全文获取类型
收费全文 | 370篇 |
免费 | 52篇 |
国内免费 | 66篇 |
出版年
2022年 | 2篇 |
2021年 | 9篇 |
2020年 | 7篇 |
2019年 | 11篇 |
2018年 | 22篇 |
2017年 | 31篇 |
2016年 | 24篇 |
2015年 | 24篇 |
2014年 | 29篇 |
2013年 | 56篇 |
2012年 | 31篇 |
2011年 | 30篇 |
2010年 | 11篇 |
2009年 | 22篇 |
2008年 | 16篇 |
2007年 | 26篇 |
2006年 | 44篇 |
2005年 | 31篇 |
2004年 | 17篇 |
2003年 | 10篇 |
2001年 | 14篇 |
2000年 | 6篇 |
1999年 | 6篇 |
1998年 | 1篇 |
1997年 | 1篇 |
1996年 | 1篇 |
1994年 | 2篇 |
1993年 | 3篇 |
1989年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有488条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
71.
72.
Yoad Shefi 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(6):427-448
This paper models the interactions between the defense industry market structure and the defense needs of Israel, the USA and Western Europe, which produce several heterogeneous defense goods. The model specifies that the defense industries of the US and Europe are ‘large’ while that of Israel is ‘small’. The US military aid to Israel is also an integral part of the model. The results show that net defense costs of Israel are minimal when the number of its defense firms is one. The model predicts that an increase in US military aid reduces Israel’s government expenditure, its defense industry’s profits and its net defense costs. 相似文献
73.
This paper models the interactions between the defense needs of the USA and Western Europe, which produce several heterogeneous defense goods, and the defense industry market structure. The results show that net defense costs of the USA and Europe are lower when the number of defense firms in each arms‐producing country is small and when the world prices of the defense goods are high. The model predicts that the increase in world prices will crowd‐out countries in the developing world from the market for modern weapon systems and may force them to develop and use ‘cheap and dirty’ weapon systems. 相似文献
74.
Nicholas Apergis Matteo Bonato Rangan Gupta Clement Kyei 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(6):684-696
AbstractWe use the k-th-order nonparametric causality test at monthly frequency over the period of 1985:1 to 2016:06 to analyze whether geopolitical risks can predict movements in stock returns and volatility of 24 global defense firms. The nonparametric approach controls for the existing misspecification of a linear framework of causality, and hence, the mild evidence of causality obtained under the standard Granger tests cannot be relied upon. When we apply the nonparametric test, we find that there is no evidence of predictability of stock returns of these defense companies emanating from the geopolitical risk measure. However, the geopolitical risk index does predict realized volatility in 50% of the companies. Our results indicate that while global geopolitical events over a period of time is less likely to predict returns, such global risks are more inclined in affecting future risk profile of defense firms. 相似文献
75.
Since the post-World War II genesis of nuclear deterrence, two presidential initiatives have been presented to deliver humanity from the threat of its failure. The first was the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a constellation of space- and ground-based systems that President Ronald Reagan envisioned would render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” The second is President Barack Obama's roadmap to “a world without nuclear weapons,” commonly referred to as “Global Zero.” While these proposals appear to have little in common, deeper investigation reveals a number of provocative similarities in motivation and presentation. Moreover, both generated fierce debate, often with ideological overtones, about their strategic desirability and technical feasibility. We use these parallels, as well as prominent dissimilarities, to draw lessons from the SDI experience that can be applied to the debate over Global Zero. 相似文献
76.
77.
78.
Matthew Hughes 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3-4):528-550
This article details two largely unreported atrocities by British forces operating against Arab rebels during the Arab revolt, 1936–9, at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul. It then examines the military-legal system that underpinned and authorised British military forces operating in aid of the civil power, suggesting that the law in place at the time allowed for a level of reprisals and punitive actions, such as happened at al-Bassa and Halhul. The article does not conclude that the law allowed for atrocities but it does argue that it gave a basic form and understanding to an operational method that was brutal and could lead to atrocities. It thus tests the idea in much of the literature on counterinsurgency that the British were restrained and used minimum force when compared to other colonial and neo-colonial powers fighting insurgents. 相似文献
79.
80.
Jangkhomang Guite 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(2):447-478
ABSTRACTThis paper concerns the lesser known British counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Northeast frontier of India during the First World War. Officially known as the ‘Kuki Operations’, it was considered as part of the Great War. Carried out in isolation from press and public, and shelved in colonial archives, the event remained invisible until today. Yet, it registers a critical case of colonial COIN doctrine where the ‘moral effect’ doctrine was employed without being questioned. It unleashed enormous amount of organized violence, ranging from shoot at sight to indiscriminate burning of villages, wholesale destruction of property and livestock, prevention of cultivation and rebuilding of villages, forced mass displacement in jungles or in ‘concentration camps’, and collective punishment (communal penal labour and payment of compensation) after the war. This paper argues that the theory of ‘minimum force’ and the practicability of the ‘moral effect’ doctrine as applied by the Empire, sit oddly with each other at the frontier, where violence was seen both as a natural and moral orders. Violence as an ‘imperatively necessary’ method to bring order in a disorderly frontier, in the opinion of colonial state, informs and registers Northeast India as geography of violence. 相似文献