Currency Warfare and Just War: The Ethics of Targeting Currencies in War

ABSTRACT

Is Currency Warfare defined as, the use of monetary or military force directed against an enemy’s monetary power as part of a military campaign, a just way to fight a war? This article explores the ethics of waging currency warfare against the Just War Tradition’s principles of jus in bello (just conduct in war) and its criteria of discrimination and proportionality. The central argument is that currency warfare is inherently indiscriminate but may be proportionate when policy makers consider the nature of the threat confronted and the targeted currency's level of internationalization, that is, to what degree it is used in foreign transactions or used as a foreign currency reserve. I evaluate this argument against historical cases during the Second World War (1939–1945), the Gulf War (1990–1991), subsequent operations against Saddam Hussein in the early 1990s, and the ongoing campaign against ISIS.     

网络舆论智能引导仿真推演模型与系统构建

传统马甲机械发帖的网络舆论引导方式存在智能水平不高、效果不佳的缺点。人工智能的快速发展为网络舆论智能引导奠定了坚实的理论与技术基础。本文突破新闻传播学的思维定式，利用智能体、系统建模与仿真等理论技术，研究网络舆论智能引导，提出“态势感知-仿真推演-舆论引导”的网络舆论智能引导思路，构建网络舆论智能引导仿真推演模型，明确仿真推演工具，进而构建网络舆论智能引导系统，在仿真推演的基础上实施网络舆论引导，从而颠覆传统马甲的机械式发帖引导方式，破解难以在真实网络环境中直接尝试各种引导策略的困局。本文的研究成果对于丰富网络舆论斗争理论，占领网络舆论制高点，具有重要理论意义和参考价值。     

Systems failure: the US way of irregular warfare

ABSTRACT

Since 9/11, the United States has achieved notable gains against al Qaeda, and also Islamic State (IS), all while avoiding another mass-casualty attack at home. Yet, institutionally, culturally, and in its capabilities, the US government remains seriously ill-equipped for the task of countering irregular threats. Partly as a result, Islamist extremism shows no sign of being defeated, having instead metastasized since 9/11 and spread. Why, given the importance accorded to counterterrorism, has the US approach remained inadequate? What is impeding more fundamental reforms? The article evaluates the United States’ way of irregular warfare: its troubled engagement with counterinsurgency and its problematic search for lower cost and lower risk ways of combating terrorism. It suggests needed reforms but acknowledges also the unlikelihood of change.     

The strategic purpose of individual augmentee officers for junior partners in multinational military operations

ABSTRACT

This article examines the strategic purpose of Individual Augmentee Officers (IAOs) for junior partners in multinational military operations through an exploratory case study of Danish IAOs in Iraq and South Sudan between 2014 and 2017. IAOs are individual officers who are moved from their normal functions to be seconded to other units of the armed forces of their own or another country or an international institution. The study concludes that IAOs function as strategically important, yet not necessarily indispensable, supplements to military contingents in several ways: making tangible contributions to the overall mission (contributing), gaining access to information, knowledge, and experience (learning), and lobbying decision-making processes within mission headquarters (lobbying). The usefulness of IAOs depends on whether the junior partner has specific interests and a significant presence in the theatre and whether the mission is conducted as a UN mission, a NATO mission, or an ad hoc coalition.