军民融合产业创新集群的形成

在军民融合发展战略与创新驱动发展战略深入推进进程中,军民融合产业创新集群成为军民融合产业发展的重要创新形式,其形成问题研究更是对其发展与演化具有重要影响。以军民融合产业创新集群的内涵着手,通过刺激—反应模型与演化博弈模型,分析其形成过程与促进措施。研究表明,军民融合产业创新集群作为复杂适应系统,创新主体的适应性能力及其内在关系是集群形成的关键所在;为使合作创新行为成为演化博弈的稳定策略,从合作创新能力系数和合作创新成本、拥有的创新资源以及政府资金支持三个方面剖析集群形成的促进作用,对军民融合产业创新集群的发展与演化研究奠定基础。     

一种基于博弈论的无线网状网络路由与信道分配联合优化算法

无线网络中的路由与信道分配可极大地影响网络的性能.为了解决无线网状网络中的路由与信道分配问题,提出并研究了一种称为CRAG(基于博弈论的无线网状网络路由与信道分配联合优化)的方法.CRAG采用协同博弈的方式将网络中的每个节点模型化为一个弈者,每个弈者的策略为与其相关的路由与信道分配方案,收益函数为给定流量需求矩阵下的成功传输流量.弈者通过协同博弈来优化收益函数以最大化网络的吞吐量.基于NS3的仿真结果表明,CRAG在收敛性、时延、丢包率和吞吐量方面优于其他当前的算法,从而证明了协同博弈的方法可以用于无线网状网络的路由与信道分配联合优化,并有效地改进网络性能.     

攻击主动防御飞行器的微分对策制导律

基于微分对策理论设计了躲避护卫弹的同时攻击飞行器的制导律。根据传统的性能指标推导了该场景的微分对策制导律,并且根据权重系数的取值定义了三种制导律:最优追赶制导律、逃脱-追赶制导律和复合制导律。最优追赶制导律容易被护卫弹拦截,逃脱-追赶制导律容易造成导弹和飞行器的零控脱靶量急剧增大而使得攻击失败,复合制导律很难选择合适的权重系数。针对以上不足,提出了两种改进的制导律,并对该两种制导律的适用情况进行了分析。通过非线性模型仿真,验证了这两种方法的可行性。该两种制导律目的性强,攻击导弹可以躲避护卫弹进而攻击飞行器。     

多维TCM的编码符号同步方法

针对多维TCM译码中的编码符号同步问题,提出了两种同步方法:累计度量和同步法、回溯初始状态比较同步法。其中累计度量和同步法适用于非完全透明的编码,而回溯初始状态比较同步法对完全透明的编码和非完全透明的编码都适用。它们都直接利用Viterbi译码器的中间结果,计算量少,简单有效。     

军事攻防中的多属性资源分配对策模型

针对资源受限情形下的两阶段攻防资源分配问题,提出一种基于多属性决策的资源分配对策模型。防守者首先将有限的防护资源分配到不同的目标上,继而进攻者选择一种威胁组合方式对目标实施打击。基于博弈论相关知识,模型的求解结果可以使防守者最小化自身损失,使进攻者最大化进攻收益。同时,针对模型的特点,给出了一些推论和证明。通过一个示例验证了模型的合理性以及相关推论的准确性,能够为攻、防双方规划决策提供辅助支持。     

基于非合作博弈的栅栏信息覆盖虚拟节点组合算法

邻近节点通过协作感知和信息融合组成虚拟节点,能够增加信息覆盖栅栏长度.基于非合作博弈模型,设计了一种完全分布式的虚拟节点组合算法DVSF算法.DVSF算法面向栅栏信息覆盖应用,以尽量增加整个网络的信息覆盖栅栏长度为目标,将合适的邻近节点组合成虚拟节点,提升了整个网络的栅栏信息覆盖性能.仿真实验验证了DVSF算法的有效性...     

多舰对抗研究

研究了海上军事实战模式抽象出的一追二和一二对抗的两大问题。解决一追二问题的方法共讨论了三种：初始角的平分线航向法、瞬时角的平分线航向法、中点轨迹法。给出了确定性的数学模型、以及选代计算方法。一二对抗问题的结论可以由—一对抗问题的结论经过迭加而得到。而—一对抗问题的解决是以定性微分对策的双边极值原理为基础展开的。     

New results on a stochastic duel game with each force consisting of heterogeneous units

Two forces engage in a duel, with each force initially consisting of several heterogeneous units. Each unit can be assigned to fire at any opposing unit, but the kill rate depends on the assignment. As the duel proceeds, each force—knowing which units are still alive in real time—decides dynamically how to assign its fire, in order to maximize the probability of wiping out the opposing force before getting wiped out. It has been shown in the literature that an optimal pure strategy exists for this two‐person zero‐sum game, but computing the optimal strategy remained cumbersome because of the game's huge payoff matrix. This article gives an iterative algorithm to compute the optimal strategy without having to enumerate the entire payoff matrix, and offers some insights into the special case, where one force has only one unit. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 56–65, 2014     

A nonatomic‐game model for timing clearance sales under competition

We deal with dynamic revenue management (RM) under competition using the nonatomic‐game approach. Here, a continuum of heterogeneous sellers try to sell the same product over a given time horizon. Each seller can lower his price once at the time of his own choosing, and faces Poisson demand arrival with a rate that is the product of a price‐sensitive term and a market‐dependent term. Different types of sellers interact, and their respective prices help shape the overall market in which they operate, thereby influencing the behavior of all sellers. Using the infinite‐seller approximation, which deprives any individual seller of his influence over the entire market, we show the existence of a certain pattern of seller behaviors that collectively produce an environment to which the behavior pattern forms a best response. Such equilibrium behaviors point to the suitability of threshold‐like pricing policies. Our computational study yields insights to RM under competition, such as profound ways in which consumer and competitor types influence seller behaviors and market conditions. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 365–385, 2014     

Timely exposure of a secret project: Which activities to monitor?

A defender wants to detect as quickly as possible whether some attacker is secretly conducting a project that could harm the defender. Security services, for example, need to expose a terrorist plot in time to prevent it. The attacker, in turn, schedules his activities so as to remain undiscovered as long as possible. One pressing question for the defender is: which of the project's activities to focus intelligence efforts on? We model the situation as a zero‐sum game, establish that a late‐start schedule defines a dominant attacker strategy, and describe a dynamic program that yields a Nash equilibrium for the zero‐sum game. Through an innovative use of cooperative game theory, we measure the harm reduction thanks to each activity's intelligence effort, obtain insight into what makes intelligence effort more effective, and show how to identify opportunities for further harm reduction. We use a detailed example of a nuclear weapons development project to demonstrate how a careful trade‐off between time and ease of detection can reduce the harm significantly.