Optimal control of an M/G/1 queue with impatient priority customers

An optimal operating policy is characterized for the infinite‐horizon average‐cost case of a single server queueing control problem. The server may be turned on at arrival epochs or off at departure epochs. Two classes of customers, each of them arriving according to an independent Poisson processes, are considered. An arriving 1‐customer enters the system if the server is turned on upon his arrival, or if the server is on and idle. In the former case, the 1‐customer is selected for service ahead of those customers waiting in the system; otherwise he leaves the system immediately. 2‐Customers remain in the system until they complete their service requirements. Under a linear cost structure, this paper shows that a stationary optimal policy exists such that either (1) leaves the server on at all times, or (2) turns the server off when the system is empty. In the latter case, we show that the stationary optimal policy is a threshold strategy, this feature being commonplace in most of priority queueing systems and inventory models. However, the optimal policy in our model is determined by two thresholds instead of one. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 201–209, 2001     

导弹集成测试策略研究

以美国军方在武器系统研发、生产和维护过程中推行的设计—制造—维护纵向集成测试策略为参考,针对我国导弹武器系统的测试和诊断技术的应用和发展现状,论述了适合我国导弹测试系统开发的集成测试策略。     

浅析日本太空安全战略

近年来,日本将太空安全视为国家太空战略的首要事项,不断加强太空安全能力建设.成立宇宙作战部队之后,太空安全战略向备战太空走向明显.本文分析了日本太空安全战略由"和平利用"到"保守防御"型再到"攻防兼备"型的演变过程,通过对《宇宙基本法》《宇宙基本计划》《国家安全战略》《日美防卫合作指针》等文件内容进行研判,得出日本太空...     

随舰备件需求分析中维修策略问题

分析了面向任务保障性工程理论指导下的舰船随舰备件配置问题,就最大、最小两种维修策略下随舰备件配置问题进行了研究,给出了面向任务的随舰备件需求分析仿真模型框架,结合算倒,研究了最大维修策略与最小维修策略的适用时机:在任务确定且任务结构函数明确条件下,应采用最小维修策略;否则采用最大维修策略.     

对我国农村环境污染防治对策的系统分析

分析了现阶段我国农村环境污染的主要特点,并对农村环境污染防治的宏观对策进行了系统性分析。由手农村污染严重、防治形势严峻且比城市环境污染情况复杂,在制定农村环境污染防治对策时,需要运用系统工程原理全方位、全过程分析实际情况,制定整体效果最优的系统化对策组合,并注意对策措施的系统性、协调性、连续性和针对性。     

Why did Sudan Lose a small war in Southern Sudan?

ABSTRACT

When on the wrong end of an asymmetry in the projection of hard power, weaker sides countenance the grim arithmetic of avoiding direct and massed confrontations. Invariably, insurgents have over the ages tended to employ indirect tactical methods to render their stronger opponents ineffective. Ultimately – interest asymmetry, regime type, asymmetries of strategy, and external intervention – combine in a complex interplay and pattern, to militate against a strong side. In Sudan, these factors interacted throughout the civil wars to produce regional autonomy and finally an independent South Sudan in 2011. Similar strategic logic had confronted many large African states battling insurgencies in Ethiopia, Angola, Nigeria, Zaire, and apartheid-era South Africa. Oftentimes, weakening public resolve has caused these governments to accommodate, capitulate or withdraw even if they try not to blink. Notwithstanding the regime type, it can be concluded that the majority of strong actors are prone to fail in a protracted, asymmetric conflict. Hence, the notion of linking victory in counterinsurgency to the degree of openness (democratic polyarchies); or closeness (totalitarianism) – is still valid but highly contestable in the case of Africa’s large dysfunctional states.     

Buy now,pay later: American military intervention and the strategic cost paradox

This paper explores the notion that US efforts to evade the political costs of war paradoxically contribute to the subsequent exacerbation of costs over time. Leaders seek to purchase political capital in the short term by limiting the costs and requirements of military operations, but in doing so cause strategic and political liabilities to mount in the long run. While identification of such behaviour is not new, insufficient attention has been devoted to explaining its causes, dynamics, and manifestations in relation to key decisions on and in war. Evidence derived from studies of recent American discretionary campaigns is analysed to advance an argument with respect to this pattern of self-defeating strategic behaviour.     

A search game on a cyclic graph

There is a finite cyclic graph. The hider chooses one of all nodes except the specified one, and he hides an (immobile) object there. At the beginning the seeker is at the specified node. After the seeker chooses an ordering of the nodes except the specified one, he examines each nodes in that order until he finds the object, traveling along edges. It costs an amount when he moves from a node to an adjacent one and also when he checks a node. While the hider wishes to maximize the sum of the traveling costs and the examination costs which are required to find the object, the seeker wishes to minimize it. The problem is modeled as a two‐person zero‐sum game. We solve the game when unit costs (traveling cost + examination cost) have geometrical relations depending on nodes. Then we give properties of optimal strategies of both players. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

Europe,Russia and the Ukraine crisis: the dynamics of coercion

This article analyses European strategy towards Russia during the Ukraine crisis between February 2014 and December 2015, conceptualising it as a coercive diplomatic strategy and analysing the relationship between its ends, ways and means. European strategy sought to reverse Russian intervention. However, this overarching aim was flanked by two ‘constraining’ aims of avoiding an escalation of the conflict and a breakdown of relations with Russia. The strategy shifted between these aims, which proved to be irreconcilable: while the EU partly succeeded in containing the conflict, it failed to reverse Russian intervention and relations between the EU and Russia deteriorated sharply.     

一种基于部分搜索的GNSS模糊度解算方法

为解决LAMBDA算法搜索策略效率不高的问题,提出了一种基于部分搜索的模糊度解算新方法。该方法的解算成功率接近LAMBDA算法,且只需对最后3维模糊度元素采取搜索策略。同时,通过合理设定搜索椭球的大小和搜索策略;大大提高了搜索效率。通过实验对该新算法与Bootraping算法、LAMBDA算法进行了比较分析,进一步验证了该新算法的有效性。