COOPERATION,SIGNALS, AND SANCTIONS

This paper uses game theory and modeling to address the role of incentive structures and information dynamics in nuclear inspections. The traditional argument is that compliant states should be willing to allow inspections to prove their innocence, while proliferating states are likely to impede inspections. This argument does not take into account the historical variation in inspection, signaling, and sanctioning behaviors. Using a game theoretic analysis and model, it is shown that the separation of proliferators from nonproliferators only occurs when the likelihood of proliferation is high and punishment costs are moderate. The model assumes that states can choose how much to cooperate with inspectors and must pay opportunity or secrecy costs when inspections are effective. The results are tested against a set of real-life cases, providing support for the claims of historical variation and the model's deductive propositions.     

Arms trade,arms control,and security: Collective action issues

This article puts forth collection action as a unifying theme for the conference essays on arms trade, control, and production. For each of these topics, collective action failures are related to group size and group composition considerations. Other issues are also examined including the manner in which individual contributions determine the overall level of the associated collective good ‐ the so‐called aggregation technology of public supply. Based on alternative aggregation technologies, the game‐theoretic underpinnings of these arms issues are explored.     

YOU CAN'T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT

The 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) produced a Final Document calling for an extension of the principles of the nonproliferation norm as well as steps toward complete disarmament. This article looks beyond the rhetoric, however, to examine recent decisions by great powers to expand nuclear trade with non-NPT countries and the implications of these decisions on the traditional nonproliferation norm of restraint. This article seeks to contribute to constructivist theory by supplementing existing accounts of norm creation and establishment with a new model of norm change. The article develops a case study of the 2008 US-India nuclear deal to highlight the role of elite agency in key stages of norm change, including redefinition and constructive substitution through contestation. It concludes that the traditional nonproliferation norm may be evolving in new directions that are not well captured by existing theoretical frames.     

理论背景及应用在复变函数教学中的提升作用

目前,国内复变函数教学普遍存往一些问题：缺乏适合课堂放学的优秀教材,教学手段落后单一．没有结合复变函数课程的特点,考核方式不够合理等突出问题。为适应索质教育釉社会发展的要求,培养学生的应用能力和创新能力,必须调整优化教学内容和体系;并结合复变函数课程自身过于抽象的特点改革教学模式,在复变函数的教学中穿插理论的来源背景及其在各学科中的简举应厢;制定合理的考核形式。     

电力系统电压稳定分析方法及应用

介绍了电力系统电压稳定性的概念及其分类,对电压稳定性的静、动态分析方法进行了介绍和比较,最后综合运用连续潮流法、模态分析法、分岔理论以及时域仿真法对WSCC9节点系统进行了电压稳定性分析,结果表明综合方法能充分利用各种方法的优点,分析的结果是有效可靠的。     

用薄船理论计算方尾军舰兴波阻力的一种修正方法

以薄船理论的马丁法为基础,对船型横剖面面积曲线,加上考虑粘性作用产生的排挤厚度的修正,来计算兴波阻力。结果表明,计算值与试验值吻合较好,尤其是在中高速下,即F_n=0.4～0.7范围内,相对偏差不超过0.5％。在计算某型方尾军舰时,方尾产生的虚长度据试验得到的规律来确定。与其他方程比较,简单方便,且有较高精度。     

时滞细胞神经网络的代数抗饱和补偿设计

针对时滞细胞神经网络,提出了一种基于代数判据的抗饱和补偿设计。运用M矩阵理论、迪尼导数、系统参数设计了无饱和输入限制系统镇定的代数判据。在此基础上,利用不等式放缩原理、分区讨论与大中取大综合方法和Lyapunov理论,得出了二次矩阵不等式形式的抗饱和控制设计方案,进而将之转化为线性矩阵不等式。同时,给出了吸引域及其最大化方法。仿真验证了该设计方案的可行性和有效性。     

一种结合弹道规律的模糊交互式多模型算法

针对交互式多模型算法中转移概率矩阵与实际运动不匹配而影响跟踪精度的问题,通过分析某型导弹的典型弹道,将弹道规律融合到模型概率转移矩阵中,然后将转移概率模糊化处理,提出了一种基于弹道规律的模糊交互式多模型算法,然后以导弹蛇形运动转至比例导引的机动过程为例进行了仿真验证,比较了典型交互式多模型算法和模糊交互式多模型算法的跟踪性能。仿真结果表明:该算法可显著提高导弹机动段的跟踪精度。     

搜索路径给定时的搜索对策问题及其应用

搜索路径给定时的最优搜索方案问题,也可以理解为是关于搜索者和目标的二人对策问题,主要讨论了当搜索路径给定时的单个搜索者和单个目标的搜索对策问题。首先根据问题的特点,利用动态规划和迭代的方法,确定关于目标逃逸路径混合策略的最优分区,证明该分区是多面体凸集;针对目标不同逃逸路径的分区,求出搜索者的最大期望收益,再将问题转化为二人有限零和对策,计算出搜索者的支付矩阵,确定最优搜索策略。最后结合海军护航行动,对我舰载直升机搜索小型海盗船进行分析和计算,说明搜索路径给定时的最优搜索对策对于双方的资源分配和提高搜索效率具有一定的应用价值。