Dual‐ascent and primal heuristics for production‐assembly‐distribution system design

This article proposes two dual‐ascent algorithms and uses each in combination with a primal drop heuristic embedded within a branch and bound framework to solve the uncapacitated production assembly distribution system (i.e., supply chain) design problem, which is formulated as a mixed integer program. Computational results indicate that one approach, which combines primal drop and dual‐ascent heuristics, can solve instances within reasonable time and prescribes solutions with gaps between the primal and dual solution values that are less than 0.15%, an efficacy suiting it for actual large‐scale applications. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

The practice and theory of British counterinsurgency: the histories of the atrocities at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul, 1938–1939

This article details two largely unreported atrocities by British forces operating against Arab rebels during the Arab revolt, 1936–9, at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul. It then examines the military-legal system that underpinned and authorised British military forces operating in aid of the civil power, suggesting that the law in place at the time allowed for a level of reprisals and punitive actions, such as happened at al-Bassa and Halhul. The article does not conclude that the law allowed for atrocities but it does argue that it gave a basic form and understanding to an operational method that was brutal and could lead to atrocities. It thus tests the idea in much of the literature on counterinsurgency that the British were restrained and used minimum force when compared to other colonial and neo-colonial powers fighting insurgents.     

India's counter-insurgency experience: the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy

The Indian Army, a force trained primarily for conventional warfare, has been engaged in internal counter-insurgency operations since the 1950s. Despite such a long innings on a counter-insurgency mode, little attention has been accorded within military circles to doctrinal innovation for waging sub-conventional warfare in India's democratic political context. At best, the Army continues to view counter-insurgency duty as secondary to its primary duty of defending India from external conventional threats. By conceptualizing a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’, this article aims to fill this critical doctrinal gap in India's military policy. The author argues that a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’ based on democratic political culture, measured military methods, special counter-insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness and an integrative nation-building approach will result in positive handling of India's internal security problems. The author utilizes India's counter-insurgency experiences in Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, and Operation ‘Sadhbhavana’ in Jammu and Kashmir as illustrative empirical indicants in order to validate the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy.     

基于非对称balls-into-bins的高效平衡负载分配模型

在大规模数据中心和P2P覆盖网络等复杂网络负载平衡分配中,前人提出了多种多样的负载分配方法,但许多方法为了达到更好的平衡负载指标,追求越来越复杂的算法,使得时间复杂度和算法复杂度很难控制在合理的范围之内。本文在研究了经典balls-into-bins、Azar balls-into-bins和balls into non-uniformbins等模型的基础上,提出了一种新颖高效的非对称balls-into-bins平衡负载分配模型,该模型具有异构的balls、异构的bins,以及不同的bin选择概率,能以很高的概率将最大负载均衡地控制在合理的范围内,通信负载很小,且具有很好的可扩展性,通过拓展,该模型在负载平衡的诸多领域都将有广阔的应用空间。     

失去润滑条件下弧齿锥齿轮传动系统瞬态温度场Simulink仿真分析

根据传热学理论和热网络法,以某型直升机尾减速器弧齿锥齿轮传动系统为研究对象,建立了其温度场Simulink仿真计算模型。基于该模型,计算获得该传动系统正常润滑条件下的稳态温度场,并以它作为初始条件计算分析该传动系统失去润滑条件下的瞬态温度场,为预测该弧齿锥齿轮传动系统在失去润滑条件下的干运转生存能力提供理论依据。     

弹载惯性测量系统抗高过载技术

在现代高技术条件下的局部战争中,为了提高火炮的射程、打击精度和反应速度,发展制导炮弹系统就成为必然的选择.弹体姿态测量系统是制导系统的重要组成部分,解决其在炮弹发射高过载恶劣环境下的生存问题就成为研究的关键之一.提出了主要抗高过载手段,并对弹体姿态测量系统的抗高过载性能进行了Ansys软件仿真、马歇特试验以及实弹飞行试验.最后得到结论,所给出的抗高过载方案在降低高过载对弹体姿态测量系统的影响方面,可以发挥良好的作用.     

雷达侦察比幅测向系统干扰技术

重点分析了比幅测向系统的原理,在此基础上提出对其进行"主动反侦察"干扰的方法,推导了受到干扰下比幅测向系统的测量结果公式,讨论了不同条件下的干扰效果,并通过仿真进行验证。     

Unrestricted warfare: Review essay I

During the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970), France chose to support Biafra, but only on a limited scale, providing mercenaries and obsolete weaponry to Ojukwu's regime. General Charles de Gaulle's assistance to Ojukwu was conditioned by the French military drawdown after 1961, the increased power of French secret services on the continent, and the interventions in Katanga (1960–1963), Gabon (1964) and Chad (1968–1972). France supported Biafra primarily to protect its former colonies from Nigeria, stop Soviet subversion and acquire an economic foothold in the oil-rich Niger Delta. De Gaulle chose a limited strategy for two reasons. If Biafra won the war, France would be Biafra's greatest ally. If Nigeria won the war, France could extricate itself from the situation relatively easily and re-establish relations with the Nigerian government, which is what ultimately occurred.     

Component importance for linear consecutive‐ k ‐Out‐of‐ n and m ‐Consecutive‐ k ‐Out‐of‐ n systems with exchangeable components

Measuring the relative importance of components in a mechanical system is useful for various purposes. In this article, we study Birnbaum and Barlow‐Proschan importance measures for two frequently studied system designs: linear consecutive k ‐out‐of‐ n and m ‐consecutive‐ k ‐out‐of‐ n systems. We obtain explicit expressions for the component importance measures for systems consisting of exchangeable components. We illustrate the results for a system whose components have a Lomax type lifetime distribution. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Institutionalizing supreme command: explaining political–military integration in the Vietnam War, 1964–1968

Under what conditions can leaders achieve wartime political–military integration? In the Vietnam War, political–military integration exhibited dramatic variation: in the air war, the US was able to tightly integrate its political objectives and military conduct, but in the ground war, the American military prosecuted a strategy that was both divorced from broader political objectives and was immune from Washington's influence. I argue that the nature of information management between the military and civilian leadership explains the pattern of political–military integration in the Vietnam War more completely than do explanations that focus on the organizational cultures of professional militaries.