联合作战的远程火力战法动态分析方法*

用定量动态分析方法开发远程火力战法是联合作战规划中必须解决的重要问题。借助仿真和博弈分析的混合方法,在对博弈效用函数计算的基础上,构建基于识别真目标、假目标以及火力命中目标概率的二人非零和(TPNZS)非合作博弈模型来开发远程火力战法动态分析方法,对两个典型的联合作战远程火力打击战法性能的初步动态分析表明:战场势态的动态变化直接影响定量规划最优战法的结果。     

A sequential partial information bomber-defender shooting problem

A bomber carrying homogenous weapons sequentially engages ground targets capable of retaliation. Upon reaching a target, the bomber may fire a weapon at it. If the target survives the direct fire, it can either return fire or choose to hold fire (play dead). If the former occurs, the bomber is immediately made aware that the target is alive. If no return fire is seen, the true status of the target is unknown to the bomber. After the current engagement, the bomber, if still alive, can either re-engage the same target or move on to the next target in the sequence. The bomber seeks to maximize the expected cumulative damage it can inflict on the targets. We solve the perfect and partial information problems, where a target always fires back and sometimes fires back respectively using stochastic dynamic programming. The perfect information scenario yields an appealing threshold based bombing policy. Indeed, the marginal future reward is the threshold at which the control policy switches and furthermore, the threshold is monotonic decreasing with the number of weapons left with the bomber and monotonic nondecreasing with the number of targets left in the mission. For the partial information scenario, we show via a counterexample that the marginal future reward is not the threshold at which the control switches. In light of the negative result, we provide an appealing threshold based heuristic instead. Finally, we address the partial information game, where the target can choose to fire back and establish the Nash equilibrium strategies for a representative two target scenario.     

对策理论的防空作战决策级融合模型

随着防空C3I系统的发展,防空作战决策的过程较以往更为自动化,用于生成各种作战辅助决策方案的计算机模型也具备随着作战环境改变所表现出一定的自适应调整的特征.影响防空作战决策结果正确性的因素众多,表现这些因素的信息有些是冲突的,为得到更为准确、有效的决策方案,各类冲突信息的处理成为防空作战的核心问题.构造了一种在冲突信息环境下基于对策理论的融合模型,以对策理论的相关算法实现了融合中心各类信息的交互决策.实践表明,这一融合模型能有效地解决防空作战决策中各类信息的综合处理问题,具有一定的实用价值.     

Designing rewards-based crowdfunding campaigns for strategic (but distracted) contributors

In rewards-based crowdfunding, entrepreneurs solicit donations from a large number of individual contributors. If total donations exceed a prespecified funding target, the entrepreneur distributes nonmonetary rewards to contributors; otherwise, their donations are refunded. We study how to design such campaigns when contributors choose not just whether to contribute, but also when to contribute. We show that strategic contribution behavior—when contributors intentionally delay until campaign success is likely—can arise from the combination of nonrefundable (potentially very small) hassle costs and the risk of campaign failure, and can explain pledging patterns commonly observed in crowdfunding. Furthermore, such delays do not hurt the entrepreneur if contributors are perfectly rational, but they do if contributors are distracted, that is, if they might fail to return to the campaign after an intentional delay. To mitigate this, we find that an entrepreneur can use a simple menu of rewards with a fixed number of units sold at a low price, and an unlimited number sold at a higher price; this segments contributors over time based on the information they observe upon arrival. We show that, despite its simplicity, such a menu performs well compared to a theoretically optimal menu consisting of an infinite number of different rewards and price levels under many conditions.     

The timing of contests

We develop a simple model to analyze the timing of contests. When the odds of winning a contest are exogenously given – we show that if either the players discount the future or if the total cost of contest is smaller in the future – there exist subgame perfect equilibria where both players settle, anticipating a contest in the future. With endogenous efforts, the aggregate efforts expanded in a contest are smaller if the contest occurs in the future when the relative effort productivities remain constant or diverge over time, thus creating scope for delay in contests. When the effort productivities converge over time, the total efforts may be greater under a future contest. As a consequence, players either settle over the two periods, or else they initiate a contest immediately.     

中国空间安全形势

随着中国在太空领域的不断崛起,太空地位不断提升的同时,也面临着各种各样的挑战,这些挑战既有源自传统政治领域的大国阻挠,也有来自外太空的人类共同威胁。为了应对这些威胁和挑战,保护中国的太空利益和国家利益,我们需要从多方面着手,多管齐下,以维护日益重要的中国国家太空利益。     

基于合作博弈的智能集群自主聚集策略

以无人车集群系统协同监视再入体着靶过程为任务背景,开展智能集群自组织策略相关技术研究。设计无人车集群执行再入体着靶协同监视的集群行为模式;针对协同监视过程中的集群聚集行为,提出基于合作博弈的智能集群自主聚集策略。各智能体以实现群体聚集为"合作目标",以降低自身能量消耗为"竞争目标",开展博弈;基于微粒群算法规划局部路径,最终使群体系统涌现出聚集行为。仿真实验验证了设计的自主聚集策略的有效性。     

军事云环境下基于动态博弈的资源调度方法

针对军事云环境下联合指挥资源调度优化问题,综合考虑了多部队任务需求,多目标优化,多部队资源竞争等约束条件,运用动态博弈理论及方法,建立并提出了一种基于完全信息扩展博弈的资源调度模型及方法,提高了资源调度效率,兼顾了多部队利益,增加了联合作战效益。最后通过实验验证了其有效性及准确性。     

Decentralized admission control of a queueing system: A game‐theoretic model

Consider a distributed system where many gatekeepers share a single server. Customers arrive at each gatekeeper according to independent Poisson processes with different rates. Upon arrival of a new customer, the gatekeeper has to decide whether to admit the customer by sending it to the server, or to block it. Blocking costs nothing. The gatekeeper receives a reward after a customer completes the service, and incurs a cost if an admitted customer finds a busy server and therefore has to leave the system. Assuming an exponential service distribution, we formulate the problem as an n‐person non‐zero‐sum game in which each gatekeeper is interested in maximizing its own long‐run average reward. The key result is that each gatekeeper's optimal policy is that of a threshold type regardless what other gatekeepers do. We then derive Nash equilibria and discuss interesting insights. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 702–718, 2003.     

Rendezvous search on labeled networks

Two players are independently placed on a commonly labelled network X. They cannot see each other but wish to meet in least expected time. We consider continuous and discrete versions, in which they may move at unit speed or between adjacent distinct nodes, respectively. There are two versions of the problem (asymmetric or symmetric), depending on whether or not we allow the players to use different strategies. After obtaining some optimality conditions for general networks, we specialize to the interval and circle networks. In the first setting, we extend the work of J. V. Howard; in the second we prove a conjecture concerning the optimal symmetric strategy. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 256–274, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10011