天基信息支援指挥控制体系运行机制及复杂网络建模?

天基信息支援是当前联合作战的主要样式之一,指挥控制体系是天基信息支援联合作战的核心和神经中枢,构建天基信息支援指挥控制体系运行机制和网络结构模型有助于提升天基信息支援乃至联合作战体系效能。探讨了天基信息支援云作战的基本概念和主要特点、天基信息支援云作战体系的构成和运行机制、以及天基信息支援云作战指挥控制体系的构成和流程,勾画了天基信息支援云作战指挥控制的理论框架,并结合示例构建了天基信息支援云作战指挥控制体系结构的复杂网络模型,并进行了主要参量分析,对开展天基信息支援指挥控制体系建设,指导天基信息支援以及联合作战体系需求论证、结构设计、评估优化等具有积极而现实的参考价值。     

电脑黑客的研究意义及对抗效果

综述了黑客对网络的巨大破坏性及在军事上的攻击方法,就保护己方网络免受黑客破坏的防范措施、黑客闯入己方网络后的补救方法,及黑客对抗的消长等问题进行了探讨     

引入定向越野训练,提高学员综合素质

将定向越野训练引入军事地形学教学,激发学员的竞争意识与学习兴趣,改变单一的教学方式,将用图训练与体能训练相结合,提高训练的难度与强度,加强了课程的综合性,这一过程无论从理论或实践上,都为全面提高学员的军人综合素质、课程教学质量,深化教学改革打下了基础。     

C3I系统仿真及仿真环境研究

首先讨论了C3I系统开发中存在的问题并提出解决这些问题的重要性,然后从C3I系统描述模型和仿真环境两个方面,介绍了国内外对于C3I系统仿真的研究现状和发展趋势.最后介绍了我们正在研制的基于对象Petri网的仿真演示环境的特点以及设计和实现方法.     

Automated integration of real-time and non-real-time defense systems

Various application domains require the integration of distributed real-time or near-real-time systems with non-real-time systems.Smart cities,smart homes,ambient intelligent systems,or network-centric defense systems are among these application domains.Data Distribution Service(DDS)is a communi-cation mechanism based on Data-Centric Publish-Subscribe(DCPS)model.It is used for distributed systems with real-time operational constraints.Java Message Service(JMS)is a messaging standard for enterprise systems using Service Oriented Architecture(SOA)for non-real-time operations.JMS allows Java programs to exchange messages in a loosely coupled fashion.JMS also supports sending and receiving messages using a messaging queue and a publish-subscribe interface.In this article,we pro-pose an architecture enabling the automated integration of distributed real-time and non-real-time systems.We test our proposed architecture using a distributed Command,Control,Communications,Computers,and Intelligence(C4I)system.The system has DDS-based real-time Combat Management System components deployed to naval warships,and SOA-based non-real-time Command and Control components used at headquarters.The proposed solution enables the exchange of data between these two systems efficiently.We compare the proposed solution with a similar study.Our solution is superior in terms of automation support,ease of implementation,scalability,and performance.     

A reusable planar triggered spark-gap switch batched-fabricated with PCB technology for medium-and low-voltage pulse power systems

Triggered spark-gap switch is a popular discharge switch for pulse power systems. Previous studies have focused on planarizing this switch using thin film techniques in order to meet the requirements of compact size in the systems. Such switches are one-shot due to electrodes being too thin to sufficiently resist spark-erosion. Additionally, these switches did not employ any structures in securing internal gas composition, resulting in inconsistent performance under harsh atmospheres. In this work, a novel planar triggered spark-gap switch (PTS) with a hermetically sealed cavity was batched-prepared with printed circuit board (PCB) technology, to achieve reusability with low cost. The proposed PTS was inspected by micro-computed tomography to ensure PCB techniques meet the requirements of machining precision. The results from electrical experiments demonstrated that PCB PTS were consistent and reusable with lifespan over 20 times. The calculated switch voltage and circuit current were consistent with those derived from real-world measurements. Finally, PCB PTS was used to introduce hexanitrostilbene (HNS) pellets in a pulse power system to verify its performance.     

重塑军队作战力量体系的几点思考

作战力量体系是一个国家军事力量体系的核心组成部分。近些年通过深化国防和军队改革,我军军事力量体系宏观上发生了脱胎换骨的变化,接下来到了对作战力量体系进行重塑的攻坚阶段,本文结合当前作战力量体系发展的一些特点和建设存在的短板,提出了重塑我军作战力量体系的决策建议。      

Moving the techno-science gap in Security Force Assistance

This paper looks at the impact of military technology diffusion on military assistance operations (MAO), in the United States known as Security Force Assistance or SFA. The discussion looks conceptually at the role of technological change and how it interacts with martial cultures in military assistant operations. I argue that growing trends in science and technology suggest potential conflicts between culture and technology. Relying on a culture-technology model drawn from anthropology, the paper contends that new technologies will present increasing challenges for the emerging MAO landscape. The paper will illustrate that the techno-science gap will continue to grow as innovations such as robotics, sensors, and networks continue to develop. Finally, the paper will look at ways to overcome this conflict between culture and technology.     

Mirror,mirror on the wall,who is the most offensive of them all? – Explaining the offensive bias in military tactical thinking

This article explores why the offensive predominates military tactical thinking. With survey results showing an offensive bias among 60 per cent of senior Swedish officers and as many as 80 per cent in the case of the army, it is clear that this is not just a problem of the past but is equally relevant today. The article asks why there is a tendency to perceive and understand offensive tactics as the preferred choice and the way to conduct battle that should be encouraged and preferred. Drawing on existing research and the findings of a pilot study, ten propositions for why the offensive bias exists are tested using a mixed-method approach. Based on the findings, the article develops a model to understand why the offensive dominates military tactical thinking. It is found that the two key constitutive factors behind the offensive bias are military culture and education. These factors most directly and profoundly influence an officer’s identity, perceptions, and thinking. Military culture and education, in turn, work as a prism for four other factors: military history, the theory and principles of war, doctrine and TTPs, and psychological factors.     

The Russian hybrid warfare strategy – neither Russian nor strategy

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its initial actions in eastern Ukraine in 2014, the term hybrid warfare has received much public attention. Many have argued that the Russian actions we saw in Ukraine were part of a completely new strategy while others have suggested that there was nothing new in Russia’s actions. This article takes a critical look at these claims. Through the assessment of the history of the term hybrid warfare and a rigorous analysis of the so-called Gerasimov doctrine, this study finds that the Russian hybrid warfare strategy is rather a western myth than a formal comprehensive Russian strategic concept. Additionally, through the assessment of the Russian use of information operations and the way she has utilised the cyberspace in several recent conflicts, the study finds that against all claims Russia did not make these areas its main battlefield, but rather has been using them in support of its traditional concepts.