重大自然灾害警卫任务的特点及措施——以四川抗震救灾警卫任务为例

以2008年四川“5·12”地震发生后的抗震救灾警卫任务为例,对重大自然灾害警卫任务的特点进行深入剖析,总结抗震救灾警卫工作经验。探求重大自然灾害警卫任务的方式方法,有利于更好地完成警卫任务。     

在任职教育中开发学员任职经验的探讨

任职教育是在受训学员有着一定的任职经验基础上,提高岗位任职能力的一种短期培训。在教学实施过程中,必须注重挖掘任职经验,交流任职经验,再把经验上升为理论从而去指导部队实践。这种任职经验的开发,有利于在教学过程中按需施教,扩大师生的视野,丰富教学资源,实现理论与实践的统一,有效达成任职教育的目标。     

Natural gas storage valuation and optimization: A real options application

In this article, we present an algorithm for the valuation and optimal operation of natural gas storage facilities. Real options theory is used to derive nonlinear partial‐integro‐differential equations (PIDEs), the solution of which give both valuation and optimal operating strategies for these facilities. The equations are designed to incorporate a wide class of spot price models that can exhibit the same time‐dependent, mean‐reverting dynamics, and price spikes as those observed in most energy markets. Particular attention is paid to the operational characteristics of real storage units. These characteristics include working gas capacities, variable deliverability and injection rates, and cycling limitations. We illustrate the model with a numerical example of a salt cavern storage facility that clearly shows how a gas storage facility is like a financial straddle with both put and call properties. Depending on the amount of gas in storage the relative influence of the put and call components vary. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

Client‐contractor bargaining on net present value in project scheduling with limited resources

The client‐contractor bargaining problem addressed here is in the context of a multi‐mode resource constrained project scheduling problem with discounted cash flows, which is formulated as a progress payments model. In this model, the contractor receives payments from the client at predetermined regular time intervals. The last payment is paid at the first predetermined payment point right after project completion. The second payment model considered in this paper is the one with payments at activity completions. The project is represented on an Activity‐on‐Node (AON) project network. Activity durations are assumed to be deterministic. The project duration is bounded from above by a deadline imposed by the client, which constitutes a hard constraint. The bargaining objective is to maximize the bargaining objective function comprised of the objectives of both the client and the contractor. The bargaining objective function is expected to reflect the two‐party nature of the problem environment and seeks a compromise between the client and the contractor. The bargaining power concept is introduced into the problem by the bargaining power weights used in the bargaining objective function. Simulated annealing algorithm and genetic algorithm approaches are proposed as solution procedures. The proposed solution methods are tested with respect to solution quality and solution times. Sensitivity analyses are conducted among different parameters used in the model, namely the profit margin, the discount rate, and the bargaining power weights. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Military Spending,Conflict and External Debt in Sub-Saharan Africa

The damaging economic effects of the debt crises on Africa in the late 1980s encouraged considerable research on the determinants of external debt in developing economies. Although sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA) debt was cut by two-thirds by 2008, through two debt relief programmes, debt in the region has since been rising at an increasingly rapid pace. This study provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of external debt in SSA over the period 1960–2016, using dynamic panel methods. It also considers two potentially important factors that have received relatively little attention. One is military spending, rarely considered, despite a number of well-publicised scandals over the procurement of unnecessary and expensive high-tech weapons systems. A second, is the possibility that the countries studied have been involved in conflict. The empirical results point to a positive impact of military spending on external debt, but with some evidence of heterogeneity across the countries. Furthermore, findings indicate that the positive effect of military expenditure on debt becomes more marked in countries that have been affected by conflict. These results imply that policies to improve security and reduce military spending could be beneficial in reducing external debt and, potentially, improving economic performance in the region.     

