整数线性规划问题的一个新算法

本文给出求解整数线性规划问题的一个算法。基本思想是通过求出其伴随线性规划问题的最优单纯形表,把整数线性规划化成正整数系数的不定方程,然后从不定方程的非负整数解集中选取一组满足整数线性规划的约束条件的解,作为整数线性规划的最优解。     

“一体化联合作战”的概念辨析

利用形式逻辑与语言学知识,分析了"一体化联合作战"这一术语组合存在的问题,对"一体化联合作战"和"一体化作战"2术语及概念进行了辨析,澄清了2术语及概念使用中的模糊性.得出了准确把握概念本质必须结合时代特点的基本结论.     

空战模型研究

本文论述了空战一般作战模式厦空战构模特点,并具体构造了一个集团军作战规模的训练用空战模型。利用该模型对不同空战编队的作战效果进行了计算,其结果可用干战术分析。     

KDM 智能车的数学模型研究

本文确定了对载车数学模型构造方法,并试图以KDM-1移动机器人作为实例,用非完整系统力学当作分析工具,通过实验获得模型数据,并由实车行驶进行检验,几个重要参数由仿真试验校核。数学模型的仿真与室内的行车试验相对比的结果比较一致。对同类载车数学模型的建立提供了有效的方法。     

The challenges of Iraq: putting US Army stability operations doctrine to the test

The US Army develops doctrine as a set of fundamental principles that guide its actions in support of national objectives. Recently, those national objectives required stability operations, with increasing scope and frequency. This study examines whether existing US Army doctrine adequately fulfilled its role as a guide to tactics in addressing the challenges that Army forces faced in the first 15 months of the war in Iraq. Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency has remedied many deficiencies, but several remain to be addressed to offer commanders better guidance in the face of the many complex challenges they face in stability operations.     

Controlled warfare: how directed-energy weapons will enable the US Military to fight effectively in an urban environment while minimizing collateral damage

US military operations are increasingly conducted within urban environments and with these operations come the risk of increasing the number of civilian casualties and infrastructure damage. The use of non-lethal weaponry, such as directed-energy weapons, is one method for minimizing collateral damage. This method enables US military forces to effectively fight within urban environments through force escalation capabilities. Using a series of historical examples and future scenarios for urban warfare, this article highlights deficiencies affecting military capabilities in military urban operations, addresses the consequences of collateral damage, assesses the effectiveness of directed-energy weapons in military urban operations and encourages further funding, research and integration of non-lethal weaponry, such as directed-energy weapons, within the US military.     

Did the Panamanian Defense Forces conduct infiltration operations at the Arraijan Tank Farm in 1988?

This article reviews the circumstances surrounding a relatively obscure and almost forgotten US Marine Corps and Army security enhancement operation undertaken in Panama that commenced in early April of 1988. Marines were sent to Panama to protect oil and ammunition storage facilities from potential saboteurs. By April 1989 they had reported sighting armed, uniformed intruders on at least 43 occasions and receiving gunfire or discharging their own weapons during 16 incidents. Yet despite the repeated barrages of small arms fire over the course of a year, they failed to recover enemy ammunition, bodies or body parts and their own equipment and positions displayed no signs of suffering from hostile fire. This article analyzes the events from the point of view of a veteran of the operation and highlights the role that psychological operations may have played in generating the situation.     

The missing dimension: IDF special operations forces and strategy in the Second Lebanon War

In the course of the 2006 Lebanon War the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) employed special operations forces (SOF) for raids against Hizb'allah's command and control structure. This article argues that a faulty conceptualization of the value of special operations and misguided expectations determined by the new IDF concept of operations impacted adversely on the employment of SOF for this kind of operations. Both these elements contributed in turn to substantially degrade SOF performance in the context of the war.     

Contents and Author Index,Volume 20, 2013

The United States has multiple nuclear detection initiatives to secure against a terrorist nuclear attack, including the Container Security Initiative, installation of radiation detectors at U.S. border points of entry, and establishment of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). The current nuclear detection system architecture falls short of being able to reliably catch fissile nuclear material in transit, specifically shielded Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Plutonium (Pu), both within the US and abroad. Checkpoints at border crossings can be circumvented, and no adequate system is under development to deter the transport of fissile materials. Using nuclear link-budget calculations, we show why a network relying primarily on handhelds, fixed detectors, and portals is not sufficient. We examine the technical, economic, and operational feasibility of a comprehensive national network incorporating in-vehicle detectors to reliably detect and deter the transport of fissile material inside the vehicle itself.