign during the First Malayan Emergency (1948–60) was determined by the use of intelligence. Special Branch — the Federation’s primary intelligence agency — dominates the prevailing paradigm of how the insurgent threat was tackled. Conversely, the role of the Royal Air Force (RAF) within this paradigm is very limited. Most observers simply dismiss the role of photoreconnaissance or airstrikes as being largely inconsequential to the counter-insurgency effort. This is perhaps understandable: the Emergency was after all a ‘policing action’ and the insurgents were largely hidden under Malaya’s jungle canopy and amongst the Chinese community. However, further scrutiny reveals that the RAF made a much more significant contribution to the intelligence element of the counter-insurgency campaign than previously realised. First, the RAF decided to locate their Advanced Headquarters with the Army’s General Headquarters. This led to the creation of the Land/Air Operations Room, through which intelligence, tasking and resources were coordinated. Moreover, the RAF put its intelligence teams into the field to provide a practical link between local units and theatre-level assets. Second, with the support of the Army, the RAF established at the beginning of the Emergency the Joint Air Photographic Intelligence Board (Far East). This coordinated all photographic intelligence requirements throughout the Emergency, which was then delivered via the Joint Air Photographic Centre (Far East). Hence, via Joint Operations Centre and JAPIB (FE), the RAF provided both the practical means for effective joint intelligence operations at theatre level throughout the Emergency.     

PXI计算机在一体化多模式发控系统中的应用

针对一体化火控系统的特殊性,提出了基于PXI计算机的发控技术,介绍了PXI总线计算机在一体化火控系统中的设计理念及其在一体化火控系统中的功能实现.应用表明,PXI计算机在火控系统测控领域具有广阔的应用前景.     

改进的粒子群神经网络在飞控中的应用

针对BP神经网络对初始值敏感、容易陷入局部寻优且收敛速度较慢,提出用粒子群对神经网络的参数进行优化,同时设计了衰减的指数函数对惯性权重进行动态调整以提高算法性能.并应用该算法对导弹飞控系统的逆误差进行补偿,仿真结果表明,该方法对逆误差进行了有效的补偿,避免了局部寻优并提高了学习效率.     

基于倾斜开关曲线的小推力器姿态控制方法分析与准极限环控制方法

研究了利用小推力器进行航天器姿态控制问题。从理论上推导了在给定姿态控制精度、小推力器参数以及倾斜开关曲线参数的前提下,能够形成理想极限环控制效果的充分必要条件。对相关文献中倾斜开关曲线设计方法不能形成理想极限环的情况进行了理论分析,提出了一种新的基于倾斜开关曲线的准极限环控制方法,并推导了其控制精度。研究对于航天器应用小推力器实现高精度姿态控制具有较大的工程应用价值。     

应急辅助定位及精度评估方法研究

在可视导航卫星数少于四颗、无法进行传统导航解算的恶劣环境下,导航接收机可利用外部高程气压计提供的高程或者内部守时模块的钟差等信息进行应急辅助定位。在该应急辅助定位工作模式的误差分析中,传统导航定位误差传递模型无法适用。针对此问题,本文在研究三星结合高程、三星结合钟差、双星结合高程钟差等几种应急辅助定位原理的基础上,给出了新的应急辅助定位误差传递的分析模型,利用仿真算例验证了该模型的正确性。通过对定位精度的分析,说明根据卫星分布特点可以按照本文方法量化得到伪距测量与辅助信息的精度的最优数量级关系,可以用最小代价实现定位精度的提升。该结论可指导接收机外部辅助器件的选择。     

The Long and Winding Road: The US Army Managerial Approach to Command and the Adoption of Mission Command (Auftragstaktik)

The purpose of the current paper is to examine the adoption and adaptation process of mission command (Auftragstaktik) in the US Army. This concept, developed by the Prussians, denotes a decentralized command approach wherein superiors dictate their intent and allow subordinates to formulate their operational plans independently and change it according to the emerging situation. The paper examines the US command approach prior to the adoption of mission command. It argues that it was heavily influenced by corporate management practices which inherently contradict mission command approach. It continues and investigates how the US Army endeavored to emulate the approach in its doctrine and in major operations.

While it has officially incorporated mission command into its doctrine, it has been less successful in utilizing it in operational situations. This state of affairs has to do with the cultural legacy of the managerial approach to command that still persist. Despite the partial success, the US Army has recently reaffirmed its commitment to this approach.     

Insights from a Database of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Militants

This article uses a novel database of 1,625 posthumously published biographies of members of two Islamist militant organizations (Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)), all of whom were killed in the course of carrying out militant attacks. In general, each biography provides data on the militant’s birthplace, education, recruitment, and training. The number of observations in this database is a full order of magnitude larger than those of previous databases assembled from militant biographies. While the sample of militants in this database is the product of multiple selection effects, analysis of the database undermines many common myths about Pakistani militants and casts doubt on current policy approaches to mitigating Islamist militancy in Pakistan.     

The Israel Defense Forces as an epistemic authority: An intellectual challenge in the reality of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict

The changes in the nature of warfare and its transformation toward Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) intrastate conflict have challenged the patterns of interaction between the political and the military echelons in Israel. It seems that the political echelon's superiority is maintained at the institutional and formal levels, but on the substantive level, which demands relying on knowledge and systematic staff work, the political echelon's position is weakened and loses its validity.

Introducing the military echelon in Israel as an epistemic authority regarding the violent confrontation and the main outlines of the military knowledge development process might clarify why the absence of the required dialogue between the echelons and the weakness of the intellectual effort increased the military's influence over the shaping of Israeli conflict-management strategy. The argument's validity and its explanatory power can be found relevant for other countries whose militaries are deeply involved in the management of LIC.     

Reconsidering American strategy in South Asia: destroying terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan's tribal areas

Over seven years after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, Afghanistan is again at the forefront of the headlines, faced with a brutal insurgency and a resurgent Taliban. Many scholars and policymakers attribute the instability in Afghanistan to a terrorist sanctuary in the neighboring Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Pakistan has attempted to eliminate this sanctuary through negotiation and armed force. This paper argues that Pakistani strategy has failed to achieve its desired results because of local tribal norms, the weak nature of previous agreements, military units ill-equipped for a counterinsurgency and counterterrorism role, as well as ideological fissures in the Pakistani establishment. Afterward, the paper argues that the United States and Coalition forces should pursue their strategy remaining cognizant of local tribal norms, step up training efforts for Pakistani forces, promote development of the tribal areas, and cultivate options for eliminating the FATA sanctuary through covert means.