The politics of multinational military operations

Today, few countries fight alone; most fight as allies or partners in multilateral campaigns. The end of the Cold War opened a window of opportunity for multinational military operations (MMOs). These have seen varying degrees of participation, enthusiasm, and success. This special forum is devoted to the politics of multilateral warfare including their formation, maintenance, and durability. The introduction sketches past research and derives some key questions of continuing relevance. The contributions shed light on the domestic and international politics of MMOs, focusing on the implementation of national restrictions and their repercussions for MMOs, party politics of military intervention, the conditions under which states decide to defect from military operations, and the role of junior partners in MMOs. In sum, this forum offers a fresh look at the politics of MMOs, including conceptual contributions to the study of national restrictions, domestic constraints, and coalition warfare.     

On Government-industry Nexus and Indigenous Armed Resistance

This paper proposes a simple game-theoretic framework for analyzing the relationship between the government, industry and indigenous community, especially in the context of mounting violence surrounding displacement of indigenous communities by governments for the purposes of commercial use of their habitat. It specifically takes into account the possibility of alleged ‘nexus’ between the government and the industry and explores its implications on the level of allocation and utilities of the players. We find that the bias in allocation that occurs when the government and the industry enter a ‘nexus’ can be rectified when there is resistance from the indigenous groups. Moreover, rebellion is a dominant strategy of the indigenous community, irrespective of whether there is ‘nexus’ or not, and being in ‘nexus’ with the government is a best response for the industry. The unique SPNE occurs when there is ‘nexus’ between the industry and the government and resistance by the indigenous groups, corroborating the widespread allegations of ‘nexus’ and evidence of resistance worldwide. We also explore a few extensions of the basic model and present some narrative evidence in support of the theoretical model.     

雷达干扰资源一对多分配方法

在对雷达干扰资源分配的一般优化模型和求解算法进行分析的基础上,从提高资源利用效率的角度出发,提出了目标雷达分群思想,并建立了一种新的基于一对多策略的雷达干扰资源分配模型,通过对目标雷达群的一对一分配实现对单部雷达的一对多分配.最后,对该模型中一些关键性问题进行了探讨,如任务整合、新任务参数确定、任务优先级排序、干扰机位置部署以及单目标雷达群干扰效益评估等.     

A genetic algorithm with neighborhood search for the resource‐constrained project scheduling problem

The resource‐constrained project scheduling problem (RCPSP) consists of a set of non‐preemptive activities that follow precedence relationship and consume resources. Under the limited amount of the resources, the objective of RCPSP is to find a schedule of the activities to minimize the project makespan. This article presents a new genetic algorithm (GA) by incorporating a local search strategy in GA operators. The local search strategy improves the efficiency of searching the solution space while keeping the randomness of the GA approach. Extensive numerical experiments show that the proposed GA with neighborhood search works well regarding solution quality and computational time compared with existing algorithms in the RCPSP literature, especially for the instances with a large number of activities. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Technical note: Find a hidden “treasure”

This paper deals with a two searchers game and it investigates the problem of how the possibility of finding a hidden object simultaneously by players influences their behavior. Namely, we consider the following two‐sided allocation non‐zero‐sum game on an integer interval [1,n]. Two teams (Player 1 and 2) want to find an immobile object (say, a treasure) hidden at one of n points. Each point i ∈ [1,n] is characterized by a detection parameter λ_i (μ_i) for Player 1 (Player 2) such that p_i(1 ? exp(?λ_ix_i)) (p_i(1 ? exp(?μ_iy_i))) is the probability that Player 1 (Player 2) discovers the hidden object with amount of search effort x_i (y_i) applied at point i where p_i ∈ (0,1) is the probability that the object is hidden at point i. Player 1 (Player 2) undertakes the search by allocating the total amount of effort X(Y). The payoff for Player 1 (Player 2) is 1 if he detects the object but his opponent does not. If both players detect the object they can share it proportionally and even can pay some share to an umpire who takes care that the players do not cheat each other, namely Player 1 gets q₁ and Player 2 gets q₂ where q₁ + q₂ ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is found and numerical examples are given. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007