网络中心战中的协作及其量化模型研究

协作是网络中心战的原则之一.协作的概念及其量化模型是目前网络中心战研究中的一个热点.在详细解释了信息时代中协作的概念基础上,分析研究了协作的维以及网络中心战中的信息域和认知域的协作,指出协作既有利也有弊.进而,将协作的影响简化为协作对完成作战任务的时间上的影响.利用信息熵量化了协作带来的\"正影响\",利用Logistic方程量化了协作带来的\"负影响\",综合这两种影响给出了简化的协作量化模型.最后指出了该模型适用于量化诸如防空作战中的协作等时间关键的协作.     

C4ISR 领域本体研究初探

如何实现C4ISR系统的跨越式发展,是当前的研究重点。本体论作为最新的知识工程化技术,信息系统建设是其研究、应用的重要领域。通过分析C4ISR系统特点及未来军事发展趋势,结合C4ISR系统建设的实际情况,阐述了军事领域开展本体研究的广阔前景,并探求建立C4ISR领域本体库,对本体库的作用及发展过程提出了初步设想,在C4ISR系统建设和本体应用两方面做出了有益的探索。     

The Peninsular War guerrilla and its antecedents: humiliation forgotten,disaster prefigured: the guerra fantástica of 1762

ABSTRACT

The brief war that took place between Spain and Portugal in 1762 is one of the least known episodes in the latter’s military history, whereas, thanks to Wellington’s construction of the Lines of Torres Vedras, the French invasion of 1810–11 is right at the other end of the spectrum. Yet the two episodes are closely linked to one another. At the very least, they are uncannily reminiscent in terms of their details – in both cases substantial foreign armies were vanquished through a combination of irregular resistance, scorched-earth tactics and the clever use of field fortifications – and the article therefore argues that Wellington based the plan that defeated the forces of Marshal Massena on the strategy used by the Portuguese half a century earlier.     

The sources of the Australian tradition in irregular warfare, 1942–1974

This article had its genesis in a background study for the development of a new Australian Army counter-insurgency doctrine. Archival research showed that the Australian counter-insurgency doctrine employed in such post-1945 conflicts as Burma, Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam originated in the jungle campaigns of the South West Pacific Area during World War II. The historical record also showed that the Army's counter-insurgency doctrine, as with its World War II-jungle warfare doctrine, was a pragmatic amalgam of Australian experience and British doctrine. The article traces this process through the development of a series of doctrine manuals. It also considers the contribution of key individuals to both counter-insurgency theory and practice. This distinctively Australian approach to the development of doctrine was responsible for producing a highly successful manual, The Division in Battle: Pamphlet No. 11, Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (DIB 11), which the Army used during its involvement in Vietnam.     

Boko Haram’s increasingly sophisticated military threat

ABSTRACT

This paper evaluates Boko Haram’s military capabilities and details the process of how its standing army, driven by these capabilities, came to pose a phased threat between 2013 and 2015 in particular. This was a period when military fighting dominated the insurgency in north-east Nigeria. Whereas there is an abundance of literature on Boko Haram’s histories and the impact of its insurgency on north-east Nigeria, analysis of Boko Haram’s military campaigning is still deficient. Attempting to fill this gap, this paper uses field findings and battlefield case studies from north-east Nigeria to highlight how Boko Haram’s overt front – its standing army – came to supplant its guerrilla operations as the main security threat to the frontier area.

This pivot towards military fighting, for a group initially composed of a few ragtag combatants, on the surface might seem surprising. Yet, whereas Boko Haram may lack the popular support required for ‘people’s war’, classic insurgency theories nevertheless hold some explanatory power for this deliberate shift: away from guerrilla warfare as the expedient of the weaker side, and towards the use of a large standing army of locals to swarm, and sometimes successfully overrun, state forces.