Killing with Culture: Anthropology’s Ethical Dilemma with War

ABSTRACT

This article highlights the difficulty of creating a code of ethics in anthropology, particularly one that appropriately addresses the nuanced nature of the military and the anthropologists who conduct research and disseminate information in the context of war. The article consults one of the most important books on this topic, George R. Lucas' Anthropologists in Arms (2009), along with several other relevant texts, and examines the ethical complexities and dilemmas American and European anthropologists faced during their involvement in both World Wars, as well as those faced during Vietnam and the more recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The article also examines the military's recruitment of cultural experts, the methods used to culturally engage combatants, and the criticisms against social scientists who choose to work as so-called military anthropologists. The anthropologists in this article risked academic exile conducting what some consider an adulteration of academic principles. The article contributes to the discourse regarding unconventional warfare and the methods used by the armed forces to better understand the cultural nuances of people, and to highlight the need for the development of a better anthropological code of ethics that accounts for the challenges of war.     

Intelligence and military doctrine: paradox or oxymoron?

This article examines the evolution of the current British military joint intelligence doctrine. We argue that military intelligence doctrine is dogged by an intrinsic tension between the ethos and expectations of military doctrine and those of the professional practice of intelligence. We further argue not only that prior iterations of UK joint intelligence doctrine failed to effectively deal with this intelligence doctrine dilemma, but also that measures in the current doctrine to address this problem directly created their own problems. Moreover, as a result, otherwise sound innovations in the current UK intelligence doctrine have proven unsuitable to wider diffusion in more recent intelligence doctrine such as the new NATO intelligence doctrine which, otherwise, draws extensively on its British precursor.     

Slow failure: Understanding America’s quagmire in Afghanistan

ABSTRACT

The United States government has no organised way of thinking about war termination other than seeking decisive military victory. This implicit assumption is inducing three major errors. First, the United States tends to select military-centric strategies that have low probabilities of success. Second, the United States is slow to modify losing or ineffective strategies due to cognitive obstacles, internal frictions, and patron-client challenges with the host nation government. Finally, as the U.S. government tires of the war and elects to withdraw, bargaining asymmetries prevent successful transitions (building the host nation to win on its own) or negotiations.