Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

Intelligence and military doctrine: paradox or oxymoron?

This article examines the evolution of the current British military joint intelligence doctrine. We argue that military intelligence doctrine is dogged by an intrinsic tension between the ethos and expectations of military doctrine and those of the professional practice of intelligence. We further argue not only that prior iterations of UK joint intelligence doctrine failed to effectively deal with this intelligence doctrine dilemma, but also that measures in the current doctrine to address this problem directly created their own problems. Moreover, as a result, otherwise sound innovations in the current UK intelligence doctrine have proven unsuitable to wider diffusion in more recent intelligence doctrine such as the new NATO intelligence doctrine which, otherwise, draws extensively on its British precursor.     

Buy now,pay later: American military intervention and the strategic cost paradox

This paper explores the notion that US efforts to evade the political costs of war paradoxically contribute to the subsequent exacerbation of costs over time. Leaders seek to purchase political capital in the short term by limiting the costs and requirements of military operations, but in doing so cause strategic and political liabilities to mount in the long run. While identification of such behaviour is not new, insufficient attention has been devoted to explaining its causes, dynamics, and manifestations in relation to key decisions on and in war. Evidence derived from studies of recent American discretionary campaigns is analysed to advance an argument with respect to this pattern of self-defeating strategic behaviour.     

The Anglo-American military relationship: Institutional rules,practices, and narratives

The Anglo-American military relationship is a vital yet neglected area of study. This article argues that the British military have actively cultivated a relationship with the U.S. military that has contributed to the longevity of the broader so-called “Special Relationship,” even in the Trump era. The article contends that the complexities of the military relationship can best be captured by the theoretical lens provided by Lowndes and Roberts that combines different strands of institutionalism to focus on rules, practices, and narratives. The intense linkages between the United States and United Kingdom have become routinized, enabling them to adapt their peacetime cooperation to conflicts, and thereby address post-Cold War security challenges. The article draws upon semi-structured interviews with senior British military officers as well as policy documents to explore how these patterns of collaboration have become ingrained in patterns of both thinking and behavior.     

区块链在分队战术协同中的应用构想

从战术分队角度出发,探讨了区块链技术在作战实体之间的信息交互及智能协同方面的应用设想,分析了战术分队信息交互的相关技术及面临的挑战,阐述了区块链在未来战术分队指挥体系构建中的发展构想。     

基于层次分析法的军校学员体能训练评估

针对目前军校学员军事体育训练评估难以量化考核的问题,提出了基于层次分析法的军校学员体能训练评估方法。首先,通过建立评估指标体系,构建评估指标判断矩阵;其次,进行归一化并计算指标组合权重,构建评估基本模型;最后,利用评估模型对学员体能训练进行综合评估。结果表明本文提出的方法能够对军校学员体能训练进行有效评估,相比于传统考核评估方法更能反映出学员体能的真实状况,突出学员体能特征,开展针对性训练。      

Armed Conflict,Military Expenses and FDI Inflow to Developing Countries

This paper investigates the relationship between military expenditure and FDI inflow conditioning on the exposure of a country to armed conflict in the long run. We apply the band spectrum regression estimator, and the maximal overlap discrete wavelet transform, to a panel of 60 developing countries, for the years 1990 to 2013. The estimated results indicate that military expenditure, in the absence of armed conflict, reduces FDI inflow. However, the negative effect is mitigated by increased military expenditure, in the presence of armed conflict. We also show that the effect of military expenditure on FDI is time sensitive, in that it takes time for military expenditure to affect FDI inflow. FDI inflow in response to higher military expenditure is higher for the country that faces higher armed conflict than the country that faces lower armed conflict. The findings are robust in the case of overall as well as internal conflict. These results are also robust to the alternative specification, subsample analysis with different armed conflict thresholds, and the estimation using the time variant long-run models.     

通用武器装备供应系统设计中的硬、软系统方法整合研究

分析了硬、软系统方法应用的异同点,研究了将硬、软系统方法整合起来处理通用装备供应系统设计的问题,最后提出了系统设计的框架。     

装备物资供应保障中的装卸优化方法

装备物资装卸作为供应保障的一个重要环节 ,对装备物资保障效能的发挥有着极大的影响。综述了装备物资装卸过程中应遵循的原则和装卸搬运作业方法 ,提出了装备物资装卸的优化方法。     

风险评价在军队营区环境管理中的应用

分析了军队营区环境风险的概念,认为要消减军队营区环境风险,不能仅考虑降低风险概率或风险后果,而应从风险概率与风险后果两者的乘积效应出发,通过综合分析和控制环境风险系统来解决;着重探讨了军队营区环境风险评价的内容和方法,包括环境风险识别、环境风险预计、环境风险评价与对策.军队营区环境风险评价可从二个层次进行评价一是从事件及与之有关联的周围环境条件出发,按"环境风险系统"的思路,从风险源、初级控制条件、二级控制条件、目标4个阶段进行评价;二是从事件或行动的具体问题出发,评价其风险的重大性和可接受性.最后讨论了军队营区环境风险管理的内容和方法.