基于能力的远程航空通信用频需求获取策略

提出一种基于能力的远程航空通信用频需求获取策略。分析了远程航空通信用频需求获取的基本思路。在此基础上,将远程航空通信用频需求自顶而下划分为任务需求、能力需求、效果需求3个层级,通过对层级进行定义和关系分析,给出基于能力的远程航空通信用频需求获取框架,最后对需求获取准则进行定义,得出一套较为科学有效的远程航空通信用频需求获取流程。     

适用于捷联惯性/星光组合导航的导航星表构建方法

构建满足完备性、精简性和查询快速性的导航星表是实现捷联惯性/星光组合导航系统的重要前提和保证。为了达到这一目标,本文选取天文学中的Tycho-2星表作为导航星表的初始星表,它与TRC星表相比具有明显的优势,在实践运用过程中更加完备。在Tycho-2星表基础上,对球矩形分区方法进行了改进,包括明确了分区及子分区的划分方法,提出了备选导航星的选择策略。实验结果表明,采用改进型球矩形分区方法的备选导航星数量最多只占赤纬带法导航星的19.39%,仅占全天遍历法导航星的3.12%。因此,改进型球矩形分区方法更加精准,查询更快捷,更适用于SINS/CNS组合导航系统。     

一种基于目标的雷达对抗侦察策略

传统的电子战接收系统的搜索方式主要针对参数完全未知的敌方信号,通过在频域、空域等各维度进行大范围的逐段重复搜索可在较长时间内获得较好的侦察效果,但不适合短时间内对特定目标群的搜索和验证。针对电子战接收机存在的盲目侦察接收、与作战目标结合不紧密等问题,提出了一种基于作战目标的侦察策略,能够智能引导超外差接收机进行搜索截获,有效提升了超外差接收机对重点目标的实时截获与准确识别能力。     

职校数学课堂“分层教学”的策略研究

职校的分层教学是根据职校教育的现状、针对不同层次中职学生的实际,在教学目标、内容、途径、方法上区别对待,使不同层次中职学生都能在其已有基础上很好发展的一种课堂教学策略。在职校数学课程改革理念的引领下,通过对学生自身状况的分析、做好中职学生的层次划分、不同备课目标的制定、不同课堂教学的设计、不同层次联系的布置、课后分层辅导的制定、评价等环节,更能展现因材施教的教学原则,对中职学生个性化教育有所帮助,同时,有利于培养中职学生的逻辑思维,改善当前数学课堂教学的情形,增强学生在数学中的应用能力,从而提高数学教学效果。     

粘-弹层合板的阻尼振动和横向应力

应用混合分层理论在板的厚度方向取二次插值函数描述每个数值层内位移沿厚度方向的变化规律,采用三次和四次插值函数描述横向应力沿厚度方向的变化,推导出粘-弹层合板的动力学方程,并得出简支粘-弹层合板自由阻尼振动的解.数值结果不仅与三维结果吻合较好,且能够计算合理协调的横向应力.     

美国军方科研基金资助策略研究(2010—2020年)

美国能够保持军事技术的长期领先与其稳定的军事科研投入和科学的资助策略密不可分,但以往研究存在切入角度单一、关注领域有限、缺少长时间跨领域研究等不足.本文基于Web of Science数据库收录的2010年至2020年美国军方机构参与资助的科研项目文献数据,分析了美军长期关注的主要研究方向和重点研究领域以及美军主要资助...     

一种炮瞄雷达故障诊断专家系统

依据炮瞄雷达故障诊断的需要,提出了一种智能化炮瞄雷达故障诊断专家系统设计方案。探讨了方案的组成,给出了实用诊断策略。     

The Afghan model in northern Iraq

In Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’, as the Coalition's heavy forces fought in the South, in the North a handful of special operations forces, working with Kurdish rebels, clashed with the Iraqi army along the Green Line. In operations reminiscent of those used a year earlier to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, the lightly armed and heavily outnumbered Coalition forces called in air strikes to defeat Iraq's regular and Republican Guard army divisions. This article tells the story of these operations and discusses some of their implications for future US military policy. The success of the Afghan model in Iraq goes a long way toward demonstrating the efficacy of new air-heavy tactics and shows the strategic value of using light indigenous allies to replace heavy US land forces in both conventional combat and occupation operations.     

Westmoreland was right: learning the wrong lessons from the Vietnam War

Fourth Generation Warfare is a theory of contemporary warfare that posits a number of different ideas that are able to shed light on current conflicts. Whilst much of the debate has been concentrated on the linear development of warfare and also on analysis of the current situation of US forces in Iraq, it has resonance for a number of different conflicts taking place in Africa, if only because the US has become involved in contemporary conflicts in Somalia and the Mahgreb. There are clearly significant issues with the US-centric, flawed linear approach to history, but the actual analysis of modes of warfare has much to offer policymakers in a continent that is under-represented in the literature, and is also in danger of being forgotten in the shadow of analysis of Iraq. This paper moves on from criticising the stepped approach to history and looks at patterns of warfare in contemporary Africa, arguing that there is much in the theory that could be used to explain seemingly illogical tactics or patterns, and thus has much to tell policymakers engaged in conflict analysis.

Rebellions can be made 2 per cent active in a striking force, and 98 per cent passively sympathetic.1 ?1. T.E. Lawrence, ‘Science of Guerrilla Warfare’, 1929, published in Malcolm Brown (ed) T.E. Lawrence in War and Peace: An Anthology of the Military Writings of Lawrence of Arabia (London: Greenhill Books, 2005) p.284.      

Unnecessary or unsung? The utilisation of airpower in Britain's colonial counterinsurgencies

Making extensive use of primary archival documents, this article seeks to explore whether airpower in three of Britain's most significant post-war colonial counterinsurgency campaigns, Malaya, Kenya and South Arabia, was an unnecessary part of British strategy, offering little useful military force due to the futility and strategic damage rendered by offensive bombardment, or whether airpower was indeed an unsung factor that provided operational flexibility through its effectiveness in a supply context, as well as its intelligence role in providing valuable aerial reconnaissance. In all three case studies the role played by the RAF in medical evacuations, in troop drops, in crop spraying during food-denial initiatives, and in providing ‘Voice Aircraft’ for the propaganda campaign, provide insights into an under-explored component of Britain's politico-military efforts in counterinsurgency in the 1950s and 1960s and suggests that the main strategic value of airpower in counterinsurgency, then and now, lies in its non-kinetic functions.