The Practice and Power of Firing Broadsides in British Men of War During the Age of Fighting Sail

The development of naval broadside tactics and practice is discussed. The technology of smooth bore ordnance is examined, with an account of naval gunfiring trials. The fundamental purpose of gunnery at sea — damage to ship structure and casualties sufficient to disable an enemy ship — is reviewed.     

舰船装备修理规划方案的DEA分析与优化

运用DEA方法对舰船装备修理规划方案的有效性进行了分析,对非有效单元的改进途径进行了探讨,为舰船修理规划的制定提供了科学依据.     

高海情对反导舰炮命中概率的影响

根据某型反导舰炮配装的舰船摇摆特性及海浪运动数学模型,首先模拟得到高海情舰船摇摆趋势图;然后分析了高海情对反导舰炮射击诸元的影响;其次,采用变换抽样法在高海情射击诸元变化范围内随机产生方位角和高低角增量,通过解6自由度弹道方程计算方位角和高低角增量概率误差,再根据概率误差解算高海情条件下系统的命中概率;最后,对大量的仿真计算结果进行统计分析,得出了具有实用价值的结论,为靶场试验及系统精度设计提供参考。     

舰艇作战系统嵌入式模拟训练技术研究

为了改进传统水面舰艇作战系统训练方式,通过设计舰艇作战系统嵌入式时装模拟训练设备,将该设备与舰艇作战系统设备联为一体,并设计了作战模拟训练的流程,着重阐述了嵌入式模拟训练设备需要解决的关键技术,实现了作战系统嵌入式实装模拟训练,提高了作战系统训练真实程度,增强了训练效果;最后提出了未来模拟训练技术的发展趋势。     

推进舰队舰船装备保障军民融合深度发展

文章就推动装备保障军民融合深度发展,提出应正确把握和领会其基本内涵,客观分析其发展现状,着力解决制约装备保障军民融合深度发展的深层次矛盾和问题,并从创新体制机制、构建管理系统、健全法规标准三方面提出了相关的对策思考。     

“These aren’t the SLOC’s you’re looking for”: mirror-imaging battles of the Atlantic won’t solve current Atlantic security needs

ABSTRACT

Discussion surrounding the announcement of a new NATO Maritime Command for the North Atlantic seems to have settled on the assumption that there is again a vital “sea-line of communication” (SLOC) between North America and Europe as there was supposed to be during the Cold War. The Soviet Union had a large fleet of nuclear and conventional submarines and it seemed very clear that Soviet admirals intended to fight a third “Battle of the Atlantic” in the event of war to prevent Western resupply of NATO. However, this scenario bore no resemblance to what the Soviet Navy actually intended to do in case of war. Changes in technology, notably in submarine propulsion, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and ballistic missile range and accuracy were the real drivers of the Cold War in the Atlantic. Cruise missile-armed submarines that can attack shore-based economic infrastructure are the real threat from the Russian submarine force.     

The U.S. Navy's task forces: 1–199

ABSTRACT

Grouping warships for combat has evolved greatly over the centuries. In the early 1940s, the United States Navy began to group its warships for combat in much more flexible task forces than the previous single-type-of-warship formations. This system has evolved and spread to naval forces ashore but remains fundamentally unchanged. It now covers numbers between 1 to over 1000, of which the most prominent is the first 100 or so which U.S. Navy combat forces use. The numbered fleets worldwide utilize the series covering 20-79; 1-19 and 90-99 appear to be reserved for special allocations and Commander, Pacific Fleet; numbers over 80 to the Atlantic; 100-119 for Northern Europe and briefly Tenth Fleet; the 120 series for Second Fleet as a Joint Task Force leader; the 150 series for Naval Forces Central Command; and the 180 series for Atlantic Fleet and now-Fleet Forces Command.     

What U.S. Navy strategists and defense planners should think about in the era of maritime great power competition

ABSTRACT

For the first time in a generation, the US Navy finds itself in an era of great power competition. As US naval strategists and defense planners begin to organise materially and conceptually to confront the strategic and operational-level challenges posed by China and Russia, what should they keep in mind? What should frame their thinking? Absorbed with the day-to-day tasks associated with managing how the fleet is being built, operated, and rationalised, these busy officers and civilians seldom can step back and gain some perspective on fundamental aspects of the security environment and relate those to naval purpose. To that end, this article provides a primer on what to keep in mind and how to think in an era of maritime great power competition.