舰船航渡过程中的松弛时间与航渡策略问题

针对舰船特点和任务要求,提出了舰船航渡中的松弛时间问题。在对问题分析的基础上,给出了松弛时间的定义并对其进行了建模,讨论了航渡失败的判断准则,给出了松弛时间的上下限以及航渡中实际的松弛时间的计算方法,并采用仿真的方法进行了典型航渡过程的松弛时间和成功概率的计算。在大量计算的基础上,初步探讨了航渡成功概率与各类航渡参数之间的关系,并对舰船最优航渡策略问题进行了初步分析,最后对于优化目标、计算初值、结果的表达方式等提出了一个可行的解决方案。     

新一代海军指挥信息系统体系架构

面向新一代海军指挥信息系统,结合海军指挥信息系统的使命,对海军指挥信息系统的发展现状及趋势进行了研究,分析了新一代海军指挥信息系统的发展需求,在此基础上提出了未来新一代海军指挥信息系统的建设构想,分析了系统的动态构建、人机一体以及平行指控等特点。     

舰炮制导炮弹技术风险评估

针对技术风险评价中信息的模糊性和不确定性,提出了舰炮制导炮弹技术风险的灰色聚类评价方法。首先将舰炮制导炮弹研制方案的关键技术进行分解,确定综合评价指标,得到各指标的属性值;然后按照综合评价要求划分灰类,建立白化权函数;最后结合权重采用灰色聚类综合评价方法获得各关键技术所属风险级别及研制方案的综合技术风险值。算例表明,灰色聚类评价方法可将技术风险评价中的模糊和不确定信息定量化处理,能够有效地对舰炮制导炮弹的技术风险进行评价。     

基于模糊综合评价模型的武器研制技术风险分析*

针对舰炮武器系统研制的技术特点和风险分布特征,提出了基于模糊综合评价模型的技术风险分析方法,并结合具体风险因素分析了舰炮武器系统研制技术风险评估的指标和准则。介绍了某型大口径舰炮系统的研制风险分析实例,给出了该舰炮系统研制技术风险的评估结果,验证了该方法的可靠性和有效性。     

多弹种快速供弹系统设计

在研究国内外供弹系统的基础上,借鉴它们的可取之处,通过机构上的综合和创新来建立一个有效的、可行的方案模型,确定供弹系统的结构形式与布置方式,对其进行详细设计,并在Solidworks中建立供弹系统的实体模型。完成了方案的总体结构布置和时序设计。对弹鼓进行了结构和运动规律设计,完成了弹丸的运动过程分析,运用ADAMS对模型进行了仿真验证。为提高舰炮的射速和供弹系统的自动化以及多弹种快速转换能力提供了新的思路与构想。     

The Practice and Power of Firing Broadsides in British Men of War During the Age of Fighting Sail

The development of naval broadside tactics and practice is discussed. The technology of smooth bore ordnance is examined, with an account of naval gunfiring trials. The fundamental purpose of gunnery at sea — damage to ship structure and casualties sufficient to disable an enemy ship — is reviewed.     

基于海军武器装备体系结构视图的能力评估研究

文章探讨了基于海军武器装备体系结构视图的能力评估框架,形成了海军武器装备体系结构视图产品与能力评估的映射关系。首先概述了海军武器装备体系能力及其视图的概念及内涵,然后分析了能力视图与其它视图间的映射关系,构建了由六个能力视图产品为主组成的海军武器装备体系能力视图体系,最后提出一个基于海军武器装备体系结构视图的体系能力评价框架,为海军武器装备体系能力评估的建模方法研究提供了技术基础。     

“These aren’t the SLOC’s you’re looking for”: mirror-imaging battles of the Atlantic won’t solve current Atlantic security needs

ABSTRACT

Discussion surrounding the announcement of a new NATO Maritime Command for the North Atlantic seems to have settled on the assumption that there is again a vital “sea-line of communication” (SLOC) between North America and Europe as there was supposed to be during the Cold War. The Soviet Union had a large fleet of nuclear and conventional submarines and it seemed very clear that Soviet admirals intended to fight a third “Battle of the Atlantic” in the event of war to prevent Western resupply of NATO. However, this scenario bore no resemblance to what the Soviet Navy actually intended to do in case of war. Changes in technology, notably in submarine propulsion, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and ballistic missile range and accuracy were the real drivers of the Cold War in the Atlantic. Cruise missile-armed submarines that can attack shore-based economic infrastructure are the real threat from the Russian submarine force.     

The U.S. Navy's task forces: 1–199

ABSTRACT

Grouping warships for combat has evolved greatly over the centuries. In the early 1940s, the United States Navy began to group its warships for combat in much more flexible task forces than the previous single-type-of-warship formations. This system has evolved and spread to naval forces ashore but remains fundamentally unchanged. It now covers numbers between 1 to over 1000, of which the most prominent is the first 100 or so which U.S. Navy combat forces use. The numbered fleets worldwide utilize the series covering 20-79; 1-19 and 90-99 appear to be reserved for special allocations and Commander, Pacific Fleet; numbers over 80 to the Atlantic; 100-119 for Northern Europe and briefly Tenth Fleet; the 120 series for Second Fleet as a Joint Task Force leader; the 150 series for Naval Forces Central Command; and the 180 series for Atlantic Fleet and now-Fleet Forces Command.