动物机器人及其潜在军事应用价值

动物机器人由于具有出色的隐蔽性和环境适应性,可能在未来战争或局部冲突中会扮演重要角色,成为决定战场胜负的杀手锏。针对动物机器人及其潜在的军事应用价值,本文介绍了动物机器人的原理,根据动物生存环境的差异综述了陆地动物机器人、飞行动物机器人和水下动物机器人等三种类型机器人的研究现状;在此基础上,分析了动物机器人在抵近侦察、目标引导、对象识别和直接打击等方面的潜在军事应用价值,并讨论了动物机器人走向实用过程中存在的刺激靶点、刺激方式、生物相容性、操控器件、无线通讯以及能源供给等方面存在的工程问题以及未来研究方向。动物机器人优势十分明显,但对技术的要求也非常高,目前仅仅处于起步阶段,未来的路还任重道远。     

以联合训练推动军种训练提质增效

联合训练以军种训练为基本支撑,形成作战能力的关键在于军种训练与联合训练的无缝衔接。在新的领导指挥体制下,战区作为组织开展联合训练的主体,必须将军种训练纳入战区联合训练的整体计划。因此,军种训练要从标准体系、训练内容、组训模式等方面进行革新优化,切实将军种作战能力融合形成联合作战能力。本文针对当前军种在训练过程中出现的思维转变慢、训法不灵活和联训质效偏低等问题,着眼联训需求、部队建设实际以及战争发展方向,从提升联合素养、深化联合观念、丰富训练内容、引入智能化军事训练方法、优化训练环境、督导训练落实等方面提出了对策建议,以期以联合训练牵引军种训练提质增效,切实推动联合训练不断向高水平跃升。     

美军推进人工智能军事应用的举措、挑战及启示

人工智能技术的发展加速了军事智能化的脚步。本文分析了美军在推进人工智能军事应用方面采取的一系列举措,如注重国家战略层面的顶层设计,出台一系列智能化发展战略规划;部署各类军事智能化研究项目,开展大数据、智能算法研究,促进人工智能技术向情报处理、无人作战平台、指挥控制、武器装备系统、作战方式变革的渗透转化;重视智能化技术的基础理论研究和人才培养,聚焦核心和关键技术的突破,夯实军事智能化发展的基础。阐述了美军在推进人工智能军事应用进程中面临的来自技术、信任、伦理等多方面的挑战,并从成熟算法民转军用、寻求认知智能算法突破、培养军事智能化复合型人才等角度提出几点启示。     

共享经济视域下的军事训练场地整合

军改以来,"军委管总、战区主战、军种主建"的格局打破了原有军事训练场地的建设、管理和使用模式,训练场地需求旺盛,缺口较大,急需构建适应新体制新机制的新型训练场地建设管理体系,满足训练需求。本文分析了当前军事训练场地建设管理中存在的问题,提出了基于共享经济模式整合军事训练场地资源的对策措施。     

近期美国海军南海地区活动态势分析

随着南海地区力量结构和美对华战略的转变,南海地区成为中美战略博弈的焦点。为围堵遏制中国的崛起,美国针对中国在南海实施了一系列海上挑衅行为。美国海军作为美国军事干预的主要力量,从兵力部署、演习演训、“航行自由”行动等着手,积极拉拢域内外盟友,展开并强化了在南海地区的军事活动。这些军事活动表现出极强的针对性和实战性,致使中美海上摩擦和竞争加剧。未来,美国为维护主导的全球秩序,将进一步提升美国海军在南海地区的威慑力。美国海军会借助并增加域内盟友的军事力量,继续维持高强度的装备平台活动及“航行自由”行动,推动海上力量合作。     

新形势下军队军事计量培训建设

随着我军信息化建设的不断发展,军事计量在装备全系统、全寿命、全过程监管中发挥着越来越重要的作用。武器装备信息化程度越高,越需要严苛的计量保障体系,而计量人员是军事计量保障工作的主体,所以,加强我军军事计量人员的培训工作,具有非常重要的意义。本文通过对地方计量人员培训体系进行分析,利用军地融合方式,研究我军军事计量培训工作在新时期新阶段的发展思路。     

应急物流保障与军地物流一体化研究

应急物流与军事物流都是在特殊条件下发生的物流活动,研究应急物流与军地物流一体化对于促进军事物流的发展具有重要意义.简述了应急物流的基本问题,分析了实现应急物流保障的基本条件:需要完善的应急法律体系、功能健全的应急指挥机构以及高效可靠的应急物流保障平台,阐明了军地物流一体化与应急物流的区别、军地物流一体化的重要作用,并对军地物流一体化下的应急物流保障模式进行了研究.     

Asia-Pacific Demand for Military Expenditure: Spatial Panel and SUR Estimates

This article investigates the demand for military expenditure for a sample of key Asia-Pacific countries. Spatial panel demand estimates are presented for three joined spatial units using a fixed-coefficient spatial lag model based on a two-step efficient GMM estimator. Spatial autoregression estimates are next presented for 1991–2015, founded on alternative kinds of country connectivities, such as contiguity, inverse distance, discrete distance, and power-projection considerations. Finally, 11 select countries’ demands for defense equations are estimated using seemingly unrelated regressions. From alternative perspectives, these estimated models indicate how Asia-Pacific countries respond to the defense spending of other countries. In the spatial runs, free riding is prevalent despite the growing military might of China, which apparently is not generally viewed as a threat. For the sample period, the projection of Chinese or American power is a relevant spatial factor. The main threat is reflected in non-U.S. allies’ reaction to U.S. allies’ defense spending during 1991–2015 and to Chinese defense spending after 2002.     

Ideology,ballots, and alliances: Canadian participation in multinational military operations

The decision to employ force abroad is often a contentious political decision, where partisanship plays a crucial role. Prior to military intervention, political parties usually make their ideologically distinctive preferences clear and seek to implement them once in power. What remains unclear, however, is how ideology affects the decision to use military force. This article contends that alliance and electoral calculations constrain the ability of political parties to implement their ideological preferences with regards to the use of force. It examines a “most likely” case for the partisan theory of military intervention, namely Canada’s refusal to take part in the invasion of Iraq and its decision to commit forces to the war against the Islamic State. It finds that only in combination with alliance and electoral calculations does executive ideology offer valuable insights into Canada’s military support to U.S.-led coalition operations, which contributes to our understanding of allied decision-making.     

Did the Russian General Staff experiment with free play during VOSTOK-2018?

The VOSTOK-2018 strategic field training exercise (FTX) that took place in mid-September 2018 rehearsed forces’ integration and combat preparedness across multiple strategic directions. Regarding combat readiness, the research question outlined in this paper relates to whether the General Staff experimented with mission-command - a key component of Russia’s modern military thinking. The answer is clearly no: operational creative manoeuvring hardly featured during the VOSTOK-2018 drills for clearly identified reasons. At the systemic level, little room was left for initiatives since the drills focused on implementing and testing command and control (C2) systems. At the structural level, VOSTOK-2018 was not oriented towards mission-command but ‘mission-control’ and streamlining centralised decision-making processes down to the tactical level. At the symbolic level, free play was not exercised due to the participation of China in the drills, and the necessity to impress Chinese military observers.