航空时敏制导炸弹增程弹道组合优化设计

为增强航空时敏制导炸弹在中制导段的滑翔能力,将极小值原理与自适应进化粒子群算法相结合,提出了一种适用于航空时敏制导炸弹增程弹道的组合优化设计方法。基于纵向平面内质心运动模型,推导了性能指标泛函及各不等式约束函数。引入Lagrange乘子矢量并建立相应的Hamilton函数实现无约束泛函极值问题的转换,推导出兼顾各优化目标函数的满意优化模型。利用自适应进化粒子群算法对该段增程弹道进行了攻角与弹翼张合档位双设计变量的组合优化。数值仿真算例表明,在满足状态方程约束的条件下,双变量的增程效果比常规单变量控制时显著提高,其优化结果可为制导炸弹弹道规划设计的研究提供一定的理论参考。     

潜艇自航模控制系统设计

为满足自航模操纵性试验的需要,设计了潜艇自航模控制系统的结构,建立了基于TCP/IP的网络通信协议,为保障自航模操纵性实验的安全性,设计了应急处理流程,通过对自航模定深控制过程的分析,完成了升降舵模糊控制器的设计。基于实现的自航模控制系统在操纵性实验中表现良好,对于类似系统的设计与实现具有一定借鉴意义。     

舰炮火控雷达实测误差时序特性分析建模

针对舰炮火控雷达高精度实时仿真建模的问题,运用高斯分布和正态平稳过程的两种误差序列生成方法,建立火控雷达简化仿真模型。通过对某火控雷达实测数据误差的统计及时序相关性分析,完成误差序列仿真生成与验证,给出了实现舰炮火控雷达探测误差仿真的优选方法。实践证明,正态平稳模型的误差生成方法可以有效满足新型舰炮仿真试验火控雷达建模要求。     

绳系拖曳离轨过程中的摆动抑制策略

以周向常值连续小推力作用下的绳系拖曳离轨为背景,针对离轨过程中的系绳摆动抑制问题,建立了系统质心轨道动力学方程及系绳摆动动力学方程,分析了无系绳收放控制时的系绳摆动特性以及系绳收放对系绳摆动的作用效果,构造了使系绳摆动衰减的期望绳长收放速率并设计了系绳张力控制律。仿真结果表明:无系绳收放控制时,系绳摆动表现为平衡位置附近的周期性往复运动;张力控制连续平滑,很好地实现了系绳实际长度对期望长度的跟踪,同时有效地抑制了离轨过程中的系绳摆动。     

远程复杂通信电磁环境模拟器的设计与实现

通信电磁环境模拟器是保障完成通信对抗装备检测与训练的重要设备。提出了一种基于任意波形发生器和嵌入式GPRS/GPS模块的远程模拟器设计方案。同时,讨论了一种模拟器的组网拓扑设计,实现了复杂信号环境生成。解决了远程通信电磁环境生成问题,具有很高的工程应用价值。     

多无人机协同任务分配方法

任务分配是多UCAV协同控制的核心和有效保证,是一类复杂的多目标优化问题。针对一种扩展的混合整数线性规划(MILP)任务分配模型,通过对模型特点的分析,提出一种基于相似度的遗传退火算法解决该问题并进行仿真实验,仿真结果表明该算法具有较强的收敛性和较好的多样性,验证了改进算法解决该问题模型的有效性。     

基于脉冲控制的末修弹飞行稳定性研究

脉冲力的瞬间作用会引起攻角和侧滑角的急剧变化,对末修弹飞行稳定性产生较大的影响.以线性化运动微分方程组为数学解析手段,对末修弹脉冲作用稳定性进行深入分析研究.数值仿真表明,采用小扰动法分析弹丸脉冲控制弹丸飞行稳定性是可行的.     

Is Russia a revisionist military power in the Arctic?

In contrast with a widespread perception of Russia as an expansionist power in the Arctic, this article argues that Moscow does not seek military superiority in the region. Rather, Moscow's military strategies in the Arctic pursue three major goals: first, to demonstrate and ascertain Russia's sovereignty over its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the region; second, to protect its economic interests in the High North; and third, to demonstrate that Russia retains its great power status and still has world-class military capabilities. The Russian military modernization programs are quite modest and aim at upgrading the Russian armed forces in the High North rather than providing them with additional offensive capabilities or provoking a regional arms race. The Russian ambitions in the Arctic may be high, but they are not necessarily implying the intentions and proper capabilities to confront other regional players by military means. On the contrary, Moscow opts for soft rather than hard power strategy in the Arctic.     

Financial versus human resources in the Greek‐Turkish arms race: A forecasting investigation using artificial neural networks

This paper aims at forecasting the burden on the Greek economy resulting from the arms race against Turkey and at concentrating on the leading determinants of this burden. The military debt and the defence share of GDP are employed alternatively in order to approximate the measurement of the arms race pressure on Greece, and the method used is that of artificial neural networks. The use of a wide variety of explanatory variables in combination with the promising results derived, suggest that the impact on the Greek economy resulting from this arms race is determined, to a large, extent, by demographic factors which strongly favour the Turkish side. Prediction on both miltary debt and defence expenditure exhibited highly satisfactory accuracy, while the estimation of input significance, indicates that variables describing the Turkish side are often dominant over the corresponding Greek ones.     

Arms trade,arms control,and security: Collective action issues

This article puts forth collection action as a unifying theme for the conference essays on arms trade, control, and production. For each of these topics, collective action failures are related to group size and group composition considerations. Other issues are also examined including the manner in which individual contributions determine the overall level of the associated collective good ‐ the so‐called aggregation technology of public supply. Based on alternative aggregation technologies, the game‐theoretic underpinnings of these arms issues are explored.