舰载激光武器反导作战使用研究

反舰导弹日益严重的威胁要求水面舰艇必须进一步提高自身防空反导能力。在分析研究激光武器拦截反舰导弹可行性的基础上,模拟了激光武器对“鱼叉”反舰导弹的拦截,提出了激光武器反导作战使用的一般方法及其上舰所存在的问题,对增强水面舰艇在未来海战中的生命力和战斗力有重要意义。     

战略防御系统软件的可靠性分析

战略防御是试图消除来自核弹道导弹的威胁．根据目前的软件技术和战略防御系统的特点,我们认为,其软件不可能达到预期目标．     

真实静电感度测试的数据处理方法

简要介绍了静电感度测试方法的研究现状,结合真实静电感度测试研究的实际情况并参照GJB377—87感度试验用升降法,导出了试样50％发火能及其发火能量标准差的计算公式,给出了多组试验参数的统计计算方法,确定了试样静电最小点火能的置信区间。     

野战防空作战系统的仿真策略

在分析野战防空作战系统特点的基础上,讨论该系统的仿真策略,提出了主动实体交替扫描的仿真策略,并给出了非形式化的描述。该方法体现了事件调度法和活动扫描法的优点,使之更适合于仿真带有对抗性离散事件系统,因此,对其它作战系统,尤其是战术C~3I 系统的仿真,也是适用的。     

野战防空C~3I与防空兵作战指挥控制

陆军防空兵自动化指挥系统已作为防空作战效能“倍增器”列入国家军装武器发展规划,并在近期可能交付防空部队使用。这一新装备、新技术的出现和发展必然会引起防空作战指挥的变化。在分析防空兵指挥自动化对防空作战指挥影响的基础上,对如何发挥防空兵自动化指挥的防空作战效能和防空兵指挥自动化需迫切解决的一些问题加以探讨。     

Expeditionary police advising: some causes of failure

ABSTRACT

The practice of dispatching teams of police advisors to other states to build or train foreign security forces began at the end of the nineteenth century, yet there exists no definitive history of the practice, or any definitive theoretical approach underpinning why such missions succeed or fail. Drawing upon their recent edited book on expeditionary police advising, and by examining the donor or sending states, the host nations, and the use of police in counterinsurgency situations, the authors present some key reasons why such missions fail, and lay some groundwork for additional study of this important subject.     

The failure of defense planning in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions: ascertaining causation and determining solutions

By any objective measure, defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe have all but universally been incapable of producing viable defense plans that are based on objective costing and operational planning data. This situation exists in spite the provision of considerable Western advice and assistance, let alone reporting to and receiving assessments by NATO’s International Staff under Partnership for Peace, as well as via the integrated defense planning and reporting systems. An explanation for this systematic failure across European post-Communist defense institutions can be found in the continued slow development of an over-arching policy framework which directs and approves all activities of the armed forces, as well as the de-centralization of financial decision-making down to capability providers. The essay ends with an examination of the adverse effects of the early introduction of planning programming, budgeting system (PPBS), have had on the development of effective policy and planning capabilities within these defense institutions.     

Boost-glide Weapons and US-China Strategic Stability

ABSTRACT

The United States and China are testing boost-glide weapons, long-range strike systems capable of flying at Mach 5 or faster through the upper atmosphere. For the United States, these systems would provide a conventional prompt global strike capability, which, together with US ballistic missile defense programs, Chinese experts regard as a threat to China's ability to conduct nuclear retaliation. This perception is encouraging the Chinese military to modify its nuclear posture in ways that tend to create greater risks for both sides. If China's own boost-glide systems are meant to carry nuclear payloads only, their deployment would not fundamentally alter the current situation between the two states. However, if they were conventionally armed or dual-purpose, or if the United States could not determine the payloads they carried, the deployment of Chinese boost-glide systems could compound problems of strategic stability created by the introduction of ballistic missile defense, antisatellite, and antiship ballistic missile capabilities. If the technical hurdles can be overcome, it may be difficult for the two sides to refrain from these deployments in the absence of strong mutual trust or an established arms-control relationship. New confidence-building measures and expanded mutual transparency are warranted to avoid creating new dangers.     

Bomboozled: How the U.S. Government Misled Itself and Its People into Believing They Could Survive a Nuclear Attack

Bomboozled: How the U.S. Government Misled Itself and Its People into Believing They Could Survive a Nuclear Attack, by Susan Roy. Pointed Leaf Press, 2011. 176 pages, $45.     

Pakistan's policy on minimum deterrence: why minimum is not the minimum?

This article focuses on Pakistan's policy option of “minimum deterrence” (MD) post-1998 nuclearization of South Asia and explores why “minimum” in reality is not the minimum. It states that the term “minimum” has not been fully defined yet due to which MD stays ambiguous. In addition, it endeavors to elaborate the rudimentary factors responsible for the non-existence of an MD, which, in turn, keeps the Pakistani stance on MD dynamic and evolving.