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931.
Steve Wills 《Defense & Security Analysis》2020,36(1):30-41
ABSTRACTDiscussion surrounding the announcement of a new NATO Maritime Command for the North Atlantic seems to have settled on the assumption that there is again a vital “sea-line of communication” (SLOC) between North America and Europe as there was supposed to be during the Cold War. The Soviet Union had a large fleet of nuclear and conventional submarines and it seemed very clear that Soviet admirals intended to fight a third “Battle of the Atlantic” in the event of war to prevent Western resupply of NATO. However, this scenario bore no resemblance to what the Soviet Navy actually intended to do in case of war. Changes in technology, notably in submarine propulsion, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and ballistic missile range and accuracy were the real drivers of the Cold War in the Atlantic. Cruise missile-armed submarines that can attack shore-based economic infrastructure are the real threat from the Russian submarine force. 相似文献
932.
Colin D. Robinson 《Defense & Security Analysis》2020,36(1):109-122
ABSTRACTGrouping warships for combat has evolved greatly over the centuries. In the early 1940s, the United States Navy began to group its warships for combat in much more flexible task forces than the previous single-type-of-warship formations. This system has evolved and spread to naval forces ashore but remains fundamentally unchanged. It now covers numbers between 1 to over 1000, of which the most prominent is the first 100 or so which U.S. Navy combat forces use. The numbered fleets worldwide utilize the series covering 20-79; 1-19 and 90-99 appear to be reserved for special allocations and Commander, Pacific Fleet; numbers over 80 to the Atlantic; 100-119 for Northern Europe and briefly Tenth Fleet; the 120 series for Second Fleet as a Joint Task Force leader; the 150 series for Naval Forces Central Command; and the 180 series for Atlantic Fleet and now-Fleet Forces Command. 相似文献
933.
根据通信设备及其网络的特点和通信业务训练的要求 ,提出了层次化结构的仿真训练模型 ,并提供和分析了各层建模方法和编程技术。然后介绍了通信设备及其网络仿真训练系统的典型实例 ,结果表明 :该模型对于建立通信设备及其网络仿真训练系统具有易于代码开发、易于理解、易于维护管理、易于系统功能扩展的特点。 相似文献
934.
Peter Haynes 《Defense & Security Analysis》2020,36(1):101-108
ABSTRACTFor the first time in a generation, the US Navy finds itself in an era of great power competition. As US naval strategists and defense planners begin to organise materially and conceptually to confront the strategic and operational-level challenges posed by China and Russia, what should they keep in mind? What should frame their thinking? Absorbed with the day-to-day tasks associated with managing how the fleet is being built, operated, and rationalised, these busy officers and civilians seldom can step back and gain some perspective on fundamental aspects of the security environment and relate those to naval purpose. To that end, this article provides a primer on what to keep in mind and how to think in an era of maritime great power competition. 相似文献