微分对策及其在军事领域的研究进展*

介绍了微分对策的产生背景及其半个多世纪以来的发展历程,简述了国内外微分对策理论发展的几个重要阶段及其标志性成果。全面地阐述了国内外关于微分对策在军事领域的应用研究状况,特别是美、俄等军事强国在微分对策军事应用研究方面的现状以及我国研究人员在该领域的主要研究成果。还进一步论述了微分对策在军事应用研究方面存在的问题,并对微分对策的发展前景做出了展望,指出了微分对策在军事应用领域中的研究热点、难点和主要发展方向。     

联合作战的远程火力战法动态分析方法*

用定量动态分析方法开发远程火力战法是联合作战规划中必须解决的重要问题。借助仿真和博弈分析的混合方法,在对博弈效用函数计算的基础上,构建基于识别真目标、假目标以及火力命中目标概率的二人非零和(TPNZS)非合作博弈模型来开发远程火力战法动态分析方法,对两个典型的联合作战远程火力打击战法性能的初步动态分析表明:战场势态的动态变化直接影响定量规划最优战法的结果。     

非接触空爆对舰艇结构的破坏作用分析

基于非接触空爆理论,对作用于船体结构的载荷进行了分析,并将船体结构简化为板架模型进行了破坏作用的数值计算,计算结果与实际情况相符.     

大型装备费用预测中的系统分析

将大型装备连续建造的总成本及控制变量作为一个变化系统,并用灰色系统理论进行建模分析,采用龙格-库塔法求解微分方程组.通过对精度的分析,指出使用灰色系统预测结果不能采用统计分析方法的相关性检验标准,而要通过预测数列与原始数列的逼近情况来判断其预测精度.     

对地预标定射击原理

以往的对地射击原理一般只针对固定目标、粗略地修正风引起的误差,瞄准精度不高。有鉴于此,目前出现了一种新的对地射击原理,通过用瞄准标志先后两次与运动目标重合,完成目标预标定和瞄准,引入目标的综合速度修正,从而提高了瞄准精度。建立了数学模型,推导出了原理公式,并给出了仿真实例,最后分析了此原理的特点。     

析行政法的平衡论

从行政立法、行政执法、权力手段的淡化、行政救济制度的出现等方面论述了平衡论是现代行政法的精义 ,并阐明了以平衡论指导行政法的重大意义及如何正确、全面看待平衡论。     

基于RS理论的电子对抗装备编配辅助决策方法

根据电子对抗装备编配的主要特点,提出利用RS(RoughSet)理论探索装备编配问题。综合考虑影响装备编配的各种因素,建立起知识表达系统,并且约简得到一些相对简单的编配规则;然后再根据实际情况,结合数学规划方法进行装备编配优化。分析结果表明,运用RS理论,能够较好地用定性与定量的方法解决电子对抗装备编配问题。     

基于改进核极限学习机和集成学习理论的目标机动轨迹预测

为了提高目标轨迹预测的精度以及预测模型的泛化能力,提出基于改进蝙蝠算法优化的核极限学习机(Kernel Extreme Learning Machine,KELM)和集成学习理论目标机动轨迹预测模型.构建KELM模型,并采用改进的蝙蝠算法对KELM的参数进行优化;以优化后的KELM神经网络为弱预测器,结合集成学习算法生...     

A sequential partial information bomber-defender shooting problem

A bomber carrying homogenous weapons sequentially engages ground targets capable of retaliation. Upon reaching a target, the bomber may fire a weapon at it. If the target survives the direct fire, it can either return fire or choose to hold fire (play dead). If the former occurs, the bomber is immediately made aware that the target is alive. If no return fire is seen, the true status of the target is unknown to the bomber. After the current engagement, the bomber, if still alive, can either re-engage the same target or move on to the next target in the sequence. The bomber seeks to maximize the expected cumulative damage it can inflict on the targets. We solve the perfect and partial information problems, where a target always fires back and sometimes fires back respectively using stochastic dynamic programming. The perfect information scenario yields an appealing threshold based bombing policy. Indeed, the marginal future reward is the threshold at which the control policy switches and furthermore, the threshold is monotonic decreasing with the number of weapons left with the bomber and monotonic nondecreasing with the number of targets left in the mission. For the partial information scenario, we show via a counterexample that the marginal future reward is not the threshold at which the control switches. In light of the negative result, we provide an appealing threshold based heuristic instead. Finally, we address the partial information game, where the target can choose to fire back and establish the Nash equilibrium strategies for a representative two target scenario.     

Reconsidering the Legal Equality of Combatants

ABSTRACT

The legal equality of combatants (LEC) is a fixture of international law and just war theory. Both scholars who embrace and those who reject the moral equality of combatants seem committed to the legal equality of combatants. Their reasons usually include pragmatic worries about unjust combatants committing even more harm if they were to be simply prohibited from fighting. In this article I argue that this sweeping commitment to the legal equality of combatants is mistaken and that it is often grounded in a misunderstanding of the way international law governs behavior.