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31.
Some U.S. military leaders have asserted that the United States, Japan, Australia, and India and the Republic of Korea are developing multilateral defense cooperation to deter aggression and uphold norms much like North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has in Europe. Frequent military exercises and China’s threats to freedom of navigation (FoN) and North Korea’s nuclear missiles comprise the motive force for such cooperation. However, cooperation thus far has been trilateral and minimal, given divergent national interests and dispersed geopolitical locations. Cooperation among Japan, Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States is increasing given the threat, but ROK’s public opinion is divided about Japan. Australia, Japan, and India have increased cooperation with the United States but are reluctant to conduct FoN operations with the United States to challenge China’s expansionism in the South China Sea. If China becomes more aggressive and blocks FoN or seizes territory, development toward an Asian NATO is possible. 相似文献
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对学前儿童进行交通安全教育的直接目的是减少交通事故,保护其生命和身体,同时还具有重要的教育价值。基于教育价值的两个方面即教育的个人价值和社会价值,学前儿童交通安全教育的价值主要体现在对学前儿童的发展价值和以学前儿童为中心扩散开来的延伸价值。发展价值是指交通安全教育促进学前儿童的认知、动作、情意等方面的发展。延伸价值是指学前儿童获得的交通安全知识与意识、规则与行为、尊重与利他等对其成为合格的社会公民是一种自然而然的准备,同时在生态系统理论之下以儿童为中心扩散开来的重要他人、社会相关机构和行业等都会发生相应的改变,将最终有利于社会的进步。 相似文献
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Assessing missile defence through the prism of offence–defence theory requires primarily an examination of legal and structural constraints on future development. New weapons technology is frequently cited as having the most critical impact on the offence–defence balance. Yet, the method for assessing the introduction of a new weapons technology tends to neglect projected maturity and instead focus excessively on the initial rudimentary capabilities. It is argued here that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO’s) missile defence is set to incrementally become more advanced in terms of quality, quantity and mobility, which is supported by a strategy that is increasingly favouring offence. As the system gradually enhances the offensive advantage vis-à-vis Russia, NATO categorically rejects any legal or structural constraints on future deployments. 相似文献
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