Dual‐ascent and primal heuristics for production‐assembly‐distribution system design

This article proposes two dual‐ascent algorithms and uses each in combination with a primal drop heuristic embedded within a branch and bound framework to solve the uncapacitated production assembly distribution system (i.e., supply chain) design problem, which is formulated as a mixed integer program. Computational results indicate that one approach, which combines primal drop and dual‐ascent heuristics, can solve instances within reasonable time and prescribes solutions with gaps between the primal and dual solution values that are less than 0.15%, an efficacy suiting it for actual large‐scale applications. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Component importance for linear consecutive‐ k ‐Out‐of‐ n and m ‐Consecutive‐ k ‐Out‐of‐ n systems with exchangeable components

Measuring the relative importance of components in a mechanical system is useful for various purposes. In this article, we study Birnbaum and Barlow‐Proschan importance measures for two frequently studied system designs: linear consecutive k ‐out‐of‐ n and m ‐consecutive‐ k ‐out‐of‐ n systems. We obtain explicit expressions for the component importance measures for systems consisting of exchangeable components. We illustrate the results for a system whose components have a Lomax type lifetime distribution. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Estimating non‐transparent military expenditures: The case of china (PRC)∗

Data limitations arising from non‐transparency in military expenditure reporting impose significant constraints on economists studying country and comparative developments in this field. This article focuses on the case of China. It reviews the recent literature on China's military expenditure, examines the variance in published estimates, and identifies three factors which help explain the variance: budgetary falsification; non‐budgeted PLA revenue; and the US dollar purchasing‐power parity of the yuan. Conclusions emphasize important policy implications of such variance and suggest a more active role for defence economists in a field of research generating considerable attention from international relations scholars.     

WHO IS THE ENEMY?

We examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and who benefits when a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to serve the same people in common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rents obtained from the public by engaging in actions against the common enemy. We determine the leadership structure under which each group is better off, as well as the circumstance that the common enemy prefers. We are able to state simple and general conditions for each group and the common enemy to benefit.     

DEFENSE SPENDING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN TURKEY: A LINEAR AND NON‐LINEAR GRANGER CAUSALITY APPROACH

This paper uses linear and non‐linear Granger causality methods to determine the causal relationship between defense spending and economic growth in Turkey for the period 1949–2004. The innovative feature of this paper is that it provides evidence regarding the nonlinear causal dependence between military spending and economic growth in Turkey. The empirical results contribute to the empirical literature by indicating support for both linear and non‐linear causality between military expenditures and economic development and they may prove useful in theoretical and empirical research by regulators and policy makers.     

Democracy and peace: Reply to oneal and russett

The criticism of James, Solberg and Wolfson (JSW) (1999) by Oneal and Russett (OR) is not responsive to the methodologica] issues at stake. JSW argued that war is an endogenous feature of the world political and economic system. If its causes are to be measured, it must be as a structural equation in a simultaneous system. Wedded to the idea that “democracies never fight each other,” OR rely on a single equation to justify their view. JSW claim that such an equation may be an ad hoc reduced form with no causal implications unless the equation is explicitly identified as a structural equation. JSW expand the model to explain democracy and conflict as two endogenous variables. JSW do not claim to have discovered the true relationships between these variables by their minimal expansion of the structural relation. They do show that unless these (and other) variables are treated as part of a system, the results are unstable, contradictory, of minimal size and not a reliable guide to public policy.     

“Government contracting options: A model and application“∗

This paper models and simulates a government‐contractor principal‐agent weapon system repair model. Insights are derived as to how government repair contracts should be constructed so as to induce optimal contractor behavior. The paper's general conclusion is that the best contracting approach combines a lump‐sum payment that does not vary with the number of units repaired, expensive item cost‐sharing, and a contractor‐provided availability guarantee. Provided there is intercontractor competition, this type of contract performs well even if the government is poorly informed about weapon system break patterns or repair costs.     

Optimal (τ, T) opportunistic maintenance of a k‐out‐of‐n:G system with imperfect PM and partial failure

The opportunistic maintenance of a k‐out‐of‐n:G system with imperfect preventive maintenance (PM) is studied in this paper, where partial failure is allowed. In many applications, the optimal maintenance actions for one component often depend on the states of the other components and system reliability requirements. Two new (τ, T) opportunistic maintenance models with the consideration of reliability requirements are proposed. In these two models, only minimal repairs are performed on failed components before time τ and the corrective maintenance (CM) of all failed components are combined with PM of all functioning but deteriorated components after τ; if the system survives to time T without perfect maintenance, it will be subject to PM at time T. Considering maintenance time, asymptotic system cost rate and availability are derived. The results obtained generalize and unify some previous research in this area. Application to aircraft engine maintenance is presented. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons;, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 223–239, 2000     

Optimal policies for M/M/m queue with two different kinds of (N,T)‐policies

In this paper, two different kinds of (N, T)‐policies for an M/M/m queueing system are studied. The system operates only intermittently and is shut down when no customers are present any more. A fixed setup cost of K > 0 is incurred each time the system is reopened. Also, a holding cost of h > 0 per unit time is incurred for each customer present. The two (N, T)‐policies studied for this queueing system with cost structures are as follows: (1) The system is reactivated as soon as N customers are present or the waiting time of the leading customer reaches a predefined time T, and (2) the system is reactivated as soon as N customers are present or the time units after the end of the last busy period reaches a predefined time T. The equations satisfied by the optimal policy (N*, T*) for minimizing the long‐run average cost per unit time in both cases are obtained. Particularly, we obtain the explicit optimal joint policy (N*, T*) and optimal objective value for the case of a single server, the explicit optimal policy N* and optimal objective value for the case of multiple servers when only predefined customers number N is measured, and the explicit optimal policy T* and optimal objective value for the case of multiple servers when only predefined time units T is measured, respectively. These results partly extend (1) the classic N or T policy to a more practical (N, T)‐policy and (2) the conclusions obtained for single server system to a system consisting of m (m ≥ 1) servers. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 240–258, 2000     

Note: On the two‐machine no‐idle flowshop problem

In this short note we study a two‐machine flowshop scheduling problem with the additional no‐idle feasibility constraint and the total completion time criterion function. We show that one of the few papers which deal with this special problem contains incorrect claims and suggest a way how these claims can be rectified. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47:353–358, 2000