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排序方式: 共有172条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
151.
通过结合空降兵师(团)级登岛作战的战术特点,确立了遮断点的单点和联合价值的指标体系,建立了以联盟博弈为基础的兵力分配初步模型,然后以Shapley值作为此联盟博弈的解,结合投放过程中的兵力损耗,得到一个合理的兵力分配方案,从而建立了师(团)级空降登岛作战的兵力分配模型和算法. 相似文献
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153.
Validation of a strategy for harbor defense based on the use of a min‐max algorithm receding horizon control law 下载免费PDF全文
We present a validation of a centralized feedback control law for robotic or partially robotic water craft whose task is to defend a harbor from an intruding fleet of water craft. Our work was motivated by the need to provide harbor defenses against hostile, possibly suicidal intruders, preferably using unmanned craft to limit potential casualties. Our feedback control law is a sample‐data receding horizon control law, which requires the solution of a complex max‐min problem at the start of each sample time. In developing this control law, we had to deal with three challenges. The first was to develop a max‐min problem that captures realistically the nature of the defense‐intrusion game. The second was to ensure the solution of this max‐min problem can be accomplished in a small fraction of the sample time that would be needed to control a possibly fast moving craft. The third, to which this article is dedicated, was to validate the effectiveness of our control law first through computer simulations pitting a computer against a computer or a computer against a human, then through the use of model hovercraft in a laboratory, and finally on the Chesapeake Bay, using Yard Patrol boats. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 247–259, 2016 相似文献
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Ulrich Hendel 《Defence and Peace Economics》2016,27(5):665-687
This paper examines the interaction between a growth-oriented terrorist organization and an uninformed government based on a two-period signalling game. Combining the signalling game and organizational growth approaches of previous contributions, this paper shows that, if a terrorist group follows a growth strategy, it has an incentive to appear weaker than it is by mimicking the behaviour of a smaller organization. Depending on its beliefs about the extent of the terrorist threat, it can be optimal for a government to spend more on second-period counter-terrorism measures if it is not attacked in the first period than if it were attacked. 相似文献
156.
冯琳 《兵团教育学院学报》2016,(3)
教学对话是教师、学生与文本之间实现的智识共享、双向理解和意义创生,达成多重视界的融合。教学中教师的独白、预设的问答以及片面的对话向我们展现的是遮蔽的教学对话。游戏与教学对话有着某种契合,游戏与教学对话的相融,教师、学生和文本之间达成智识共享、共同在场、意义的创生、全面的对话直至多重的视界相融,使教学对话真正走向本真之境。 相似文献
157.
海军兵棋演习系统研究 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
兵棋演习系统是我军未来开展模拟训练的重要手段,针对国内外对兵棋推演系统现状及技术发展趋势进行研究,提出海军兵棋演习系统的发展方向和设计方法,并结合海军兵棋推演的研究内容重点,给出作战规则建模、指挥关系建模等主要关键技术的解决方法,为我国海军未来兵棋推演系统设计、研究和发展提供技术支撑。 相似文献
158.
利用集群搜索对策的理论与方法 ,建立了集群对固定目标的一类搜索对策模型 ,给出了集群的ε -最优搜寻策略 ,并考虑了其在搜索过程中的应用 相似文献
159.
Inventory transshipment is generally shown to be beneficial to retailers by matching their excess demand with surplus inventory. We investigate an inventory transshipment game with two newsvendor-type retailers under limited total supply and check whether the retailers are better off than the case without transshipment. We derive the ordering strategies for the retailers and show that unlike the unlimited supply case, a pure Nash equilibrium only exists under certain conditions. Furthermore, contrary to the conventional wisdom, we show that inventory transshipment may not always benefit both retailers. Although one of the retailers is guaranteed to be better off, the other could be worse off. The decision criteria are then provided for the retailers to determine if they will benefit from the exercise of inventory transshipment. Numerical study indicates that the carefully chosen transshipment prices play an important role in keeping inventory transshipment beneficial to both retailers. Subsequently, a coordinating mechanism is designed for the retailers to negotiate transshipment prices that maximize the total profit of the two retailers while keeping each of them in a beneficial position. 相似文献
160.
This paper analyzes how the equilibrium outcome of social conflict between factions is strategically altered by third-party intervention. We consider an intervening third party that commits financial support to one of two contending factions for reducing its cost in conflict. Within the framework of three-player sequential-move games, we investigate the questions as follows. What is the optimal intervention intensity in terms of the third party’s financial support? Is there a first-mover advantage in conflict when there is third-party intervention? Fighting against all odds, will the unsupported faction have a chance to prevail when its opponent receives third-party support? What is the optimal timing of third-party intervention? The analysis in the paper has implications for the conditions under which the strategic intervention of a third party may or may not break a conflict between factions. 相似文献