多目标模糊微分对策

多目标问题是微分对策研究的一个重要而困难的方面.多目标微分对策是动态向量对策,结合了多目标规划与动态对策,扩大了微分对策在分析冲突问题时解决问题的范围,多具有非线性和不确定性特点.为避免非线性带来求解上的困难和处理不确定信息等,基于T-S模糊微分对策思想,构造出多目标微分对策的模糊线性化模型,然后在模糊线性多目标微分对策系统下对控制器的设计方法作出探讨.对一个1∶2对策问题做了仿真,其效果说明了解决问题方法的可行.     

New product introduction against a predator: A bilevel mixed‐integer programming approach

We consider a scenario with two firms determining which products to develop and introduce to the market. In this problem, there exists a finite set of potential products and market segments. Each market segment has a preference list of products and will buy its most preferred product among those available. The firms play a Stackelberg game in which the leader firm first introduces a set of products, and the follower responds with its own set of products. The leader's goal is to maximize its profit subject to a product introduction budget, assuming that the follower will attempt to minimize the leader's profit using a budget of its own. We formulate this problem as a multistage integer program amenable to decomposition techniques. Using this formulation, we develop three variations of an exact mathematical programming method for solving the multistage problem, along with a family of heuristic procedures for estimating the follower solution. The efficacy of our approaches is demonstrated on randomly generated test instances. This article contributes to the operations research literature a multistage algorithm that directly addresses difficulties posed by degeneracy, and contributes to the product variety literature an exact optimization algorithm for a novel competitive product introduction problem. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

一种适用于点和区间混合型维度数据集的多维索引

点和区间混合型维度数据集是空间数据库系统和GIS中重要的数据对象.在分析SS树的基础上,提出了一种适用于索引点和区间混合型维度数据集的索引结构--PI树.PI树利用超球划分数据集的多维空间,以提高结点存储利用率,从而降低数据插入时的I/O次数.文章给出了PI树插入、删除和查询算法的形式化描述.理论分析和实验结果表明,所提的PI树性能上总体优于R·树.     

联合补充博弈的费用分摊

就一个仓库、多个零售商,对联合订货费用函数的模型进行分析,给出了一个求解最佳订货周期的多项式时间的算法,且算法的时间复杂性为O（nlogn）。利用文献[8]中的技巧,给出了该库存博弈的核。     

军事欺骗战法分析的数学方法-应用*

针对军事欺骗战法定量分析困难的问题,采用基于贝叶斯统计推断和博弈均衡分析的数学方法,在理论上为解决此难题提供了一种可行的方法.该方法首先定义基本概率矩阵,然后根据贝叶斯原理为交战双方构造用于统计推断的主观概率矩阵,并在由两个主观概率矩阵元素构成的偏序链与实施军事欺骗机会之间建立对应关系,再将此关系推广到基本概率矩阵,即是否存在实施军事欺骗的机会将由基本概率矩阵元素构成的偏序链决定.对理论成果的初步应用表明:通过分析由战场情报信息构成的基本概率矩阵的偏序链,可以科学地运用军事欺骗和反军事欺骗战法.     

改进博弈论的舰载无人机编队协同对海突击目标分配

目标分配问题是UAV自主控制的重要问题。针对舰载无人机编队协同对海突击目标分配问题,首先建立了基于离散动态贝叶斯网络的目标价值评估模型,在此基础上构建了舰载无人机编队的益损值矩阵,设计了舰载无人机编队协同对海突击目标分配的决策函数,提出了一种基于改进博弈论的目标分配方法,为4种不同约束条件下的目标分配问题分别设计了算法。最后对所建立的目标价值评估模型和改进博弈论的目标分配算法进行了实例仿真,仿真结果表明了模型和算法的可行性和有效性。     

The solution to an open problem for a caching game

In a caching game introduced by Alpern et al. (Alpern et al., Lecture notes in computer science (2010) 220–233) a Hider who can dig to a total fixed depth normalized to 1 buries a fixed number of objects among n discrete locations. A Searcher who can dig to a total depth of h searches the locations with the aim of finding all of the hidden objects. If he does so, he wins, otherwise the Hider wins. This zero‐sum game is complicated to analyze even for small values of its parameters, and for the case of 2 hidden objects has been completely solved only when the game is played in up to 3 locations. For some values of h the solution of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations is known, but the solution in the remaining cases was an open question recently highlighted by Fokkink et al. (Fokkink et al., Search theory: A game theoretic perspective (2014) 85–104). Here we solve the remaining cases of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations. We also give some more general results for the game, in particular using a geometrical argument to show that when there are 2 objects hidden in n locations and n→∞, the value of the game is asymptotically equal to h/n for h≥n/2. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 23–31, 2016     

Timing of information acquisition in a competitive environment

This article investigates the impact of timing on sellers' information acquisition strategies in a duopoly setting. Market uncertainty is captured by a representative consumer who has a private taste for the product's horizontal attribute, and both sellers can acquire this information either before (ex‐ante acquisition) or after (ex‐post acquisition) observing their own product qualities. We identify several conflicting effects of information acquisition that vary significantly in its timing and market characteristics. In the monopoly scenario, information acquisition is unambiguously beneficial and ex‐ante acquisition is the dominant option, because it helps a seller not only design the proper product but also craft better pricing strategy. By contrast, when there is competition, information acquisition eliminates the buffer role of market uncertainty and leads to the fiercest production or pricing competition, which makes the subsequent effects of acquisition detrimental, and a seller's payoff is nonmonotonic in terms of its acquisition cost. Moreover, compared with the ex‐ante information acquisition, ex‐post information acquisition normally generates higher sellers' equilibrium payoffs by postponing the timing of acquisition and maintaining product differentiation. Nonetheless, ex‐post information acquisition also provides the seller with greater acquisition incentive and occasionally makes him worse off than that in the ex‐ante scenario. Thus, in a competitive environment, having the option of information acquisition and flexibility in its timing can be both detrimental and irresistible. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 3–22, 2016     

A strategic model for state compliance verification

The theory of directed graphs and noncooperative games is applied to the problem of verification of State compliance to international treaties on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hypothetical treaty violations are formulated in terms of illegal acquisition paths for the accumulation of clandestine weapons, weapons‐grade materials or some other military capability. The paths constitute the illegal strategies of a sovereign State in a two‐person inspection game played against a multi‐ or international Inspectorate charged with compliance verification. The effectiveness of existing or postulated verification measures is quantified in terms of the Inspectorate's expected utility at Nash equilibrium. A prototype software implementation of the methodology and a case study are presented. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 260–271, 2016     

论寓教于乐的教学理念与设计

“寓教于乐”是一种理想的教育教学目标,也是大学教学改革的重点,教育游戏的出现为教学拓宽了道路,实践着“寓教于乐”的理念。通过参阅大量文献资料,对教育游戏的概念与现状进行了阐述,并提出了教育游戏的设计理念与策略,为教育游戏的设计提供指导和帮助。